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ONTOLOGICAL PLURALISM AND ONTOLOGICAL CATEGORY

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ABSTRACT

Ontological pluralism is the view that there are different ways of being. Historically, ways of being are aligned with the ontological categories. This paper is about to investigate why there is such a connection, and how it should be understood. Ontological pluralism suffers from an objection, according to which ontological pluralism collapses into ontological monism, i.e., there is only one way to be. Admitting to ontological categories can save ontological pluralism from this objection if ways of being ground ontological categories.

Keywords: *ontological pluralism; ontological category; ways of being; fundamentality.*

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1. Introduction

According to ontological pluralism there are different *ways of being* as well as there are different *beings*. This view is in contrast with the dominant view in the contemporary literature, ontological monism, according to which all entities exist[1] in the same way and all differences are rooted in what these different entities are, rather than the way they exist. Ontological pluralism, in contrast, had been more popular throughout the history of philosophy. Aristotle's slogan "being is said in many ways" and Aquinas's thesis of the analogy of being (1968) are just a few to mention. More recently in the history, Russell, discriminating the way the concrete and the abstract things exist, pronounced that "the relation 'north of' does not seem to *exist* in the same sense in which Edinburgh and London exist" (Russell 1912, 98).

Usually those who endorse ontological pluralism adopt a multi-categorical ontology. Aristotle's categorical distinction between substance and accidents, and Russell's categorical division between *abstracta* and *concreta* are well-known. The association of ontological pluralism and multi-categorical ontology is not a mere coincidence. For instance, Aquinas believed that one can define an ontological category in virtue of "a *special* way of existing. For existing can have different levels which correspond to different ways of existing and define different categories of thing" (Aquinas 1993, 53). Recently, Jason Turner (2010) sets forth this identification as if this is a natural path for a pluralist to go. In the same line, Kris McDaniel (2017, ch. 4) argues in detail that nothing undesirable arises if one identifies ontological categories with ways of being.

Nevertheless, within the contemporary literature around ontological pluralism it is not clear why ontological categories should be *defined* in terms of ontological pluralism. This issue is the purpose of this paper. We believe that the connection between ways of being and ontological categories is integrated with the notion of the generic way of being. Hence, in section 2, we prefer a version of ontological pluralism that admits to the generic way of being. In section 3, we raise an objection against this version of ontological pluralism that we dub 'the collapse argument'.[2]

[1] Following the literature, we use *being*, *existence* and *particular quantifier* interchangeably.

[2] There is an argument, with the same title, raised against quantifier variance, the thesis that there are

As noted in the literature, appealing to the notion of fundamentality can save the ontological pluralism from the collapse argument. At this stage, the issue of the connection between ontological categories and ways of being comes up. In section 4, based on a plausible account of ontological category, we show why and how ontological pluralism can resolve the collapse argument. Our closing remarks depict the tie between ways of being and ontological categories.

2. Ontological Pluralism and the Generic Way of Being

Given that existence should be regimented by means of particular quantifier, every way of being will have its own particular quantifier. Let's assume that there are only two ways of being: abstract and concrete.[3] We will use $\exists_a$ for abstract existence and $\exists_c$ for concrete existence. Given that for every particular quantifier, one can infer a universal quantifier ($\forall x\ \phi x \equiv \sim \exists x \sim \phi x$), consequently, there are two universal quantifiers: $\forall_a$ ranges over abstract entities and $\forall_c$ ranges over concrete entities.

Given the symbolism, ontological pluralism is defined as the following thesis:[4]

(1) For all x ($\exists_a y\ y{=}x \vee \exists_c y\ y{=}x$)

The problem, however, is that in this formulation "for all" can be replaced neither by $\forall_a$ nor by $\forall_c$, because "for all" should range over both *concreta* and *abstracta*. The formulation requires a third *generic* universal quantifier $\forall$ that could range over both categories. By the bi-conditional $\forall x\ \phi x \equiv \sim \exists x \sim \phi x$, there is a *generic* particular quantifier $\exists$ that is the *generic way of being*.

In reaction, McDaniel (2017, 25-30) and Turner (2010, 32-34) suggest that the generic particular quantifier can be defined in terms of the specific ones, and therefore there may be no need for the generic way of being:

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alternative quantifiers that range over absolutely everything (Sider 2007). It is worth mentioning that these two *collapse arguments* are not the same.

[3] We stick with this example till the end of this paper.

[4] The question of how to characterize the thesis of ontological pluralism is beyond the scope of this paper. This issue is discussed in the introduction of McDaniel (2017) and Turner (2021).

(2) $\exists x\ \phi x =_{df} \exists_a x\ \phi x \vee \exists_c x\ \phi x$

Nevertheless, (2) is not still satisfactory since applying $\forall x\ \phi x \equiv \sim \exists x \sim \phi x$ to (2) would result:

(3) $\forall x\ \phi x \equiv \sim \exists x \sim \phi x \equiv \sim (\exists_a x \sim \phi x \vee \exists_c x \sim \phi x)$

Therefore, (1) is equivalent to:

(4) $\sim [\exists_a x \sim (\exists_a y\ y{=}x \vee \exists_c y\ y{=}x) \vee \exists_c x \sim (\exists_a y\ y{=}x \vee \exists_c y\ y{=}x)]$

Indeed, (4) is a trivial truth that both monists and pluralists concede. Consequently, the thesis of ontological pluralism (i.e., (1) that is equivalent to (4)), turns out to be trivial. However, it is not a desirable outcome for pluralists to concede that the thesis of ontological pluralism is trivial. Turner (2010, 32-34) claims that this result is not as undesirable as it seems. However, it seems that triviality is, *per se*, an undesirable feature of any metaphysical thesis.[5]

Another approach, that Turner (2021, 191) in passing suggests, is that an ontological pluralist can accept the generic way of being as part of the naïve and ordinary linguistic activity.[6] This suggestion makes sense, only if there is a precise distinction between the language of ontology (*ontologese*) and ordinary language, and ontological claims should be articulated in *ontologese* rather than in ordinary language. This is a non-starter, however. If ontological pluralists advocate the distinction between ordinary language and *ontologese*, they have to formulate the thesis within *ontologese*; a language that, as they already accepted, cannot accommodate the generic way of being.

At this point, there is a dilemma: either pluralists must acknowledge that they cannot formulate ontological pluralism; or conceding the reduction of the generic way of being to the specific ones, they should admit that ontological pluralism is a trivial claim. A way out of the dilemma is to adopt the generic way of being.[7]

[5] To follow the discussion, see Turner (2010; 2021), van Inwagen (2014) and Mericks (2019).
[6] The same idea is implicitly assumed by McDaniel (2017, ch. 5), too.
[7] This solution to the dilemma has been already developed by McDaniel (2017), Builes (2019), Rettler (2021) Simmons (2022), among others.

3. The Collapse Argument and Fundamentality

The collapse argument is a serious concern that might undermine the intelligibility of ontological pluralism.[8] It is customary to have predicates for abstract and concrete entities, A and C, respectively. Now one can define the specific ways of being in terms of the generic way of being and the predicates A and C as follows (*SD*, for Specific ways of being Defined):

(5) $\exists_a x\ \phi x =_{df} \exists x\ (\mathrm{A}x \wedge \phi x)$
(6) $\exists_c x\ \phi x =_{df} \exists x\ (\mathrm{C}x \wedge \phi x)$

Therefore, ontological pluralism collapses into ontological monism. Put differently, a specific way of being turns into the generic way of being and its relevant category. For instance, one can get rid of the abstract way of being by adopting the genetic way of being and the category of abstracta. Consequently, ontological pluralism is ontological monism in disguise.

To avoid this objection, pluralists might hold that one can define *concreta* and *abstracta* in terms of the specific ways of being, as follows (*CD*, for Category Defined):

(7) $\mathrm{A}x =_{df} \exists_a y\ (x{=}y)$
(8) $\mathrm{C}x =_{df} \exists_c y\ (x{=}y)$

A new problem, however, arises: what is the criterion in virtue of which one could prefer *SD* over *CD* or *vice versa*? The issue is related to a similar question raised in the literature: what is the criterion in virtue of which one could decide which of the three quantifiers ($\exists$, $\exists_a$ and $\exists_c$) is *elite*, i.e. metaphysically privileged?[9]

McDaniel (2017, ch.1) and Turner (2010) propose that appealing to the notion of *naturalness* can help.[10] They argue that if the specific ways of being are more natural than the generic way of being, then the specific quantifiers are the elite ones. Similarly, a moist, like Sider (2009), can

[8] Similar objections against ontological pluralism raised by Van Inwagen (2014) and Mericks (2019).
[9] The term 'elite quantifier' is introduced in Caplan (2011).
[10] The concept of naturalness for properties and objects is introduced by Lewis (1983) and then extended by Sider (2009) to quantifiers as well. McDaniel and Turner employ this extended notion in the present case.

coherently prefer the converse, holding that the generic way of being is more natural than all specific ways of being. Hence, appealing to the notion of naturalness might provide a criterion for deciding which quantifiers could be elite; however, the question of which quantifier is actually elite is not the primary concern.

Even if naturalness provides a criterion of elite quantifiers, the main problem still remains untouched. First, how can naturalness play a role in *definition*? Remember that the original problem was which of *CD* or *SD* has to be preferred. It is worth noting in this context by *definition* we mean *metaphysical reduction*. So, it should be explained what the role of naturalness in metaphysical reduction is. McDaniel can address this question, since he identifies levels of naturalness with levels of fundamentality (2017, ch. 8). As assumed in the literature of grounding, metaphysical reduction can be cashed out in term of grounding relation between levels of fundamentality (Fine 2001; Rosen 2010). Taking this identification for granted, McDaniel could hold that the less natural is reduced to the more natural, since the less fundamental is grounded in the more fundamental. Therefore, naturalness plays a role in definition; however, this role is mediated by fundamentality.

If this is a legitimate way of using naturalness to deal with the problem, it seems that the preferred strategy is appealing to grounding and fundamentality, directly. The original problem is what would be the criterion in virtue of which one could prefer between the two sets of definitions, i.e., *SD* and *CD*. The solution, now, is to see which one is more fundamental: the generic way of being or the specific ways of being. If the generic way of being is more fundamental, a version of monism is true; otherwise, a version of pluralism is more defensible.[11]

The second problem, however, is more pressing. Not only are *SD* and *CD* about ways of being, but also, they are tied to ontological categories, A and C. Now the question is what the relationship between ontological categories and their relevant ways of being could be. Appealing to the concept of elite

[11] Indeed, the question of which definition is preferable can be addressed by appealing to the notion of naturalness *tout court*: as one might define *less natural* in terms of *more natural*. Although this approach is preferable by those who might not be comfortable with the notion of fundamentality, in this paper we offer the solution that is more congenial to the literature of fundamentality as this notion enables us to link *definition* to *metaphysical reduction*.

quantifier, by itself, does not address this question since the main issue is why ontological categories should be defined in terms of ways of being rather than the other way around. As we noted at the outset, this is the question that remained unanswered by McDaniel and Turner, though they believe in the identification of ontological categories and ways of being. In the next part, we attempt to provide an explanation to show why and how ontological categories metaphysically relate to ways of being.

4. Ontological Category and Way of Being

An important metaphysical question, germane to the discussion in hand, is: *what is it to be an ontological category*? A straightforward answer to the question is that ontological categories are the most general partitioning of all entities.[12] Although generality is necessary, it is not a sufficient condition for the characterization of ontological category. If X and Y, for instance, are ontological categories, X$\vee$Y is more general than both X and Y. Therefore, based on the characterization, the disjunction is more eligible to be an ontological category. Hence, more conditions, besides generality, is needed to have an accurate characterization of ontological categories.

Jan Westerhoff (2005) suggests that appealing to the notion of *fundamentality* might help us here. Not only are ontological categories the most general partitioning of all entities, but also they are the most fundamental ones. In this way, the disjunction problem can be resolved, insofar as X and Y are supposedly more fundamental than X$\vee$Y; hence, X$\vee$Y is not an eligible candidate for being an ontological category (Westerhoff 2005, 27-28).[13]

Adopting fundamentally (besides generality) as the sufficient condition for the characterization of ontological categories,[14] we can explain what

[12] There are alternative characterizations of ontological categories as well (see Westerhoff 2005).

[13] Westerhoff (2005, 25-26), as suggested by Norton (1976), takes up an alternative qualification: in addition to be the most general partitioning of all entities, ontological categories should be natural. The qualification solves the disjunction problem since X$\vee$Y is supposedly less natural that X and Y. Due to the argument presented in the previous section, naturalness plays a proxy role in this discussion. Hence, we prefer to merely employ fundamentality and remain neutral about the relationship between naturalness and fundamentality.

[14] Although adding fundamentality to generality can resolve the disjunction problem, Westerhoff (2005, 28-29) believes that this characterization of ontological categories still suffers from a difficulty: in the hierarchy of levels of fundamentality, where is the *cut-off* that discriminates between ontological

relates ways of being to ontological categories. In the previous section, we argued that fundamentality gives us a plausible criterion for the preference between the definitions of the generic and specific ways of being in terms of each other. Here we state that fundamentality can play the crucial role in characterizing what an ontological category is. As a result, the key notion that links ontological categories with the ways of being is fundamentality. To illustrate this issue, let us turn into the concrete/abstract example.

Supposedly, concrete/abstract partitioning is categorical, that is to say this distinction is the most fundamental partitioning of all entities. In addition, there are two specific ways of being associated with these two categories. Now, the issue is whether the specific ways of being is less fundamental than any other ways of being including the generic way of being. Obviously not. For instance, if Dave's favorite things (which include colas, poems and hierarchical sets) enjoy a specific way of being, it is absurd to say that this way of being is more fundamental than the concrete/abstract way of being. If fundamentality explains that abstract and concrete are ontological categories, then that very fundamentality must ensure that the ways that *concreta* and *abstracta* exist are the most fundamental ways to be. Hence, we generally conclude that if there are specific ways of being associated with ontological categories,[15] then the specific ways of being are more fundamental than the generic way of being, *because* of the fact that ontological categories are the most fundamental partitioning of all entities. In virtue of the suggested connection between ontological categories and ways of being, we can overcome the collapse argument against ontological pluralism. *Abstracta* and *concreta* are ontological categories; thus, they are the most fundamental partitioning of all entities. The abstract and concrete ways of being, in effect, are more fundamental than the generic way of being. Hence, *CD* is legitimately and non-arbitrarily preferable to *SD*.

Objection: All said and done is that if ontological pluralism is true, admitting ontological categories can save ontological pluralism from the attack of the collapse argument. The objection is why one should be committed to both ontological categories and ways of being. Whereas

categories and any other partitioning? We believe that this is not a problem for our conception of ontological category since we can coherently maintain that the most fundamentals are actually ontological categories.

[15] This is a return to the historical conception of ways of being as *ways of being of ontological categories*.

monists, who believe in the generic way of being, are only committed to ontological categories. Thus, ontological monism is more parsimonious than ontological pluralism.

Reply: Indeed, ontological parsimony is violated, only if pluralists take ways of being and ontological categories as fundamental. As explained above, ontological categories are defined in virtue of (i.e., metaphysically reduced to) the specific ways of being. So, both the generic way of being and ontological categories are less fundamental than the specific ways of being. In this way, contrary to the advertisement of monism, pluralism is a more virtuous theory. Monists have to take both ontological categories and the generic way of being as fundamental, while pluralists only take specific ways of being as fundamental. Furthermore, ontological pluralism is more *qualitatively* parsimonious than ontological monism, since the latter presumes two kinds of fundamentals (i.e., ontological category and the generic way of being), whilst the former only requires one kind (i.e., way of being).[16,17]

Objection: One might object that McDaniel's theory, on which ontological categories are identified with ways of being (McDaniel 2017, ch. 4), would be more parsimonious than the theory proposed in this paper according to which ontological categories are grounded in ways of being. For illustration, McDaniel's theory posits abstract way of being and *identifies* the category of *abstracta* with the abstract way of being, while according to the theory proposed here abstract way of being is fundamental and the category of *abstracta* is defined in virtue of the abstract way of being.[18]

Reply: It is true that the theory proposed here holds that ontological categories should be *defined* in terms of ways of being, and for us the concept of *definition* is the same as metaphysical reduction. Indeed, one might explain *definition* (metaphysical reduction) as mere identity, while

[16] Considering how terms are used in ordinary language, Tegtmeier (2011) argues that it is a mistake to identify categories with ways of being. It is beyond the scope of this paper to explore this claim. However, even though the objection is in place, it does not affect our project since we already noted that we are not committed to the strict identity between ways of being and ontological categories.

[17] Applying our thesis about the relation between way of being and ontological category to a one-category ontology, like the version of trope theory defended by Keith Campbell (1990), entails that there is only one way to be, i.e., the generic way of being, as we argued that way of being grounds ontological category.

[18] We are especially thankful to an anonymous referee for this objection.

someone else might appeal to the notion of metaphysical grounding to explain this issue. The question of how to interpret this concept, however, is not the main concern of this paper. What we attempted to do here is to show why and how ontological categories should be *defined* in terms of ways of being, and either interpretation is compatible with our proposal. The fact that which interpretation is preferable depends on several factors including explanatory powers, theoretical virtues, etc. For instance, those who defend the mere identity relation between ontological categories and ways of being owe us an explanation about why there is a conceptual gap between ontological categories and ways of being, while if ontological categories are grounded in ways of being, it is more understandable why these two are still conceptually distinct. Therefore, based on parsimony alone, one cannot determine which interpretation is more plausible.

5. Concluding Remarks

According to the collapse argument, ontological pluralism would be ontological monism in disguise. We argued that the collapse argument does not refute ontological pluralism, if it is augmented by ontological categories. Consequently, there is an epistemological and methodological relationship between these two notions: adopting ontological categories makes ontological pluralism less objectionable. Moreover, throughout the paper, we tried to make a new metaphysical connection between these two concepts: ways of being ground ontological categories. The mutual interdependence may explain why these two notions have been integrated throughout the history of philosophy.

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SPECIAL ISSUE
WOMEN IN PHILOSOPHY: PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE

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INTRODUCTION TO THE SPECIAL ISSUE "WOMEN IN PHILOSOPHY: PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE"

Guest Editor

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ABSTRACT

This article is an introduction to the special issue on Women in Philosophy: Past, Present and Future. Over the past decade, there has been increased attention given to the underrepresentation of women in academic philosophy, as well as the lack of diversity in philosophy more broadly. While there has been some progress in the demographics of philosophy, as evidenced by recent surveys and empirical studies, women are still significantly outnumbered by men and disparities persist. This special issue aims to address the ongoing problem of inclusion in philosophy by exploring the contribution of women in the field. The contributors have been given freedom to write on topics they consider important, with the hope of stimulating further discussion and generating new ideas for addressing this issue.

Keywords: *women philosophers; diversity; inclusivity; representation; philosophy.*

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For the past ten years or so the underrepresentation of women in academic philosophy, and the lack of diversity in philosophy more generally, has received considerable attention. Though in the past decade some progress has been made in the demographics of philosophy and different surveys and large-scale empirical studies have recently provided evidence for this, the underrepresentation of women is still regarded as a problem by most people in our field where women are still significantly outnumbered by men and disparities persist. In fact, women are more underrepresented in our discipline than they are in other humanities and, interestingly, many of the STEM disciplines with which they seem to have more in common in this regard.

But this is not news. The fact is that philosophy has always been exclusionary—as Linda Martin Alcoff has put it, our discipline is demographically challenged. The history of philosophy has been comprised of the ideas of (white, cis, Western) men. As a result, the content of philosophy has been very narrowly circumscribed and its canon is small and very resilient. One might think that this is simply because women did not do philosophy—after all, women did not have access to philosophy or education in general—or because whatever they happened to occasionally contribute was not of good quality. But that is not the case. Women did do philosophy as they still do and do well. Nonetheless, what is true is that historically, and until recently, women were given few chances for their engagement to be taken seriously and for them to succeed in philosophy, and women's voices, just as those of other groups in philosophy, were systematically ignored. For instance, it was commonplace for anthologies and university syllabi to not include anything written by women, and conferences and seminars to include few, if any, women.

All this is a problem for a number of reasons—not only reasons of justice but also for reasons that have to do with philosophy itself and its progress. Ultimately, how you define what philosophy is, and by extension what it is not, can affect who is interested in it—both in terms of the audience of philosophy but also in terms of who becomes interested in doing philosophy. By narrowing circumscribing what philosophy is allowed to be, it is becoming irrelevant to a large number of people who feel it does not have a lot to offer in an ever-changing and increasingly multicultural world. However, if we manage to open up philosophy to include more

people and thus more and different ways of thinking and doing philosophy, we can be hopeful since the people and perspectives that have so far been systematically ignored can now become a source of new ideas to be explored.

As a response to the recognition that there has been a long tradition of epistemological injustice towards philosophers who have been systematically marginalized, part of the discussion around the underrepresentation of women in philosophy has focused on incorporating in the discipline the philosophical voices of those who have been ignored. Thus, following Eileen O'Neill's seminal and agenda-setting paper "Disappearing Ink: Early Modern Women Philosophers and Their Fate in History" in 1997, a number of publications have aimed to bring to light the contribution made by women to philosophy both historically and today. Such publications are, either explicitly or implicitly, a statement against philosophical elitism which considers only one tradition, one kind of voice or one kind of method to be of value or conducive to good philosophy. This, in addition to the increasing attention that has been given in the past decade to issues of diversity and inclusivity around the world, has helped to shift the ground a bit and to bring to light the different ways that can keep certain groups underrepresented.

However, showcasing women's work is one part of the response to the problem of representation in philosophy but it is not enough. Another part has aimed at proposing solutions to address the source of the problem. The difficulty here is that though there has been work done on why there is gender inequality in philosophy there is no one agreed upon answer to this question. Indeed, it can plausibly be argued that there are a number of different factors that contribute to underrepresentation. This is one of the reasons why visibility—in the sense of promoting women's work, hiring more women for faculty positions, accepting more women to graduate programs in philosophy and so on—is not enough. We are also now aware that there are systemic structures that make it difficult to recruit and keep women in philosophy and that there are things like bias, stereotype threat and sexual harassment that keep women from enjoying equal status and representation in our field. We are also well aware that the content and the way that philosophy is presented is rigidly gatekept in such a way that many issues that matter to people, and philosophers, are dismissed as not 'real philosophy'.

Given this, what also needs to be addressed is what can be done to further improve the situation for women and other underrepresented groups. A number of suggestions have been made and as a result some good practices schemes have been put together—e.g., in 2014 by the *British Philosophical Association* (BPA) and the UK chapter of the *Society for Women in Philosophy* (SWIP) and more recently by the *American Philosophical Association* and the *Demographics in Philosophy Project*. The aim of such guidelines is to address factors that affect gender inclusion (as well as inclusion of the other, many, underrepresented groups) in philosophy including but not limited to the methods of practicing philosophy, how it is taught, the content of philosophy and the workings of philosophy programs and their practices (e.g., regarding hiring and promotion, the organization of conferences and other events, student surveys etc.).

The aim of this special issue is to continue the exploration of the problem of inclusion in philosophy in the context of ongoing debates of women's contribution in philosophy. With this in mind and with the hope that the ideas presented here will stimulate further discussion and more ideas about what is to be done might emerge, I intentionally left considerable liberty to the contributors of this special issue to write about what they deem important in relation to this topic in the manner they consider appropriate. I asked philosophers to contribute to this special issue their different perspectives on the role and position of women in philosophy both in the past and today in the way they seem fit. The result is an issue with varied and thorough contributions. Some focus on what it is like to be a woman in philosophy, others are empirical studies on the representation of women in philosophy and others focus on what should be done to overcome the current predicament.

Hopefully the papers will encourage further work in this area, serve as a source of inspiration for women to see a future in philosophy and also, possibly, encourage new ways of doing philosophy both in form and in content.

THE PAPERS

Anita Allen opens this special issue with her paper "Vowing Moral Integrity: Adrian Piper's Probable Trust Registry" on the award-winning work of art, *The Probable Trust Registry #1-3*, by the artist and analytic philosopher Adrian Piper. Piper undertook a career in academic philosophy when there were few women of any race teaching philosophy full-time in the United States and through Allen's description of the difficulties that Piper faced in her career we not only get a sense of the serious problem of inclusivity in our field, but also of the narrowness of how philosophical work must be presented. Beyond an insightful analysis of Piper's work and her historical importance to the field of philosophy, this paper, in which Allen argues that Piper's work is catalytic, affirming and informed by philosophy, offers an important perspective on Piper's experiences and achievements, as a black woman philosopher, within philosophy but also without it. This paper, which also incorporates Allen's personal perspective, will be of interest to philosophers, especially in the fields of aesthetics and social justice, to scholars interested in issues surrounding gender representation in various disciplines as well as scholars working at the intersection of race, gender, and philosophy.

In their paper entitled "Women philosophers in communist socialism: The case of Croatian women philosophers in years 1945–1989" **Ivana Skuhala Karasman and Luka Boršić** focus on the position of women philosophers in the Socialist Republic of Croatia (SRC) during the period 1945–1989 in order to assess whether communist socialism was better for women in academia than capitalism. Presenting empirical and historical data, the authors argue that the number of publications authored by women in SRC are significantly higher than in contemporary philosophical journals in the (capitalist) West and correspond roughly to the number of publications by women today in the world's leading philosophical journals. They also argue that the percentage of women faculty in the Socialist Republic of Croatia corresponds to the percentage of women today at universities and institutes in capitalist countries, including present-day Croatia. This piece is probably the first paper tackling the question of women philosophers in Croatian communist socialism empirically and thus offers an original contribution to debates in a number of disciplines regarding the position of women philosophers in the Socialist Republic of Croatia.

Sherri Lynn Conklin, Michael Nekrasov, and Jevin West in their paper "Where are the Women: The Ethnic Representation of Women Authors in Philosophy Journals, by Regional Affiliation and Specialization" document the continuing underrepresentation of women in philosophy globally by presenting systematic data on the publication rates of women in philosophy journals from 1950 through 2020. Though there have been other studies documenting the representation of women in philosophy this piece covers a range of international journals making international comparisons—in contrast with other studies that focus on North America—and systematically compares how authorship gender in philosophy compares to that of several other disciplines since the 1950's. The authors find that not only are women underrepresented in philosophy compared to other academic fields as they have been for decades, but they also highlight the fact that the gender publication gap is not limited to North America and Western Europe but exists beyond prestigious journals and the U.S. context. This paper also addresses previous methodological issues and contributes to the literature on gender publication and philosophy both in terms of improving the methods of this research and by providing key findings that require further research.

In "Vices, Structures, and Explanatory Pluralism" **Ian Kidd** addresses through vice epistemology the phenomenon of resistance to understanding and responding to the demographic problem, that is, to attitudes and behaviors that tend or intend to resist attempts to understand and respond to the problem of the underrepresentation of certain groups in philosophy. Kidd proposes a plausible and attractive analysis to the demographic problem and defends 'explanatory pluralism'. His main claim is that in order to understand such resistance to efforts to improve things for women in philosophy we don't need to choose between either individual-level or structural-level explanations. Rather, we need a methodology that includes both individual and structural-level explanations—that is, vice and structural explanations that are mutually entailing—and Kidd offers a way to balance them using Dillon's critical character theory.

Rebecca Buxton and Lisa Whiting's "Women in Philosophy: What Is To Be Done? Interrogating the Values of Representation and Intersectionality" is a highly compelling paper that calls for philosophy to do more in terms of diversifying the field. Looking at levels of employment,

publishing, and sexual harassment in philosophy Buxton and Whiting focus on representation and intersectionality and identify the problem facing philosophy as both one of lack of ambition and one of attention. They ultimately argue that philosophy as a discipline is uniquely well-positioned to think through the marginalization suffered by women and other minorities but that more radical steps towards inclusivity need to be taken if things are to change. In order for that to happen, it is necessary to address the multiple disadvantages that many women face that go well beyond the domain of gender alone.

Suki Finn in "Being-from-Birth: Pregnancy and Philosophy" also claims that though progress has been made in both descriptive and substantive representation of women in philosophy, there is still a long way to go. Finn discusses the case of pregnancy as a topic that is significantly under-explored and under-analysed in philosophy arguably because of its (near-universal) association with women. Though she does not want to make the essentialist claim that there is a correlation between this and the underrepresentation of women in philosophy, Finn tackles both in an original combination of arguments in an attempt to redress both imbalances.

In the closing paper of this special issue, "Is Consciousness Gendered?", **Sophie-Grace Chappell** argues that consciousness is gendered since the political and physical realities of being female and male, as well as masculine and feminine, are distinctively different. Chappell moves from Nagel's question of what it is like to be a bat, to what it is like to be a man or woman and in her discussion highlights core concepts of consciousness, subjective points of view, and the private/public distinction. She brings together the political dimension of any discussion about consciousness with gender or sex by linking oppression and perception and, by also addressing the question of what it is like to be transgendered, she introduces her own experience to make the case that there is something distinct in consciousness. In arguing thus, she brings forth another way, other than just the question of inclusion, in which gender matters to philosophy.

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VOWING MORAL INTEGRITY: ADRIAN PIPER'S PROBABLE TRUST REGISTRY

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ABSTRACT

The artist and analytic Kant scholar Adrian Piper has been aptly described as "one of the most important and influential cultural figures of our time". The award-winning work of installation and participatory performance art, Probable Trust Registry: Rules of the Game #1-3, implicitly poses philosophical questions of interest to contractarian philosophy and its critique, including whether through an art installation one can execute a genuine, morally binding commitment to be honest, authentic, and respectful of oneself. Especially for audiences who closely identify with her experiences, Piper's artwork, like that of other important artists, has powerfully catalytic ethical potential. Motivated by admiration for the artist and a perceived conflictual relationship between women of color and conventional discourses of moral solidarity, I offer three different ways to understand Piper's Probable Trust Registry. I suggest that Piper's thought-provoking artwork, which implicitly nods at John Rawls and Charles Mills, can be interpreted as asking its audiences to agree to selections from a menu of rules that, in the alternative, embrace universal moral imperatives, predict future moral integrity, or vow moral integrity.

Keywords: *art; aesthetics; Adrian Piper; Charles Mills; conceptual art; performance art; contractarianism; critical race philosophy; Black Women Philosophers.*

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1. Introduction

This essay is about an award-winning work of art, The Probable Trust Registry #1-3, by the artist and analytic philosopher Adrian Piper (Museum of Modern Art 2018/2, 308-09). Piper has been aptly described as "one of the most important and influential cultural figures of our time" (Butler and Platzker 2018, 7). An installation and performance, The Probable Trust Registry #1-3 implicitly poses philosophical questions. The questions include this one: whether through an art installation one can execute a genuine, morally binding commitment to be honest, authentic and respectful of oneself, and whether if one can, when presented with the opportunity, one ought to. I argue that, in the case of Piper's work, "no" is the answer. Nonetheless, especially for audiences who closely identify with her experiences, Piper's artwork has powerfully catalytic ethical potential.

The ability of the Registry to bring about real moral change for the better in her audiences, is not undercut by the piece being a tongue-in-cheek comment on the well-rehearsed limitations of the social contract tradition in western moral and political philosophy (Silvers and Francis 2005, 40), advanced by Piper's Harvard mentor John Rawls and numerous others. Nor is the ethical potential of encountering The Probable Trust Registry #1-3 undercut by the dimension of irony apparent when the work is viewed from the perspective of the Jamaican-American philosopher Charles Mills's much-cited postulate of a "racial contract" among White peoples to exploit and subordinate non-White peoples (Mills 1997, 11). Because Piper is of mixed-race European, African and Indian descent (Piper 2018) and grew up "colored" in Harlem, cunning resides in her installation's invitation to her largely White audiences to declare allegiance to live by *her* Rules of the Game.

Piper's artwork stimulates philosophic reflection about whether anyone ought to be willing to embrace superficially race-neutral and benign-sounding commitments that establish moral codes for the regulation of behavior that may not in practice serve all racialized communities equally. Against the backdrop of historical Eurocentric racism, colonialism, and subordination, is it reassuring that White people will "mean what they say" and "do what they say they are going to do" and "be too expensive to buy"? Are such moral Rules of the Game stacked against non-Whites—ultimately

against the famed Kant-inspired artist herself, even? Before addressing her art through my proposed lenses, it is essential to say something about the artist, to situate her in the fields of philosophy and contemporary art.

Piper's Importance

> "[B]eing important to myself does not make me important *tout court*, and nothing can—not your attention, or help, or concern, or sympathy, or generosity, or interest, or vehement denial of what I am saying here. The pain I have inflicted on others and that they have inflicted on me does not even come close to counting on the scale of corruption and mutual degradation we inflict on one another; the agony we are now used to ignoring, so as to protect the small comfort and happiness we occasionally manage to extract from being trapped in these porous, leaky, badly designed physical shrines to planned obsolescence. (…) So you need not read any further."
>
> -Adrian Piper (2018)

Adrian Piper is a renowned artist and philosopher. She was born in 1948 and brought up in the majority African-American Harlem section of New York City. Piper has said that she "inherited" her analytical bent of mind from her father, a Jesuit-educated lawyer and son of a lawyer (Piper 2019, 106-107). Piper attended the now-defunct New Lincoln School, a private, progressive, racially integrated institution. At New Lincoln she was exposed to the Black Civil Rights Movement and to the ideas of Mahatma Gandhi and Indian philosophy (Piper 2019, 107). One of Piper's great-grandmothers was a native of India (Piper 2019, 107).

While in art school and college in New York City, Piper began to establish a reputation as an innovative conceptual artist (Lippard and Piper 1972, 76). Piper simultaneously emerged as a gifted student of philosophy. After college, she was admitted to Harvard University, from which she received a PhD in philosophy in 1981 under the supervision of John Rawls (Piper 2019, 113). Concerning Rawls, Piper has written:

> my admiration for the majesty and ambition of John Rawls's project in *A Theory of Justice*, of anchoring a substantive social contract theory in value-neutral methodological principles already established in the social sciences, was unbounded. I knew that this was the way I wanted to do philosophy. (Piper 2019, 110; Rawls 1971)

Despite an early epiphany that she wanted to do philosophy the way John Rawls did, her path in philosophy little resembled Rawls's. Piper would blaze her own unique path. She has made important contributions to art history and theory (Piper 1993, 1996, 1996/2). Her greatest contribution to academic philosophy is a two-volume self-published book, *Rationality and the Structure of the Self* (Piper 2013). As described by the American Kant scholar Paul Guyer, Piper has executed:

> a monumental work in meta-ethics and moral psychology inspired by Kant, but dealing decisively with the history of a considerable portion of twentieth-century moral theory along the way. The work consists of two volumes, the first a critique of a "Humean" approach to its subjects and the second the defense of a "Kantian" approach. (…) Piper surveys numerous versions of "Humeanism", including not only the paradigmatic version of Richard Brandt but also, no doubt controversially, the "instrumentalism" of none other than John Rawls (…). [T]he gist of her criticism is that any purely preference-based conception of practical rationality (…) allows for no realization of a stable, unified self acting over time. (Guyer 2018)

Otherwise described, by Richard Bradley, Piper's philosophical magnum opus is a book that:

> seeks to establish the basic principles of what she calls transpersonal rationality, the form of rationality constitutive of the Kantian conception of the self. Transpersonal rationality is governed by principles that require us to transcend our personal preoccupations and interests and focus on those that apply to all in equal measure. In contrast the rival Humean conception of the self, the main foil for her argument, draws on an egocentric form of rationality directed at the instrumental fulfilment of the agent's desires but not at their content. (…) [O]ne important strand of her argument, [concerns] (…) the interpretation of formal decision theory and its concepts and principles. Piper's position on this question is both very interesting and unorthodox. (Bradley 2018)

For reasons beyond her substantive contributions to aesthetics, moral theory and Kantian scholarship, Piper has historical importance to the field of philosophy.

At a time when there were few women of any race teaching philosophy full-time in the United States, the brilliant Piper boldly undertook a career in academic philosophy. When she obtained a PhD in philosophy in 1981 Piper became only the sixth U.S. woman racialized as African American to do so. She was preceded by Joyce Mitchell Cook (Yale University PhD), Angela Davis (Humboldt University PhD), Naomi Zack (Columbia University PhD), Laverne Shelton (University of Wisconsin PhD) and me (University of Michigan PhD). In 1979, before her PhD had been formally conferred and seemingly foretelling a bright future in philosophy, Piper obtained a tenure-track position as an assistant professor of philosophy at the top-ranked University of Michigan.

Piper did not move up the ranks at the University of Michigan. Following a tenure denial by Michigan—which had never tenured any woman philosopher—Piper relocated to Georgetown University. There she was tenured in 1987, becoming the first African American woman to be voted tenure by an American philosophy department (Piper 2019, 117; Romano 2013). After a brief, subsequent stint on the faculty of the University of California-San Diego, Piper was hired as a full professor with tenure by Wellesley College, an elite women's college near Boston, Massachusetts, thus becoming the first African American woman to be granted a full professorship in Philosophy. At Wellesley she taught ethics, Kant and Indian Philosophy. Following battles with the school over fair employment and breach of contract issues, Wellesley took the extraordinary measure of revoking Piper's tenure (Cherix et al. 2019, 319-322). Piper permanently left the United States, moving herself and the Adrian Piper Research Archive Foundation to Berlin.

2. Piper's Escape to Berlin

Piper's move to Berlin was, in her words, an "escape" (Piper 2018). By leaving the country of her birth, Piper escaped subjection to the pathologies of institutionalized academic philosophy, graduating to the status of an

"emeritus" member of the American Philosophical Association. Suggested by a work of art that Piper gifted to me and my husband Paul Castellitto before she left the United States,[1] the artist may have felt unfree prior to leaving America—surrounded by hostile and indifferent people, and constrained from being her best self. The artwork in question is a pencil drawing on yellow legal paper. It depicts a naked black female angel, contained rather than in flight, her wings vibrating in express frustration. The angel is imprisoned behind lines printed and drawn on the page, like the slats of a Venetian blind through which she peers from a realm she is unable to escape. I view the imprisoned angel as Piper herself: its lean nude torso recalling that of the young Piper in the self-portrait *Food for the Spirit* (1971), photographically self-capturing her own materiality (Larson 2020).

Despite her importance as a pathbreaking teacher and scholar, Piper describes her overall experience in academic philosophy as a disaster: a "sustained descent (…) into the ravine, down in flames, and out of the profession" (Piper 2019, 106). Less dramatically, Piper has reported never feeling fully accepted by her philosophy colleagues in the United States. Her methods and ideas weren't the standard mix. "To the self-identified continentalists, I was the analytic enemy in Kantian clothing; whereas to the Humeans, I was the Kantian enemy in analytic clothing", she has written (Piper 2018, 112).

Problems Piper encountered in the field of philosophy—indignities, internecine squabbles, narrow-mindedness, bias and sexism—were not unique to Piper. They are reminiscent of those experienced just a few decades earlier by other pioneering women philosophers at Oxford and Cambridge. Philippa Foot, Elizabeth Anscombe, Mary Midgley and Iris Murdock sought to break the mold, rigorously defending the meaningfulness and possibility of moral philosophy and spiritual life against extremes of logicism, empiricism, and positivism, embraced by leading male lights, including A. J. Ayer and R. M. Hare (Lipscomb 2022). (I once harbored similar ambitions, reflected in my New College of Florida undergraduate thesis (Allen 1974), which discussed Rudolf Carnap and the rejection of metaphysics by the Logical Positivists.) Similar to

[1] Adrian Piper, Untitled, 1992, pencil on yellow ruled paper, 12 1/2" x 8" inches, (AP/N-11-D). In the Collection of Anita L. Allen and Paul V. Castellitto.

the philosopher Iris Murdoch who turned to fiction and essay writing (Clark 2019), Piper achieved greater worldly success, more intellectual and spiritual freedom and better health outside of the strict confines of academic philosophy, in the broader world of arts and letters. On the basis of her experiences in the United States and given the vibrancy of the arts in Berlin, Piper's joyful "escape" is understandable.

Since Piper's departure from the United States, there have been positive developments for women and people of color in academic philosophy worth noting. There is now a critical mass of Black women philosophers. A "Collegium of Black Women Philosophers", convened by Dr. Kathryn Sophia Belle, has been a unique scholarly and wellness community for Black women for more than a decade (Gines 2011). In 2019 Charles Mills and Linda Alcoff mounted a two-day conference at the Graduate Center of the City University of New York entitled "Black Women Philosophers", devoted to displaying the contributions of seventeen American Black women in academic philosophy. A first for a Black woman, in 2018 I was elected President of the American Philosophical Association's (APA) Eastern Division. Another first for a Black woman, in 2021 I was awarded the American Philosophical Association's highest prize for service to philosophy and philosophers, the Philip L. Quinn Prize. Sadly, achievement and accolades have not completely shielded Black philosophers from abuse. As recounted in an interview with George Yancy published in the *New York Times*, shortly before I began as APA President, I was sexually harassed by a senior white male philosopher suffering from professional jealousy and frustration, who wrote in email to me that he brought my face to mind when he masturbated (Yancy 2018). Less than a year after someone viciously interrupted an online memorial service for Charles Mills attended by more than a hundred of his family members, friends and colleagues with rude noises and shouts of "nigger, nigger" and other hate speech, a Zoom presentation I was making on racial discrimination by Big Tech online digital platforms was similarly interrupted.

3. Art World Eminence

Piper's body of original, analytically rigorous writing in philosophy has not elevated her to an exalted status within American academic philosophy.

However, artwork—rich with philosophical learning, meaning and implications—has raised Piper to an exceptional status in the contemporary art world. Her artwork, much of which could be described as conceptual art, performance art or meta-performance art (Costello 2018), is exhibited all over the globe. It was comprehensively exhibited by the Museum of Modern Art (MOMA) in New York in a massive March 31-July 22, 2018 retrospective, "A Synthesis of Intuitions, 1965-2016". As one commentator explained, Piper's was the largest MOMA show ever mounted for a living artist and "[w]hatever mechanisms of recognition might have previously failed, Piper has finally gotten her well-deserved due from museum curators and art historians" (Allan 2020). Piper, who refuses to return to the United States, did not see the MOMA retrospective in person (Williams 2018). Piper's artwork—which can affirm and confront—variously explores with philosophical acumen racialized and gendered identities. But more broadly and as importantly, her art delves into the cutting edges of perception, rationality, emotion, spirituality, authority and moral respect.

Piper narrates a history of modern and contemporary art that would situate her, alongside Sol LeWitt, as an artist for whom the idea of art has primacy over its "medium of realization" (Piper 1993, 577). Piper's early work helped catapult a late 1960's movement wherein "the self-reflexive investigation of concepts and language themselves" are the "primary subject matter of art" (Piper 1993, 577). The aspiration of contemporary art, Piper has suggested, is to spirit one away from the comfortable world of "universally communicable judgments of taste" and "into the deep regions of the mind", the realm of "unsynthesized intuitions" (Piper 2018/2, 78).

Piper has argued in an essay entitled "The Real Thing Strange" that Kant was unwittingly committed to the existence of unsynthesized intuitions as a part of human experience (Piper 2018/2, 84). Some "appearances we recognize as unified objects"; others, the unsynthesized intuitions, we "merely intuit as spatiotemporally unrecognized presences" (Piper 2018/2, 84). An idea sharpened through her engagement with Kantian theories of judgment and rationality, unsynthesized intuitions are the "unfamiliar things and happenings and states and presences that confound and silence the mind and decompose the ego" (Piper 2018/2). Piper's artwork produces experiences of anxiety, confusion and bewilderment that push art audiences to become more watchful, alert and self-aware.

I want here to focus on one such example of Piper's remarkable body of artwork, The Probable Trust Registry: Rules of the Game #1-3 (2013). For me, this art installation and performance piece is striking for the ways in which it creates a slick, eerily familiar, yet unfamiliar physical and psychological space that, like the best analytic moral philosophy—but without its attendant tendentious logics and epistemologies—encourages hard thinking about the nature and modalities of our moral obligations and commitments to ourselves and other people.

4. A Registry of Moral Integrity

> "Cultivating a direct an unmediated relation to unsynthesized intuition on its own terms is not a sufficient condition for finally understanding it. But it is a necessary condition. It is necessary to seek out that anomalous presence beyond the edge of awareness that defies integration into conscious experience."
>
> -Adrian Piper (2019)

The Probable Trust Registry: Rules of the Game #1-3 (2013) (hereinafter "Registry") is a philosophical puzzler. The artwork won the top prize at the 2015 Biennale Venezia-Biennale Arte. It was displayed at the Hamburger Bahnhof Berlin in 2017. A version of the Registry was included as the final work on display in the 2018 MOMA Art retrospective exhibition in New York. The Registry's impact is an indivisible admixture of art and philosophy, a critical instigation for reflection on the language of moral performance (Austin 1962), and its social aims.

The Registry presents as participatory performance art. The material components of the artwork are an "Installation plus Group Performance", consisting of three sets of embossed gold vinyl wall texts on greyish white walls, three sleek, circular reception desks, each desk staffed by a well-groomed, professional-looking administrative receptionist, contracts, signatories' contact data and self-selected members of the public. The receptionists are performers whose role is to facilitate the process of participation by the self-selected art audience members who become what I will term "audience-participants" in the artwork when they approach the reception desks. To be included as Probable Trust registrants, the audience-participants sign and date a contractual "Declaration," and sign a digital

data registry with their contact information, committing on the spot to one or more of the statements spelled out in the vinyl wall texts. The statements are the "Rules of the Game":

A.1 I will always mean what I say.
A.2 I will always do what I say I am going to do.
A.3 I will always be too expensive to buy.

What is the game for which these are the rules? There is no education provided by the artist or exhibitor as to the meanings, interpretations or contexts of the three rules. The statements ("rules") are treated as if they are self-explanatory. For anyone who understands English, the statements are intelligible, yet it is likely different audience members understand the statements somewhat differently, against the background of their own experiences. When I first encountered the artwork, I read the statements from the perspective of my familiarity with western moral philosophy as statements concerning the requirements of moral integrity. Meaning what one says, is a matter of authenticity. Doing what one says one is going to do, is a matter honesty. And being too expensive to buy is a matter of self-respect. A person of moral integrity strives to be authentic, honest and self-respectful. My knowledge of the artist from time we spent together on the faculty of Georgetown University and during a resultant ten-year friendship led me to also read the three statements as representing high ideals of moral integrity to which the artist herself subscribes and to which I believe she wishes that others, myself included, more widely subscribed.

As the art world knows, there is whimsy, irony and layered meaning in Piper's artwork—it's hard to know when she is to be taken at face value. Funk Lessons, really? Moral integrity is clearly not a game for Adrian Piper the philosopher. Piper tongue is nonetheless often in the artist's cheek. The business-like attitude, faux legalism and professionalism of its expensive-looking set-up might lead an audience-participant to understand the Registry as an artwork, but/and a serious vehicle through which they can follow a sincerely intended prompt to make a genuine, morally binding commitment. The Registry potentially throws its naïve and sophisticated audiences alike off-balance, transporting them to that realm of what Piper calls "unsynthesized intuition", wherein they are presented with something they do not have the capacity immediately to understand through their

normal frames—a sleek reception desk invoking a corporate office space at which they agree, not to pay for a hotel room or purchase insurance, but to be a good and perhaps, better person. Thus here, as she often does, Piper "directs her work toward individuals, presenting them with unexpected circumstances designed to bring to awareness—and to challenge—standard ways of perceiving and responding to others (Altshuler 1997).

What is the value of playing along (or, for that matter, going along) with Piper's performance in this instance? There is worth in reflecting about whether one can and should publicly subscribe to one or more of the Rules of the Game. An audience-participant might consider, what is in it for them to publicly subscribe; or they might assume they and/or the world would be better off if they and others in implicit solidarity committed at the Registry to following the Rules of the Game. And there are a range of other possibilities.

Audience-participants are told that, using the information they supply, at the close of the exhibition they will be sent a confidential copy of the registry of signatories and thereby learn the other signatories' identities. If they wish to contact a fellow signatory upon learning their name, they agree to do so only through the art exhibitor, which will release contact information only with a signatory's explicit permission. Note that audience-participants are free to supply fictitious contact information, which some might do for the sake of privacy or in the spirit of make-believe (Walton 1993). Yet the representation that follow-up information comes with registration, could prompt those desiring continued engagement to supply truthful contact information. The original Registry documents are purportedly archived with the Adrian Piper Research Foundation archive and sealed for 100 years.

Some audience-participants likely perceive themselves in the spirit of play as *pretending* to accept the prompt to ascribe to the moral integrity statements, and *pretending* to believe they will be contacted in the future with information about whom else signed on. Yet the promise of follow-up appears to have been genuine. At the MOMA exhibition of the Registry in New York City, my adult daughter Ophelia Castellitto signed on to Rule A.2 (I will always do what I say I am going to do.) On the last day of the MOMA exhibit, July 22, 2018, she received via email a beautifully

formatted list of names purporting to be a list of the other people who signed on to Rule A2. We wondered whether the list was fictitious; each signatory could easily have been sent a list of names on which their name appeared along with numerous fictitious names. Despite promising to contact other signatories only through the exhibitors, my daughter and I discussed that one could use social media to attempt to verify (and even contact) the other signatories.

5. The Authority of Art

An artist who can induce someone to yield personal data and make a moral undertaking in the context of an art installation demonstrates the authority of art, and the receptiveness of the art public to authority. Rebellious or skeptical art audience members may have resisted Piper's bidding to subject themselves to her authority. In "The Humming Room", another of Piper's works appearing in the MOMA show, audiences are told by signage that they must hum a tune of their choosing to enter a gallery whose entry-way is guarded by a person dressed as a law enforcement officer (Cherix 2018). The Registry illustrates that the ability to exercise persuasive authority extends beyond the trappings of police power to the artistically rendered trappings of institutional bureaucracy, beyond *sotto voce* melodies to the guts of rational ethical imperatives.

Ought one yield to the authority asserted by an artist and her artwork? A similar question arises in a comparable context. In a "Founders Hall" gallery of the National Constitution Center in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, visitors walk among life-size statutes of the men who signed the original 1787 United States Constitution. The visiting public is also invited to "sign" the Constitution. Many visitors do precisely that, a public act of patriotism and loyalty to a flawed social compact (Allen 1999). Some visitors to the National Constitution Center might prefer not to endorse the 1787 document, which explicitly condoned human slavery, denied women the right to vote, and granted unequal political rights to indigenous North Americans. For a time, visitors signed by adding their signatures to the pages of big books of such signatures, and were given an index number that would enable them to locate their signatures in those books in the future. Later, signatories who provided contact information were sent

certificates stating that they had signed the Constitution. For a while there was a book that visitors to Founder's Hall could sign to voice dissent from the original Constitution. But the option to dissent in writing no longer exists. To dissent one simply declines to sign. Although it is not a work of fine art, I mention the "Founder's Room" because, like Piper's Registry, it potentially raises the question of whether one can or should seriously endorse a set of values by signing a document in an exhibition space. Yet I doubt that more than a few visitors take the signing invitation at the National Constitution Center as much more than a fleeting opportunity to express patriotism or patriotic dissent, a source of learning and fun suitable for a middle-school or family outing. Piper's Registry is contemporary fine art that succeeds in taking us someplace deeper.

Because Piper is famously and integrally an analytic Kant scholar, former mentee of John Rawls and student of the contractarian tradition in western moral and political thought, I surmise she was fully aware that her artwork poses—rather than begs my questions. What is the possibility of moral commitment through engagement with art? What is its advisability? I would argue that art spaces—installations, galleries, museums—are places in which genuine moral commitments of all sorts can be made, and that encountering an artwork such as the Probable Trust Registry can have the impact of a deeply meaningful ethical catalytic change experience even though it is unlikely that the performance artwork can itself bind its participating audiences to moral integrity. Toward describing how and why for me the Registry was a catalytic agent for me, as a Black-identifying woman philosopher, I want to distinguish three ways to understand what the Probable Trust Registry invites its audiences to do.

6. Three Interpretations of the Probable Trust Registry

> "One reason for making and exhibiting a work is to induce a reaction or change in the viewer. The stronger the work, the stronger the impact and the more total (physical, psychological, intellectual, etc.) the reaction of the viewer. (…) Separating the work from the artist (…) gives it independent status as an artwork but decreases its potential strength as a catalytic agent."
>
> - Adrian Piper (1996)

Rich with potential as a catalytic agent, there are at least three ways to understand what the Probable Trust Registry invites those who encounter it to do. First, one could understand the Registry as a vehicle for acknowledging a set of transpersonal, universal moral integrity imperatives that are the rules everyone ought to live by. Second, one could understand the Registry as a way of making and sharing with others a prediction about one's future moral conduct, where moral integrity is predicted. Third, and most compellingly, the Registry could be understood as calling upon audiences to make, and share that they have made, a moral integrity vow, in solidarity with others.

a. Interpretation One: Universal Imperatives

The Registry could be interpreted as asking its audiences to participate in acknowledging the existence of three moral imperatives. On this interpretation, the egocentric "I will" statements really convey a set of "universal prescriptions" (Hare 1963), pertaining to each of us and signaling our common expectations of consistent adherence:

B.1 Everyone ought to always mean what they say.
B.2 Everyone ought to always do what they say they are going to do.
B.3 Everyone ought to always be too expensive to buy.

Though tempted by the Registry, an audience-participant might nevertheless hold back from signing up to subscribe to these three statements interpreted as directions about what *every* moral agent *always* ought to do. Indeed, a moral philosopher might advise against signing onto B.1, B.2 and B.3. The statements are not just categorical; they are arguably, *too* categorical. That is because it is easy to imagine situations in which one *ought not* mean what one says, *ought not* do what one says one is going to do, or *ought not* be too expensive to buy. Sometimes politeness, tact or diplomacy requires that we not mean what we say. And sometimes we ought not do what we say we will do, because we should not have said we would do a particular thing in the first place, or because circumstances have materially changed. Suppose one is kidnapped and held for ransom by a violent gang. Flattering the kidnappers, falsely promising not to call the police if released by the kidnappers, and asking one's family to pay a ransom to the kidnappers could be the key to survival. In the unusual instance of needing to escape

crime victimization a person would be ethically justified in not meaning what they say, doing what they say, or being bought.

Furthermore, moral growth sometimes requires that we abandon what we may have said we would do. For example, a newly self-aware person P who understands that they are beneficiaries of what Charles Mills calls the "racial contract" might well wish to begin to do better by nonwhite persons, by violating B.1 and B.2. Mills would argue that historically what many privileged White people have said they are going to do is to exploit and subordinate a population "whose intrinsic savagery constantly threatens reversion to the state of nature, bubbles of wilderness within the polity" (Mills 1997, 83). Person P would violate B.1 by giving only lip service to racism and B2 by abandoning exploitative commitments and arrangements expected of them.

That there are plausible exceptions to moral imperatives is a detail that Piper could fairly assume her audiences know implicitly how to accommodate. Think of how Americans commonly regard moral undertakings. When they take the traditional marriage vow to love and cherish another in sickness and health, until death, most know that the vow does not require that they remain in the clutches of a spouse who is physically abusive. The Registry, the work of a nonwhite woman, is best interpreted to assume the actual social, political and economic background conditions of immorality, criminality, racism and inequality that are the contexts of our moral lives. The moral philosopher invited to participate in the Registry might quickly conclude that Piper's three statements embody at best only *prima facie* principles of integrity not absolute action guides. The imperatives one ought to embrace would look more like this:

> C.1 In most instances, everyone ought to mean what they say.
> C.2 In most instances, everyone ought to do as they say they are going to do.
> C.3 In most instances, everyone ought to be too expensive to buy.

b. Second Interpretation: Predicted Futures

Next, the Registry could be interpreted as asking audiences to become audience-participants who make and register a prediction about their own

future conduct—about what they ("I") will do in the future, inducing mutual trust:

D.1 In the future, I will always mean what I say.
D.2 In the future, I will always do what I say I am going to do.
D.3 In the future, I will always be too expensive to buy.

This predicted future interpretation is suggested by the fact that Registry is entitled a "probable" trust registry. Some audience-participants will believe they are already effective moral agents and who will continue lives of moral integrity—hence the prediction. For others, experiencing the artwork is a potential catalyst for greater moral integrity—hence the prediction. Trust is always about the future. Yet no one can say for sure how the vaunted trust will pan out.

The predicted future interpretation faces an important difficulty. There is no distinct content in or context for the artwork to prompt the artwork's audiences to make predictions about their future moral integrity—authenticity, honesty, and self-respect. Seeing a set of sleek desks in a museum or art gallery is unlikely all by itself to prompt formally registering a prediction about one's future conduct.

Arguably, the audiences' understandings of the overall global context and societal ills could prompt accepting Piper's invitation to register predictions about future conduct. Yet mindful of the context of political conflict, inequity, suffering and peril, some art audiences might more easily embrace invitations to make contextually specific predictions such as, for example:

E.1 In the future, I will become an anti-racist.
E.2 In the future, I will reduce my carbon footprint to slow climate change.
E.3 In the future, I will help secure clean drinking water and medicines for the poor.

Piper's contextually non-specific A.1, A.2 and A.3 or their predicted futures interpretative variation D.1, D.2 and D.3 might fail to touch the hearts and minds of her most morally engaged audiences.

Arguably moral integrity predicted in Piper's A.1, A2 and A.3, also predicts successful moral conduct foretold in my E.1, E.2 and E.3. Audiences thus might assume that by predicting general future moral integrity, they are also predicting an overall better moral future relating to contextually specific priorities such as the amelioration of familiar global woes including racism, climate-disaster neglect, and resource inequity. Again, unlike analytic ethics, good art does not need always to spell everything out.

It is when the Registry is experienced in the context of Piper's overall body of work and personal biography that its invitation is most plausibly and powerfully understood as an invitation to predict a future of improved moral integrity. When contextualized in the life and art of Piper, the Registry could prompt its audiences to predict their own moral integrity. Piper has written that: "Separating the work from the artist (…) gives it independent status as an artwork but decreases its potential strength as a catalytic agent" (Piper 1996). In relation to Piper herself, I agree.

Connecting Piper to her artwork increases its potential strength as a catalytic agent, as something that precipitates change. As a Black woman and a philosopher, Piper's work has been for me a powerful catalytic agent. Over time, I have indeed been changed by seeing exhibitions of Piper's work. Experiencing Piper through her biography and her artwork can prompt a person to want to be better (as it seriously has in my case) and could also prompt a person to respond favorably to an opportunity, such as the Registry, to publicly join others in a pledge to do as moral integrity demands in the future (as I did not in my case).

Sometimes Piper's Registry is installed alone, in isolation from her other work. Piper included the Registry in the retrospective of her work exhibited at the Museum of Modern Art (MOMA) in New York in 2018. The comprehensive and retrospective exhibition of Piper's work, dating back to her adolescence provided an optimal context for audiences to learn and grow—and even to predict greater moral consistency in the future precisely as a by-product of seeing the show.

In the MOMA exhibition, the gallery just before the Registry housed emotionally arousing artwork documenting, *inter alia*: the artist's problems with Wellesley College that led to her termination from an historic

tenured full professorship; the artist's disillusionment with the philosophy profession and her country; and the artist's frustration with race and racial identity that led her to declare the end of her identity as a Black person. The Registry was the last artwork in the show, at the show's point of exit. It shared a room with a video of Piper joyfully dancing in the streets of Berlin. Located in an adjacent room before but close to the Registry was a mesmerizing video performance by Piper of prolonged paroxysms of tearful hysteria suggesting the artist had finally reached the end of her ropes. Against the background of such artworks, many of which invoked wrongs of race discrimination and suffering, one might well be moved to predict that, as a result of seeing the emotionally and morally engaging show one would behave differently and better in the future. If memory serves me correct, I signed the Registry at the MOMA exhibit, despite it seeming beside the point, for the sake of encouraging my aforementioned daughter, an art student at the time who attended the exhibit with me, to more fully engage.

Throughout Piper's lifetime, women in academia faced intimidation and punishment for saying what they mean, doing what they say they will do, and refusing to sell themselves short. It is no accident that the cover of the exhibition catalogue book, A Synthesis of Intuition, reproduces an artwork of Piper's in which the image of Professor Anita Hill as a child is superimposed on words representing the kinds of things said to Black women who dare to speak their truth (Cherix 2018). The words include "You are making too much of this", "How do you know?", and "I am mystified by your reaction". At the MOMA, signing the Registry after experiencing a retrospective of Piper's art, could be a way to say to the artist and exhibitor: "You made your point to me; you reached me; I am changed". A Black woman philosopher affirmed by the exhibition, at its end I predicted greater strength to uphold my moral integrity—being frank, sticking to ambitions, and not "selling out"—despite pressures to the contrary. I did not, however, much want to play along, or go along with the Registry itself.

My professional experience with academic philosophy has been more positive than Piper's. Yet it started badly. At the age of 24, I attended my first meeting of the American Philosophical Association (APA), where I interviewed for college and university positions. My ability to do

philosophy was questioned and I was approached out of the blue for casual sex by much older White men, once by none other than John Searle who tried to persuade me to visit his hotel room. (Although I kept my loathsome experience mostly secret until now, John Searle has been publicly accused of sexual harassment by a number of people over the years. In June 2019 he was stripped of his emeritus faculty status at the University of California because of sexual harassment.) My first APA meeting was a thoroughly humiliating experience that left me feeling like a pair of breasts rather than a scholar. Leaving the meeting, I wondered if to be employable, I would have to overlook discrimination and objectification. For a long time, it seemed that I would. I was barely able to describe my experience of that first APA philosophy convention in words. In fact, I produced two collages at the time to convey my reactions in pictures. "Portrait of a Lady Please Take Me with You" (Figure 1), depicted an exotic "fish out of water" seeking acceptance; and "Untitled," (Figure 2), depicted an earnest black woman being interviewed by a distracted White man smoking and sipping a cocktail.



Figure 1. Portrait of a Lady, Please Take Me with You. Paper Collage, 7"x10" (1978). ©Anita L. Allen, 2022. The copyright for Figure 1 is exclusively owned by Anita L. Allen and is not subject to any Creative Commons license.

Figure 2. Untitled. Paper Collage 11½" x 14 ½" (1978). ©Anita L. Allen, 2022. The copyright for Figure 2 is exclusively owned by Anita L. Allen and is not subject to any Creative Commons license.

Piper's work is designed to be a catalytic agent. Over the decades, the catalytic artworks have become more subtle than the in-your-face work of her youth—including Catalyst I, the extremely bizarre performance in which she

> saturated a set of clothing in a mixture of vinegar, eggs, milk and cod liver oil for a week, then wore them on the D train during evening rush hour, [and] then while browsing in the Marlboro bookstore on Saturday night. (Piper and Lippard 1972)

Encountering Adrian Piper's work over the years has more than once prompted me toward greater moral integrity in my professional life, with positive results in leadership, mentorship, and self-esteem. The Whitney Museum in New York in 1990 featured Piper's installation, "Out of the Corner". The work consisted of a gallery installation of 64 identically framed photographs of Black women from *Ebony Magazine* and a video of the artist poised and conservatively attired discussing the irrationality of how Americans assign race. Unused to seeing images of real black women in an art museum, I took special pride in the exhibition and found it affirming, as I imagine other Black female viewers of whatever skin-tone did. Through Piper's arrival, we had all arrived.

c. Third Interpretation: Taking a Vow

The Registry does more than invite the public to acknowledge a set of *prima facie* obligations or to make predictions about their future conduct, perhaps catalyzed by Piper's art and life story. There is a third way to understand the Registry. It asks audience-participants to join others in taking a vow to behave in a certain idealized way in the future. A.1, A.2 and A.3, are accordingly interpretable as:

F.1 I vow to mean what I say.
F.2 I vow to do what I say I am going to do.
F.3 I vow to be too expensive to buy.

Vows can be private. One could take a completely private vow inspired by the Registry—or Piper's other artwork in combination with the Registry—that is shared with no one. If one goes along or plays along with the Registry, the F.1, F.2 and F.3 vow is partly public. The audience-participant will be seen and heard by other visitors in the exhibition space. Administrators at the reception desk will shepherd them through the digital "paperwork" process. If the genuine contact information of the audience-participant is consensually collected, archived for a hundred years and shared with fellow registrants, then data privacy, in the sense of control over personally identifiable information, is waived.

While the future prediction interpretation of the Rules of the Game captures my experience with the Registry, the taking a vow interpretation—a vow that is private and self-directed (vowing privately to oneself) also captures my experience. It would be accurate to say that as a result of encountering Piper's artwork in her retrospective, I both vowed to be a morally better person and predicted that I would be. It would *not* be accurate to say that I either vowed or predicted moral integrity through the act of becoming a signatory to the Registry.

The Registry arguably invites one to take a vow whose public performance communicates to the artist, exhibitors, witnesses, and other registrants that one has made a personal commitment to live in accord with moral ideals of integrity, authenticity, and self-worth. To whom is the vow directed? From one perspective it would appear the Registry vow is personal, directed at

oneself for the betterment of oneself (compare Catholic priestly vows). Yet it is also a communal vow because the Registry invites everyone in the community of art audiences to take the vow. The implication is that if a quantity of individuals take the vow, then a small advance is made toward making the world a better place. The Registry is a vehicle toward solidarity and trust aiming at the common good. The point of the vow is moral self-improvement, and the creation of a more trusting relationship with others. While it could be meaningful to the take the vow privately, the partial publicity and accountability of the Registry could fortify the will against backsliding (akrasia) and bring about a degree of the collective trust.

The Registry incorporates some of the discourse and trappings of contractarianism, but does not and cannot bring about a genuine moral obligation. (I am not sure Piper would agree, but she does not condition the success of her artwork on whether her audiences agree with her.) There is no obligation despite the fact that audience-participants are competent adults who execute an agreement. While it could be argued that the Registry is simply asking people to pledge adherence to one of several principles of everyday morality, the lack of education and transparency concerning the ambiguity of the Rules and the societal background assumptions of the Game undercut the ability of the artwork to effect a genuine agreement creating rights and obligations.

An assumption of classical Anglo-European social contract theory from Thomas Hobbes to John Rawls is that rational, self-interested individuals bind themselves to one another and rules of conduct through acts and attestations because they understand that it is vitally in their self-interest to do so. But historical social contracts, such as the original United States Constitution and Mills's racial contract creating "global European economic domination and national white racial privilege" (Mills, 1997, 31) have often and largely left nonwhite peoples outside of their protections. Some of Piper's contemporary followers will have a bad taste in their mouths about the Game (rigged against some) and its Rules (unevenly applied to some). Does the fact that the Registry is the product of a tolerant, brilliant Black woman mean marginalized people will equally embrace and benefit from participation in her Trust?

Interestingly, the Registry is mostly process. It expressly articulates no terms of a substantive bargain from which participants can expect to benefit in specific ways. A registry of personal vows selected from a menu of three, aptly describes the Registry. As a work of art, the Registry functions to encourage taking a vow to behave in a certain way, and purports to provide a data secure procedural mechanism for vow-takers to know whom else has taken the vow.

The Registry's information-sharing feature fosters a modicum of accountability that also potentially enables registrants know whom they can (probably) trust. This is the good news. The bad news is that billions of people will not have signed the registry. Moreover, as I suggested earlier, in the digital age, information shared with registrants about other registrants' names can be reshared, and also affords means of contact through popular social media and the internet, unmediated by the exhibitors or artist. There is no reason to assume promises of confidentiality and reserve secured in performance artwork would be honored. And, of course, knowing who can be trusted, is also knowing who can be taken advantage of because of their trustworthiness. Viewed realistically, signing the data registry with genuine contact information may hold significant risks of shaming and exploitation. Better to make the vow to oneself, but not sign onto the Registry.

7. Catalyzing Moral Agency and Integrity

The Registry assumes we know what we need to do, we just need a nudge to do it. The Registry is a nudge that trades on the authority of art and the trappings of law, moral contractarianism and organized bureaucracy. The question whether it is possible to make a serious moral commitment or binding obligation in an art exhibition has a direct answer. Of course one can make a meaningful moral commitment in an art space. It is less clear one can make such a commitment through the express prompt of a performance piece.

There is nothing about being in the presence of great art or in a museum or gallery that precludes moral seriousness. To the contrary, art spaces may be as good as some and better than many for moral undertakings. For reasons unrelated to any artwork, an individual who happens to be in an art

gallery might vow to take better care of their health for the sake of a young dependent family by giving up smoking cigarettes. Moreover, being in an art space could inspire a morally significant undertaking inspired by the art itself. For example, being in the Sistine Chapel beneath Michelangelo's glorious paintings might prompt a spiritual reawakening that leads a lapsed Catholic to recommit to her religion. One could make a serious marriage proposal in a museum, and indeed it could be highly romantic to do so in front of a favorite work of art. For example, it could be very romantic for an African American woman to make or accept a sincere marriage proposal in front of the official portrait of former First Lady Michelle Obama at the National Portrait Gallery in Washington D.C. One could also make a serious vow to address one's mental health engaging the vibrant artwork of Vincent Van Gogh; to be a bolder designer while engaging the mind-bending drawings of M.C. Escher; or to be more engaged politically while viewing Pablo Picasso's *Guernica*.

One can make a serious moral commitment in an art gallery, museum or art exhibition space, and genuine moral improvement or moral vows can be catalyzed encountering artwork. I maintain that this happened in my own case viewing Piper's "Synthesis of Intuition" retrospective at MOMA. Yet I do not think the audience-participants who sign on to the Registry should by virtue of their registration alone be understood as making a serious, binding moral vow or commitment of any sort. Some audience-participants will be pretending. Some will play along or go along with the work of art for the sake of recreation or even to express admiring support for the artist. One of the philosophy-trained people who visited the MOMA show with me was deeply moved by some of Piper's work, but is not one to ever "go along" or "play along" with performance art. This individual stood on the sidelines as my college-aged artist daughter and I approached the registration desk. I am not one hundred percent sure I decided to sign the agreement—I know my daughter did. I probably signed using a fake contact information. But for me, by the time I would have signed any agreements, vows inspired by Piper's moral integrity rules had already been taken, privately. The art had worked its moral power. I hope it worked some of its moral power over my exhibition companions, too.

Although a person could make a serious moral commitment of various sorts in an art gallery, museum or art exhibition space, it is not clear that every person can. Someone who has never thought seriously about moral

matters will need more than a single gallery visit to set an ethical course. Just as one Funk Lesson with Piper didn't make anyone into a funky dancer (Cherix et al 2018, 23), one encounter with Piper's Probable Trust Registry doesn't make anyone an informed moral agent whose signature constitutes a genuine act of moral self-obligation in trust and solidarity with others. Signing the Registry doesn't mean an audience-participant has genuinely assumed the burdens of moral integrity, but it could importantly signify that they want to get started on the path to moral integrity. I have made a less modest claim for myself—that encountering the Probable Trust Registry in the context of viewing a sweeping retrospective of Piper's work, combined with knowing the artist's biography, did more than start me on a path, it catalyzed informed, genuine, private vows to be a better person and mentor, and a more resilient academic professional.

8. Conclusion

Motivated by admiration for the artist and a perceived conflictual relationship between women of color and conventional discourses of moral solidarity (Mills 1997; Allen 1999; Silvers and Francis 2005), I have offered three different ways to understand Piper's Probable Trust Registry #1-3, a tongue-in-cheek and ironic engagement with moral imperatives and social compacts. I suggest that Piper's thought-provoking artwork can be interpreted as asking its audiences to agree to selections from a menu of Rules of the Game that embrace universal moral imperatives, predict future moral integrity, and/or vow to act with moral integrity.

I distinguished making a moral commitment in an art space from making a moral commitment expressly prompted by a work of performance art, arguing that the former is possible and the latter unlikely. Piper's Registry process does not effect genuine moral undertakings. But the beauty of art is that one need not insist upon an only way or a best way for all to understand. Three or more meaningful understandings can easily or uneasily coexist in the realms of experience and interpretation. And perhaps there is a perspective I have missed from which the audiences who co-perform Piper's Registry are making genuine moral undertakings whether they ought to make them or not. Piper escaped to Berlin. Maybe there is someplace better for each of us that Piper can help us get to.

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Illustrations:

Figure 1. Anita Allen, "Portrait of a Lady, Please Take Me with You," 1978, paper cutouts, cardboard and ink, 7"x10" (1978). Photo credit and copyright, Anita L. Allen.

Figure 2. Anita Allen, Untitled, 1978, paper cutouts and cardboard, 11½" x 14 ½". Photo Credit and copyright, Anita L. Allen.

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WOMEN PHILOSOPHERS IN COMMUNIST SOCIALISM: THE CASE OF CROATIAN WOMEN PHILOSOPHERS IN YEARS 1945–1989

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ABSTRACT

The text presents an analysis of the situation with women philosophers in Croatia during the communist socialist period (1945 – 1989). The analysis is concentrated on two aspects: receiving doctorate degrees in philosophy and publications. Our analysis shows that during that period, women philosophers were proportionally approximately on the level of today's women philosophers in western countries, including present-day Republic of Croatia by both criteria, i.e. the number of doctors of philosophy and the number of publications. Communist socialism was beneficial for women philosophers in two ways. First, administratively, it removed obstacles from women's employment at universities and scientific institutes. Second, communism and socialism, being themselves philosophical and socio-philosophical doctrines, offered a set of new topics, investigations, and elaborations for further development. These factors made it possible that in Croatia, which at the time was economically and educationally much less developed than most of today's western countries, proportionally the same number of women philosophers had an academic post as today in the western world (including today's Croatia). We also analysed seven major philosophical journals published at the time and found that between 1945 and 1989, in percentage, 15,4% of the texts were authored by women. The proportion of women authorship is 0,2. This is an impressive number if we think that at that time the proportion

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of women authorships was higher than in today's JSTOR, bearing in mind the differences in publication procedures then and now.

Keywords: *women philosophers; communism; Croatia; Praxis.*

1. Introduction

In our paper "Selfless Women in Capitalism?" (Boršić and Skuhala Karasman 2019) we argued that capitalism was not amicable to women. The essence of the argument is as follows: The first premise is that women are (supposed to be) selfless. According to the second premise, capitalism is based on selfishness. From this it follows that capitalism is not a suitable "habitat" for women. Of course, many objections might be raised, and many counterexamples brought against blunt generalizations as these premises might indicate. However, we hope to have successfully argued that, from a broader perspective, our premises accurately capture the essence of capitalism and the traditional role of women, and therefore, our conclusion is justified.[1]

On the other hand, one could ask the opposite question: does it imply that communism and socialism were good for women, provided that communism and socialism are understood as the opposite of capitalism?[2] To ask such a question is by no means new. One of the earliest attempts to answer this question was given in an early book by Barbara Wolfe Jancar, *Women under Communism* (Wolfe Jancar 1978). In the book Wolfe Jancar gave a negative answer to the above question: she argued that communism was not particularly successful in emancipating women. In her words:

> First, Marxism, as an ideology of economic revolution has provided wanting as a conceptual vehicle for feminism (…). Second, a central issue in female liberation, which to

[1] Our argument remains unaffected by the ongoing debate between essentialism and social construct theory. Regardless of whether women are taught to be selfless or have a biological inclination towards it, the conclusion remains unchanged.

[2] Socialism is understood as a broader term than communism: communism is an extreme form of socialism. Moreover, socialism is better understood as an economic system whereas communism as a political system: socialism can exist in a broad spectrum of political systems. In the communist Yugoslavia, especially colloquially, both terms—communism and socialism—were often used interchangeably.

> date no country has resolved, is the nature and scope of the family in industrial society (…). Third, while communism has been successful in implementing the feminist demands of the nineteenth century for women's entrance into the productive work force and public life, it has failed to modify the nineteenth-century program to meet twentieth-century conditions and attitude created by such factors as the threat of nuclear war, the pill, and the impact of technology (…). (Wolfe Jancar 1978, 219–220)

However ground-breaking and loaded with information this book was, it has received mostly mixed reviews: it was accused of historical incompetence and blatantly anti-communist bias (Stites 1979), of "facile generalization" (Ruthchild 1981, 102), and sloppy handling the evidence (Shapiro 1981; Papanek 1980).

Since this publication more than forty year ago, there has been a lot of discussion dealing with the question of how communism and/or socialism treated women. One of the most recent and detailed study is "What has Socialism even done for Women?" by Kristen Rhogheh Ghodsee, a University of Pennsylvania based anthropologist and "ethnographer of Eastern Europe"—who has dedicated a significant part of her career to this question—and her former student, Julia Mead (Ghodsee and Mead 2018). Their recent and lengthy publication gives a detailed overview of several aspects of women's position in former communist states. Here we shall quote some relevant conclusions of their research.

> Indeed, other surveys conducted across the region before 1989 confirmed the idea that even if their husbands could support them, women wanted to work at least part time. The problem was that in many countries, women were forced to work full time, and women's income was necessary to meet a family's needs. Women were also concentrated in sectors of the economy that weren't paid as well as those dominated by men. Men and women did receive equal wages if they held the same positions, but women were often funnelled into agriculture and light industry or concentrated in white-collar and service professions such as law, medicine, accounting, and teaching. Men went into mining, construction, engineering,

and other physical or technical jobs more highly esteemed in the planned economy. Finally, the state-socialist policy of granting women extended maternity leaves—and the fact that mothers were almost always the ones to stay home when children were too sick to attend school—meant that men were more likely to be promoted into higher managerial and executive positions. Men were only imagined as workers, not parents, but women were always seen as both workers and mothers. (…) Although women were concentrated in less well-paid sectors of the economy, their jobs guaranteed them access to housing, education, health care, paid vacations, kindergartens, and their own independent pension funds. Furthermore, in some countries women could retire five years earlier than men in recognition of women's domestic labors. (Ghodsee and Mead 2018, 115–6)

Although the socialist state never fully eradicated patriarchy in the home, or explicitly dealt with issues of sexual harassment or domestic violence, it did strive to provide (to a greater or lesser extent depending on the era and country) some semblance of social security, economic stability, and work-life balance for its citizens. The radical lesson is that the state intervened and did some good things on behalf of women, things that markedly changed their lives —day cares, abortion, canteens, etc. Feminist activism, the way it looks in the West with painted signs and rallying cries, did not achieve these things. Bureaucrats did.

Few would argue that life under socialism in Eastern Europe was good, generally. Consumer shortages and travel restrictions circumscribed many lives. At various times, in various places, political violence cut lives short and fractured families. And yet, by most every measure, women had a degree of education, economic independence, and legal standing that their Western peers would not have until much later and once won, always seem on the verge of losing. Reviewing the limited successes of the state-socialist past is in no way a call to recreate the failed experiments of the

> twentieth-century Eastern European regimes. But we must be able to take stock of their accomplishments for what they were, to learn from them, and to move forward. (Ghodsee and Mead 2018, 131–2)

For those who come from a former communist or socialist country, the conclusions of Ghodsee and Mead ring true with accuracy. Moreover, in several interviews we conducted before writing this text our interlocutors confirmed having had similar experiences as described by Ghodsee and Mead.

However, we believe that asking about "women in communism" is too broad and partially subjective to provide informative answers. To avoid uninformative generalizations, we have decided to focus on a specific and small group of women, namely "women philosophers". Our aim is to examine the status of women in philosophy during communist and socialist governments.

2. A Few Contextual Remarks

To make our investigation as accurate and precise as possible, we decided to concentrate our research on a limited region. The main reason for doing territorially limited research is that there has never been one single uniform communist socialism. It is certainly true that all communist socialist countries shared some basic communist socialist tenets and doctrines; however, it is also a well-known truism that these countries differed a lot in their application of these basic political and economic tenets. Different countries not only differed among themselves, but they also had diverse kinds of communist socialism in different periods of their own history. Moreover,various levels of political and academic liberty, different burdens of historical heritages, and different social structures have various impacts on the role and appreciation of philosophy in society. Thus, to make research such as ours as precise and informative as possible, it is necessary to focus on a specific region and specific period.

Our focus will be on the Socialist Republic of Croatia (SRC), our native country, in the period between 1945 and 1989. In that period Croatia was

a constitutive part of Yugoslavia, which was organized as a federation of six semi-autonomous "republics". After the end of World War II both Yugoslavia and Croatia changed their administrative appellatives several times, but after the constitutional reforms of 1963 the official titles were "Socialist Republic of Croatia" and "Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia" (SFRY). Both political entities—Yugoslavia as a conglomerate of six "republics" and Croatia as one of the "republics"—during that period had a continuous, non-democratic, one-party government. The ruling party was the communist party, from 1952 called the "League of Communists" to be distinguished from the Russian "Communist Party". In the period between 1945 and 1989 the Yugoslav communist regime had several phases, some of the crucial moments being the following: the rapprochement with the Soviet Union in 1948, teetering between the Eastern Block and NATO which resulted in the foundation of the neutral Non-Aligned Movement in 1961, growing nationalistic tensions in the 1970s, the death of the life-long *de facto* dictator of Yugoslavia, Josip Broz Tito, in 1980, and subsequent political and economic crises which resulted in the dissolution of SFRY in 1990s. Without going deep into political and historical intricacies of its very turbulent and complicated history, it should suffice to mention the following moments.

First, although Yugoslav communist government, like all communist governments in post-World War II Europe was one-party system with very limited political freedom, the particular communist government in Yugoslavia was in some respects more liberal and open than the rest of the communist governments in the world. One of the most obvious signs of this more liberal approach was the fact that Yugoslavia was never under the "iron curtain": at some moments, the Yugoslav passport was one of the most valuable documents in the world because it enabled people to travel both East and West without major restrictions. Further, from the 1950s and after the break from the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia advocated a type of political and economic system called "socialist self-management". The specific "Yugoslav path" of the socialist self-management was based on the following principle:

> The legislation rendered the workers' collective of a single enterprise a sovereign body, able to debate and vote upon fundamental factory matters through the workers' council,

> elected among its members. The workers' council met once a month and elected a management board—a professional administration, headed by an enterprise director concerned with day-to-day management. To prevent the alienation of the management from the work collective, three-quarters of this board had to consist of manual workers; the members were reelected on a yearly basis and could serve a maximum of two terms in that position. The enterprise director was nominated by the party for a four-year term but had to be approved by the workers' council as well. (Musić 2011, 233–234)

This model of "workers' self-management" was also applied to universities, particularly the University of Zagreb which was the dominant university in the post-war Croatia (Šarić 2020). This means that university faculty and staff was understood as "workers in science". A beneficial consequence of this approach was that women in academia had equal rights and duties as men. From several interviews we had with our older female colleagues who were faculty members during the communist times we learned that this equality among men and women was not just a dead letter: not only in theory, but also in practice they had equal opportunities to advance in their careers, had equal salaries as their male colleagues, and participated in governing bodies of their institutions— however, in smaller number.

Second, in the SFRY, Croatia, together with Slovenia, was culturally and economically the most developed region. However, this statement should be taken with some caution. Despite fast industrialization, Yugoslavia was still underdeveloped. For instance, in 1978 around 40% of population was employed in "the primary sector of the economy" (industry involved in the extraction and production of raw materials, such as farming, fishing, forestry, and mining, etc.). Moreover, in 1921, in Yugoslavia, around 40% of men and 60% of women were illiterate, while in 1971 around 8% of men but still more than 20% of women were illiterate. This doubtlessly significant progress in general education was success of the Communist regime, of which it took its deserved pride. However, comparatively, the situation in Yugoslavia in the late 1970s corresponded to the economic situation in the US in 1910, in France in 1901, and in Italy in 1951 (Haladin and Štokalo 1978, 135–137).

3. Women Philosophers in the Socialist Republic of Croatia

We will explore the position of women philosophers in the Socialist Republic of Croatia from two perspectives. First, we will explore the situation with feminism in the SRC. Second, we will explore the available data about women philosophers in the SRC.

Here, a methodological remark is in order. In the SRC, feminism was initially a practical and activist movement that was built upon the respect women earned during the World War II as anti-fascist fighters. The anti-fascist feminist movement(s) continued fighting for women's better position in society, education, jobs, health care, etc. after the end of the world war. However, from the early 1970s there was an even growing disappointment with the achievements of these organizations. To explain, and perhaps to justify this disappointment, it was necessary to develop a theoretical background. This explains, at least partially, some peculiarities of Croatian feminist theory from the 1970s onwards, understood a philosophical approach rather than political activism: the activist feminism of the 1950s and 1960s received a more theoretical, i.e. philosophical foundation in the 1970s and onwards. As such, it become a topic of special interest for women philosophers, both as a field of research and as an incentive, particularly to women philosophers, to develop their own theories.

3.1. Feminism in the Socialist Republic of Croatia – An Overview

Croatia had the longest history of feminism in the Eastern Europe. The movement for women's emancipation in Croatia started in urban areas around *fin-de-siècle*, and initially it did not have a firm philosophical foundation: it was a straightforward fight for women's basic rights. This fight was primarily concentrated on women's rights to education—since until the end of the twentieth century Croatia had limited political independence and rare and very basic democratic options, political life was of no particular interest.

During World War II women played a significant role in the anti-fascist resistance and in the Partisan movement: after the end of the WWII in 1945, important contributions of women's fighters in the war were

recognized by the main political factors in post-war Yugoslavia (Sklevicky 1984). The inauguration of the main women's organization, the "Anti-Fascist Women's Front" (Antifašistički front žena, AFŽ) in 1942, was welcomed by the speech given by the main Commander of the National Liberation Army and Partisan movement of Yugoslavia, and later life-long ruler of Yugoslavia, Josip Broz Tito in which he gave special praise to women and publicly recognized their contribution to the cause. After the War, the Anti-Fascist Women's Front continued its work under this name till 1953. From 1953 till 1990 the organization was renamed several times (in 1953, 1961, 1975, 1979, and 1985), however it was known under its normative title as the "Conference for the Social Activity of Women in Croatia". Its main activities included not only dealing with social problems (e.g., organizing help for employed mothers, organizing kindergartens and child-care institutions) and health-related issues, but also played a very important role as an important educational institution for women after World War II (Dijanić 2015, 293–302). Even before the fall of communism this organization was recognized as particularly progressive in promoting women's rights outside Yugoslavia, even in Western countries. As an example of this recognition, we will quote the conclusion of the text on the Conference for the Social Activity of Women in Croatia published by the US based *Frontiers: A Journal of Women Studies* from 1983:

> In 1974 the CSAW [Conference for the Social Activity of Women] had helped to resolve the debate between economic efficiency and social welfare in the interests of women (…). (….) few women's movements anywhere can boast of having achieved such an ideal, and the road to more broadly based women's organizations in the socialist countries is not now, and will not soon be, an easy one. Meanwhile, using the laws on the books to stimulate other social groups to respond to the needs of women, in the way the CSAW did, may be a plausible strategy. Indeed, this may be going on right now, locally, in socialist societies. It is in the interest of all women, East and West, to know more about it. (Dobos 1983)

Women's active participation in World War II provided them with the highest level of legal equality. Yugoslav constitution of 1946 guaranteed women's equality in matters of employment and payment (art. 24 and 25), political participation (art. 33), education (art. 38) and marriage (art.

26) (Constitution of the Federative People's Republic of Yugoslavia, January 31, 1946). This means that, from the political, i.e., the communist perspective, the general attitude was that the "women's question" was resolved within a broader question, i.e., the question about workers' equality, once and for all. On the other hand, the pre-World War II feminist movements were perceived as "bourgeois" and insufficient: women's fights for rights to vote, equal education, etc. as it was conducted in the pre-World War II non-communist millieu, were described as "anti-men" rather than "anti-class" fights and, thusly, not only limited in their scope but also wrongly directed. Nominally, the communist labour movement demanded equality for women at work and income, the abolition of classes and private property, the fight against economic, social and political inequality of women and freedom for women as well as for men (Dijanić 2015, 184 and 571).

However, from the 1970s, the Yugoslav, including Croatian, feminists argued that the ideals of feminism were only proclaimed and not truly achieved: the real equality between man and women was never fully actualized. Zsófia Lóránd in her book *The Feminist Challenge to the Socialist State in Yugoslavia* from 2018 convincingly showed that the new feminist ideologies in Yugoslavia were born out of disappointment with the promises given by the left (Lóránd 2018).

The position of women philosopher Blaženka Despot is especially noteworthy in this context. Blaženka Despot was the most influential Croatian, and probably Yugoslav feminist woman philosopher of the time. In several publications she argued that the communist regime, despite its proclaimed equality, was built on patriarchal foundations and because of that it was ideologically impossible for a woman to achieve real equality.[3]

[3] Blaženka Despot was born in Zagreb in 1930. Right after her high-school graduation, at 18, she got married, but the marriage soon ended in divorce. In that marriage, her only child, daughter Iris, was born. After the divorce, she worked in a factory, and then as a clerk in various institutions. In addition to her work, she studied philosophy at the Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences in Zagreb, where she graduated in 1954. She worked as a teacher in Ogulin, and later in Zagreb. At the same time, she taught sociology as an adjunct at the Pedagogical Academy in Karlovac and Zagreb. In 1964 she was elected an assistant professor in sociology at the Faculty of Mechanical Engineering and Naval Architecture in Zagreb. She received her master's degree at the Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences in Ljubljana in 1968, her thesis being Socialism and Technology. At the same faculty, in 1970, she defended her doctoral dissertation Humanity of Technical Society. She received a prestigious German scholarship from the Alexandar von Humboldt Stiftung. In 1974 she was appointed associate professor at the Faculty of Veterinary Medicine University of Zagreb, and in the 1980 she was appointed professor at the same Faculty. In 1977 she founded the Department of Social Sciences at the Faculty of Veterinary

She particularly accused the Yugoslav socialist approach to "women's question" as being inefficient because it remained blind to particularities of women's question – the particularities that were obfuscated by the underlying and powerful patriarchal substrate. For example, in her text "Women Issue and Feminism" she wrote (our translation):

> Marx's idea of human emancipation and freedom that transcends political emancipation procured an opportunity to subordinate the "women's question" to the question of the emancipation of the proletariat. However, with the dictatorship of the proletariat, the real-socialist countries strengthen the state, create statism as a dictatorship of generality over particularities. This generality abruptly abolishes all particularities, starting from the "women's question" and the laws of the market all the way to democracy as civic heritage. Not recognizing patriarchy as the autonomous basis of the "women's question", women remain below the level of emancipation of their own class of proletarians before the abstract generality of the instrument of freedom—the dictatorship of the proletariat. (Despot 2004, 186)

Despot also argued that the Yugoslav socialist system did not allow women to truly participate in "workers' self-management" because they did not have time to do so due to the unpaid domestic work. They had to take care of children and manage the household in their private time which made that job invisible. In communism, women often worked double: fist at their jobs outside home and then, traditionally, at home. They did twice as much work, were paid for only one, and had no time for any social or political engagement. So, in principle everything was allowed, however, in practice little was possible: this is also reflected in the fact

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Medicine in Zagreb. In 1989 she started working at the Institute of Social Research in Zagreb in the Education and Youth Research Center where she remained until her retirement in 1993. She died in Zagreb in 2001.

In 1971 she published her first book, *Humanity of Technical Society*. The period between 1975 and 1980 was the most fruitful period of her career. In 1976 her book *Plädoyer for Leisure* was published. In those years she published numerous articles, discussions, and translations. The books *Women's Issues and Socialist Self-Government* and *Emancipation and New Social Movements* have been published in 1987. For our topic, it is important to mention her lecture "Die Möglichkeit der Begründung des marxistischen Feminismus", which she gave in Ludwigsburg. She was an active member of the group *Women and Society*, very engaged in feminist debates. Her last book, '*New Age' and Modern*, was published in 1995. Blaženka Despot has always been a vigorous but not uncritical promotor of Marxist feminism (Bosanac 2008; Despot 2004).

that throughout Yugoslav's history there were only a few women at higher political posts (e.g., Savka Dabčević-Kučar, Milka Planinc, Anka Berus, Latinka Perović). Blaženka Despot wrote about this unfavourable situation of women in Yugoslavia (our translation):

> The patriarchal and traditional society of Yugoslav people retains in its spirit all these [patriarchal] relations even after they had already been legally and even de facto overcome. This retention is especially evident in relation to the "nature of women". Women's position in their abstract naturality, independent of the "history of industry and exchange" is also visible in the low participation of women in politics, self-managed bodies, science, and creativity. The production of "economic varieties", from "warehouse workers to architects" has left women mostly as "warehouse workers". The condition for getting out of this situation is regaining free time, which economically independent women have less not only than men, but also then women economically dependent on their husbands. Women are particularly interested in science, technology that realizes "human history as the true natural history of man," the principles of the "mind," "happiness," and solutions that lead to a "complete reconstitution of humanity." (Despot 2004, 171)

To a certain degree, Croatian women felt betrayed, the initial promises of uncompromised equality were not kept. Expectedly, the communist government opposed those voices, as well as, more generally, denied the dominant "patriarchal consciousness" as an integrative part of the socialist system. To strengthen their position, the Yugoslav Constitution of 1974 restated and re-guaranteed equality for women in every aspect of work and life (art. 154, 160, 165). Moreover, art. 162 guaranteed special protection of the work post and work conditions for women, youth, and people with disabilities (The Constitution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia). However, the everyday practice was too burdened and shaped by deeply rooted traditionalist patriarchy: although there were some improvements, women generally felt that advancing in business, politics, science, and academic work was harder than for men. However, we should not forget that women in the SFRY were guaranteed some rights that women in Western Europe had yet to fight for some time.

Here we should mention a philosophically tangentially relevant phenomenon of Yugoslav feminism: the magazine *Start*. From 1969, the controversial biweekly magazine *Start* was published. It began as a Yugoslav imitation of *Playboy*: it was (in)famous for photos of half-naked and naked women. In 1973 *Start* became more political. And what might be unthinkable today, several prominent Yugoslav feminists wrote for *Start*: Vesna Kesić, Slavenka Drakulić, Jasenka Kodrnja, Bojana Pejić, Žarana Papić and Maja Miles, covering mostly feminist topics. The magazine also published interviews with Western feminists such as Simone de Beauvoir, the American writer Erica Jong, the French philosopher Élisabeth Badinter, sex educator and feminist Shere Hite, and the American feminist journalist Gloria Stein. Besides keeping its pornographic and semi-pornography *imaginarium*, the magazine regularly published texts promoting women's health, information about gynaecological issues, assisted reproduction, childbirth, abortion, etc. The last issue came out in 1991. However bizarre from today's perspective a feminist collaboration with the magazine *Start* may look, from the perspective of the time, the magazine's relative financial independence offered some intellectual liberty otherwise unavailable in other state-controlled publications. Moreover, it opened a visual and verbal space for discussing pornography in a variety of ways (Lóránd 2018, 158–161).

3.2. Data About Women Philosophers in the Socialist Republic of Croatia

Only in 1901 were women first admitted as full-time students to a university in Croatia (Luetić, Prve studentice Mudroslovnog fakulteta kr. Sveučilišta Franje Josipa I. u Zagrebu 2002). On the one hand it looks late, however, if we think about the circumstance, it is within the decade in which the University of Vienna awarded the first doctoral degree to a woman. In the second half of the 19th century, high schools for women started opening their doors only in some of the more developed parts of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, of which Croatia was a part. Initially, the schools were private institutions that ran within women's societies, such as "Wiener Frauenerwerbsverein" ("Viennese Association for Providing Job for Women"), founded in 1866 (Frauenerwerbverien, Wien). Universities were more persistent in obstructing women to enter their doors. The closest university that allowed women to study as regular students and obtain

doctoral degrees in Central Europe was the University of Zurich: the first female doctoral student was admitted in 1866 (History of the University of Zurich n.d.). The University of Vienna admitted women quite late: only in 1897 the first doctorate was awarded to a woman.

In Croatia, until the end of the 19th century, many women were either completely uneducated or severely under-educated. Only about 55% of women attended the "obligatory" four-year basic elementary education and only about 1% of women continued their education in a public school ("Volksschule") (Ograjšek Gorenjak 2006). In 1892 the first high school, a "gymnasium" for women was opened in Zagreb. Women were for the first time admitted to the University of Zagreb as "guest/extramural students" without the right to get a doctoral degree in 1895 and only in 1901 women were admitted as full-time students. However, within a few years before the start of World War I, the total number of female students surpassed 10% of the total student body (Luetić 2006). Most of the female students came from middle- and upper-class families, who were economically independent and often did not calculate their odds about future academic careers. If they wanted to get a job after graduation, they were usually employed as high-school teachers. In this context it is understandable that most of the women who fought for women's emancipation were concentrated on promoting education: Natalie Wicherhauser, Marija Jambrišak, Jagoda Truhelka, Camilla Lucerna, Štefa Iskra, Milka Pogačić to name some of the most famous Croatian women intellectuals of the time who participated in founding the "Lyceum for Women" in Zagreb and later taught at it.

Between two World Wars only four women obtained a doctorate in philosophy: Elza Kučera (1883–1972, obtained her PhD degree from the University of Zurich in 1909), Ivana Rossi (1892–1963, obtained her PhD degree from the University of Zagreb in 1916), Marija Brida (1912–1993, obtained her PhD degree from the University of Zagreb in 1937), and Elly Ebenspanger (1904–1942 obtained her PhD degree from the University of Zagreb in 1939). Elza Kučera spent her life working as a librarian, Ivana Rossi was a high school teacher, and Elly Ebenspanger was killed in the Auschwitz camp due to her Jewish heritage. None of these women, with the exception of Marija Brida, had an academic career.

4. Doctoral Degrees in Philosophy in the Socialist Republic of Croatia 1945-1989

After World War II there was a significantly bigger influx of students into institutions of higher education. This was also the case with philosophy students. According to available evidence from various almanacs and encyclopaedias, we compiled a list of all doctoral titles awarded in the period 1945-1989 in philosophy.[4] In that period, only two universities issued PhD degrees: the University of Zagreb and the University of Zadar (translation of all the doctoral titles is ours):

name	PhD year	thesis title	institution[5]
men			
Rudolf Supek	1952	The phenomenology of the pathological forms of imagination	PhF
Branko Bošnjak	1956	History of philosophy as a discipline. The problem of methodology and its subject	PhF
Gajo Petrović	1956	The philosophy of Plehanov (the place of G. V. Plehanov in the history of philosophy)	PhF
***Vuko Pavičević**	1957	The relationship of value and reality in modern German idealistic axiology	PhF
Ivan Focht	1958	Hegel's doctrine on the death of art	PhF
Danilo Pejović	1958	The foundations of Nicolai Hartmann's ontology	PhF
Vanja Sutlić	1958	The essence and alienation of man in Marx's and existentialist philosophy	PhF
Ivan Kuvačić	1960	The philosophy of Edward George Moore	PhF
Milan Kangrga	1961	The ethical problem in Karl Marx. The critique of moral consciousness	PhF
Čedomil Veljačić	1962	A comparative investigation of Indian and European philosophy. Antiquity.	PhF
Davor Rodin	1964	Dialectics in Hegel and Marx	PhF
***Miroslav Krešić**	1965	Idola Fori: negative influence of language on thought	PhF
Franjo Zenko	1965	The personalism of Emmanuel Mounier	UZD
***Miodrag Cekić**	1966	The role of subject in epistemology of the classical and modern German philosophy	PhF

[4] The main sources we used are eight books entitled Bibliography of doctoral dissertations of the University of Zagreb published between 1976 and 1991 as well as various encyclopaedic and online sources. We compared our results with Tomislav Bracanović's analysis (Bracanović 2003). In four cases there are discrepancies between our and Bracanović's results.

[5] Abbreviations are the following: PhF – Faculty of Philosophy and Social Sciences of the University of Zagreb; FPS: Faculty of political science of the University of Zagreb, UZD – University of Zadar.

Ivan Babić	1966	The socio-political philosophy of John Dewey and its influence on political science in the USA	FPS
***Tine Hribar**	1969	The concept of time in Marx	FPS
Danko Grlić	1969	The fundamental idea of Friedrich Nietzsche	PhF
***Rasim Muminović**	1970	The philosophy of Ernst Bloch. The gnoseological and ontological foundations	PhF
***Ivan Urbančič**	1970	The ontological concept of the system of production and needs in Marx's philosophy or Marx's metaphysics	FPS
***Vladan Švacov**	1971	The possibility of the interpretation of dramatic expression based on existentialist ontology	PhF
Eduard Kale	1972	The problem of labor division in the social theory of Karl Marx: a methodological approach	FPS
Ivan Prpić	1972	Critique of the concept of state in Karl Marx's theory till 1845	FPS
***Borislav Gojković**	1974	Merleau-Ponty or the measure of ambiguous existence: the relationship between the thought and non-thinking	PhF
Božidar Gajo Sekulić	1974	Philosophy and proletariat in Karl Marx's works	PhF
Hotmir Burger	1975	The problem of science in Marx's works	PhF
Marijan Cipra	1975	Metamorphoses of metaphysics: spiritual and scientific concept of the history of philosophy	PhF
Branko Despot	1975	The philosophy of Vladimir Dvorniković	PhF
Zvonko Posavec	1975	The historical origin of dialectics: a study on development of dialectics in Plato's *Republic* and *Parmenides*	FPS
Josip Marinković	1976	The educational role of philosophy courses in high schools	PhF
***Dimitar Dimitrov**	1976	The paradox of the theory of activist art	PhF
Vjekoslav Mikecin	1979	The foundations of antinomies in modern Marxist thought	PhF
Boris Kalin	1980	Lectures in logic in high school: the role of logic in forming critical thinking	PhF
Dimitrije Savić	1980	The critique of philosophy in Karl Marx	FPS
Petar Tepić	1981	The historical meaning of the critique of religion in Marx and Nietzsche	FPS
Damir Barbarić	1982	Plato's *Laws* as philosophical foundation of politics	FPS
Neven Sesardić	1982	Physicalism	PhF
Lino Veljak	1982	The philosophy of praxis of Antonio Gramsci	PhF
Gvozden Flego	1983	Fromm's and Marcuse's understanding of alienation	PhF

***Muhamedin Kullashi**	1983	Lefebre's contribution to Marxist philosophy	PhF
***Milenko Perović**	1984	Value systems and moral consciousness of the petit bourgeois	PhF
***Miroslav Prokopijević**	1984	Understanding and rationality: theory of language and action as a part of critical theory of society by Jürgen Habermas	PFS
Veselin Golubović	1985	Yugoslav philosophy from dogmatic to creative Marxism: the critique of Stalinism 1950–1960	PhF
Žarko Puhovski	1985	The political philosophy of Frankfurt school from 1932–1945	PhF
***Milan Uzelac**	1985	The philosophy of play of Eugen Fink	
Antun Vujić	1985	The problem of foundations of science in Karl Popper's philosophy	PhF
Ozren Žunec	1985	The Ancient Greek theory of *mimesis* and its contemporary significance	PhF
Milan Galović	1986	Scheler's phenomenological analysis of social Being	FPS
Goran Švob	1988	Frege's conceptual alphabet and the foundations of modern logic	PhF
Zvonko Šundov	1988	The historical thought of Lukacs's *History and class consciousness*	PhF
Ante Čović	1989	The problem of World in Marx's initial and early works and its actuality	PhF
women			
Heda Festini	1964	The anthropological problems of the positive existentialism of Nicola Abbagnano	PhF
Gordana Bosanac[6]	1967	The essential properties of information and their practical verification in work organization	PhF
Branka Brujić	1974	The critical theory of society by H. Marcuse and the historical thought	PhF
Ljerka Schiffler	1974	Nikola Vitov Gučetić	PhF
Erna Banić-Pajnić	1984	The role and significance of some elements of Hermetic philosophy in works of Croatian renaissance philosophers	PhF
Nadežda Čačnovič-Puhovski	1985	The aesthetics of German romanticism	PhF
Mihaela Girardi-Karšulin	1987	The philosophical thought of Frane Petrić	PhF

[6] Gordana Bosanac's doctoral thesis belongs, properly speaking, to the area of "communicology". However, it was a compromise that Bosanac, who was a philosopher by education and vocation, had to

Here, we should also mention several men and women who were active philosophers in the SRC but who did not receive their PhDs from Croatian Universities or received PhDs before 1945 and continued working after the war. These are:

name	PhD year	title of the thesis	institution
men			
Pavao Vuk-Pavlović	1921	Cognition and epistemic theory: a methodological essay with special emphasis on the problem of the obvious	PhF
Vladimir Filipović	1930	The problem of value: historical and systematic critical discussion	PhF
Predrag Vranicki	1951	The problems of the social sciences	University of Belgrade
Ante Pažanin	1962	The problem of philosophy as exact science in Edmund Husserl's phenomenology	University of Köln
Goran Gretić	1975	The problem of absolute knowledge in Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit*	University of Köln
Nenad Miščević	1981	Theories of communication intention - Austin, Grice, Strawson	University of Ljubljana
Josip Talanga	1985	Judgments about future and *fatum*	University of Bonn
women			
Marija Brida	1937	Life-experience relationship	PhF
Blaženka Despot	1970	The humanity of technical society	University of Ljubljana
Zlata Knezović	1972	Ethics and existence in Simone de Beauvoir	University of Strasbourg
Rada Iveković	1972	On Buddhist philosophy	University of New Delhi

The asterisk indicates the persons who were never employed at any Croatian scientific institution or university and/or had very few or no contacts with philosophical events in Croatia at the time.

make to keep her job in the Department of Sociology of the Institute of Social Management (Maskalan 2021). The majority of Bosanac's publications are more philosophically oriented and thusly, we listed her among philosophers in our list.

The first women philosopher employed at one of the Croatian universities was Marija Brida (1912–1993). She worked from 1961 at the Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences of the University of Zadar. Heda Festini (1928–2018) started her teaching career in 1961 at the same university, at the Pedagogical Academy. The first women philosopher employed at the University of Zagreb was Branka Brujić (1931–2020). From 1962 she taught philosophical anthropology and ethics in the newly established Faculty of political science.[7]

Before 1989, there were also other women philosophers who were active in philosophy and/or employed at various faculties of Croatian universities but did not (yet) get their PhD degrees:

- Genoveva Slade: 1978–1990 employed at the Institute of Philosophy, no PhD,
- Azra Šarac: 1967–1969 employed at the Institute of Philosophy, no PhD,
- Dunja Tot: 1970–1976 employed at the Institute of Philosophy, no PhD,
- Ljiljana Filipović: received her PhD from the University of Zagreb in 1995,
- Gordana Škorić: received her PhD from the University of Zagreb in 1998,
- Vanda Božičević: received her PhD from the University of Zagreb in the 1990s.

As a special example, besides Blaženka Despot, about whom we wrote above, it may be worthwhile to mention the case of Zlata Knezović (1934–2016). She graduated with a degree in philosophy and Croatian language and Yugoslav literature at the Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences in Zagreb in 1961. In 1975 at the same Faculty, she graduated with a degree in French language and literature. After having received a French scholarship, she went to the Department of Philosophy at the Université des Sciences Humaines in Strasbourg and, in 1972, she received her doctoral degree after defending the thesis *L'éthique de l'existence chez Simone de Beauvoir*. This text is presumably the first monograph written on the philosophy of

[7] More details about these women and other Croatian women philosophers can be found at the webpage of our Research Centre for Women in Philosophy (cizuf.ifzg.hr).

Simone de Beauvoir in France and outside France. Simone de Beauvoir herself read Knezović's thesis and sent a letter of approval to Knezović. The manuscript of the thesis has never been published. Knezović did not stay in France: she came back to Croatia and spent the rest of her career working at the Croatian Institute of History (formerly the Institute for the History of the Croatian Workers' Movement) in Zagreb until her retirement in 1999. In her later career she published little on feminist topics: just one shorter article on de Beauvoir and two shorter texts on Simone Weil. Most of her publications were dedicated to some aspects of the history of Communism around and after World War II.

Our data show that, in the period from 1945 until 1989, there were 43 men and 11 women, holding PhD degrees, active in philosophy across various Croatian academic institutions. In other words, of 54 active philosophers 26% were women. In these numbers we did not include men and women who hadn't yet obtained their doctoral degrees but were employed at universities as assistants, etc.

5. Women's Publications in Croatian Philosophical Journals 1945–1989

Now let's look at a different criterion: journal publications as indication of women's participation in philosophical activities of the time. In the period between 1945 and 1989, in Croatia, there were seven, broadly speaking, academic journals specialized in philosophy (Bracanović 2007).[8] These were:

- *Praxis,* published from 1964 until 1974 with two separate editions: Yugoslav edition and international edition;
- *Bilten za nastavu filozofiju (Bulletin for teaching philosophy)*, published from 1969 until 1976;[9]
- *Prilozi za istraživanje hrvatske filozofske baštine (Contributions in the Research of Croatian Philosophical Heritage)*, published from 1975, ongoing;

[8] Here "academic" primarily means that these journals were published by an academic institution. At the time peer-review process was still rudimentary and consisted, mostly, in editor's reading and commenting on the manuscript.

[9] We have omitted this journal from our analysis because it was more of an informal journal meant to support high-school teachers in their preparation for philosophy and Marxism classes.

- *Marksističko obrazovanje (Marxist education)*, published from 1978 until 1989;
- *Filozofska istraživanja (Philosophical investigations)*, published from 1980, ongoing;
- *Godišnjak za povijest filozofije (Yearbook of the history of philosophy)*, published from 1983 until 1991;
- *Synthesis philosophica*, published from 1986, ongoing.[10]

In the following tables, we list the data about the number of publications sorted by gender distribution.[11] We did not differentiate between "main articles", "book reviews", "comments" etc., i.e., each paper is treated equally. There are very few papers which have more than one author, so, in principle, one paper is one author. In rare cases in which there are more than one author, we treated the text as equally shared by each author, e.g., if there were two women authoring the text, then we added the number "2" to our sum.

[10] In our analysis we did not include the journal *Naše teme (Our themes)*. This influential journal was first published from 1957 and lasted until 1990. Initially it was subtitled "Young people's journal of social events", and later, more seriously, "Journal of social questions". It was an interdisciplinary journal that included many authors from practically all social sciences and humanities, among them there were also many men and women philosophers. The reason for not including this journal in our analysis is twofold. First, it was published by an office of the "League of Communists of Croatia" and not by an academic institution. Second, we did not find any data about any sort of peer-review process. Thusly, we did not consider it a properly academic journal.

[11] In our research we assumed the sex-gender identity according to first names and personal acquaintance with the authors. We assumed that a person with a female first name and/or whom we personally know as a woman is, by gender, female, and a person with a male first name and/or whom we personally know as a man is, by gender, male. We are not aware that there is a discrepancy between biological sex and gender among the Croatian philosophers whose work was analysed.

Praxis, Yugoslav edition

year	issue	F	M
1964.	1–2	0	45
1965.	1–6	10	105
1966.	1–6	10	88
1967.	1–6	10	114
1968.	1–4	3	52
1969.	1–6	6	94
1970.	1–6	12	92
1971.	1–6	12	68
1972.	1–6	5	52
1973.	1–6	18	65
1974.	1–5	2	51

Praxis, international edition

year	issue	F	M
1965.	1–4	3	42
1966.	1–4	3	48
1967.	1–4	2	63
1968.	1–4	3	71
1969.	1–4	4	57
1970.	1–4	0	41
1971.	1–4	2	40
1972.	1–4	1	29
1973.	1–4	8	32
1974.	1–2	0	20

Prilozi za istraživanje hrvatske filozofske baštine

year	issue	F	M
1975.	1	3	9
1976.	2	8	9
1977.	3	3	7
1978.	4	5	9
1979.	5	8	13
1980.	6	4	7
1981.	7	3	7
1982.	8	3	8
1983.	9	5	9
1984.	10	7	10
1985.	11	7	8
1986.	12	4	10
1987.	13	4	11
1988.	14	4	14
1989.	15	5	13

Marksističko obrazovanje

year	issue	F	M
1978.	1–4	7	29
1979.	1–4	11	31
1980.	1–4	4	27
1981.	1–4	5	12
1982.	1–4	3	24
1983.	1–4	3	29
1984.	1–4	4	21
1985.	1–5	11	18
1986.	1–4	6	20
1987.	1–4	8	36
1988.	1–4	5	22
1989.	1–4	4	21

Filozofska istraživanja

year	issue	F	M
1980.	1–2	18	27
1981.	3–5	10	36
1983.	6–7	8	29
1984.	8–11	19	87
1985.	12–15	28	125
1986.	16–19	50	155
1987.	20–23	39	169
1988.	24–27	34	147
1989.	28–33	37	186

Synthesis Philosophica

year	issue	F	M
1986.	1–2	1	14
1987.	3–4	5	43
1988.	5–6	7	51
1989.	7–8	8	57

Godišnjak za povijest filozofije

year	issue	F	M
1983.	1	0	7
1984.	2	0	11
1985.	3	3	15
1986.	4	0	5
1987.	5	2	9
1988.	6	0	13
1989.	7	1	17

So, if we put the data altogether, we get the following numbers from the six analysed journals:

- In *Praxis*, in both Yugoslav and international edition, there were published 1269 papers authored by men and 114 papers authored by women, i.e., 8% of the papers were authored by women. The proportion of women's authorship is 0,09.
- In *Contributions in the Research of Croatian Philosophical Heritage*, 144 papers authored by men were published and 73 authored by women, i.e., 34% of the papers were authored by women. The proportion of women's authorship is 0,51.
- In *Marxist education*, 290 papers were authored by men and 71 were authored by women, i.e., 20% of the papers were authored by women. The proportion of women's authorship is 0,25.

- In *Philosophical investigations*, 961 papers were authored by men and 243 authored by women, i.e., 20% of the texts were authored by women. The proportion of women's authorship is 0,25.
- In the *Yearbook of the history of philosophy*, 77 papers were authored by men and 6 authored by women, i.e., 7% of the texts were authored by women. The proportion of women's authorship is 0,08.
- In *Synthesis philosophica*, 165 papers were authored by men and 21 authored by women, i.e., 11% of the papers were authored by women. The proportion of women's authorship is 0,13.

In sum, in Croatia, in the period between 1945 and 1989, there were 2906 philosophical papers published by men and 528 published by women. In percentage, this means that 15,4% of the texts were authored by women. The proportion of women authorship is 0,2.[12]

If one investigates the tables more carefully, there is a disproportion among the journals: whereas in *Praxis* the proportion of women authors was low (0,09), in *Contributions in the Research of Croatian Philosophical Heritage* the proportion of women authors was significantly higher (0,51). This can be explained as follows. The journal *Contributions in the Research of Croatian Philosophical Heritage* was published by the Institute of Philosophy. Not long after its foundation in 1967, there have been several women philosophers employed there: Erna Banić-Pajnić (from 1970), Mihaela Girardi Karšulin (from 1971), Ljerka Schiffler-Premec (from 1967), Genoveva Slade (from 1968), Azra Šarac (from 1968), and Dunja Tot-Šubajković (from 1970): women philosophers outnumbered men in the same period 7 to 5! The publication of these women philosophers in the Institute's journal contribute to the high ratio between women and men authors.

The employment of female philosophers at Croatian universities began in the early 1960s. In comparison, in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the mathematician Vera Popović Šnajder (1904–1976) became the dean of the Faculty of Philosophy in Sarajevo as early as 1951. In Serbia Ksenija Atanasijević (1894–1981) became the first female university professor

[12] We should be noted that at the time journals in the SRC barely had any peer-review process, which most often consisted in the editor-in-chief reading and commenting on submitted texts and then publishing them. Moreover, these journals were much oriented toward the local and regional philosophical community rather than toward scholars around the world.

to be appointed to the Arts Faculty, Department of Philosophy at the University of Belgrade already in 1924. The Slovenian philosophers Alma Sodnik (1896–1965) became a professor of philosophy at the Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences in Ljubljana in 1946. Why did Croatian women philosophers lag behind their colleagues in other parts of the SFRY in terms of employment at universities? For the moment, we can guess that the reason may be combination of the notorious absence of women in philosophy in general, and the conservative character of Croatian universities, or Croatian philosophers, in particular. As a contrast, already after World War II women educated in natural sciences did get positions at the University of Zagreb. An example may be medical biochemist Marijana Fišer-Herman (1897–1994) who started working at Faculty of Pharmacy in early 1950s. Although there were no legal obstacles to employing women, the philosophical community in Croatia was obviously slower in letting women into academia than in other parts of the SFRY.

This unfortunate combination is also obvious from the data on journal publications. In that period the most important and influential, as well as internationally recognized journal was *Praxis*. It was a journal dedicated to the special, Yugoslav, interpretation of Marxist philosophy and it was edited by mostly Croatian philosophers of the time. The publisher was the Croatian Philosophical Society and had two editions: Yugoslav and international. The founders of the journal were philosophers Branko Bošnjak, Danko Grlić, Milan Kangrga, Rudi Supek, Gajo Petrović, Predrag Vranicki, Danilo Pejović and Ivan Kuvačić. The first editors were professors from the University of Zagreb Gajo Petrović and Danilo Pejović. Of the 48 members of the editorial board, only two were women: Ágnes Heller from Budapest and Zagorka Pešić-Golubović from Belgrade. The idea behind the journal was to re-establish the creative potential of Marxism that was thought to have been stalled in practice in other communist countries of the time (Supek 1969).

As for feminist topics, *Praxis* did not publish many texts dealing with it: it was taken for granted, as we showed before, that the "women's question" had been resolved within "workers' socialist self-management". We found only two exceptions: the first is Rudi Supek's review of Vera Stein Erlich's book *Porodica u transformaciji: studija u 300 jugoslavenskih sela* (*Family in Transformation: A Study in 300 Yugoslav Villages*) published in

1964, and an article by Erna Pajnić on Simone de Beauvoir ("Simone de Beauvoir") published in 1971. Both texts argued that women's position in socialism of the day was better than before. These are the only two articles dealing exclusively with the topic of women in modern society.

As for women philosopher writing for *Praxis*, the most prolific was Blaženka Despot who published six longer articles and twenty book reviews. Interestingly, although she was a regular contributor, she neither formally nor informally belonged to the circle around it. In general, women philosophers have published more book reviews than original articles in *Praxis*. We can witness a similar marginalization of women philosophers in the case of the Korčula philosophical Summer School which was a part of the Praxis movement. Once a year the Summer School organized discussions with foreign contemporary philosophers such as Ernst Bloch, Henri Lefebvre, Herbert Marcuse, Jürgen Habermas, Erich Fromm, H. G. Gadamer etc. on current philosophical, political, and social topics. Unsurprisingly, out of 224 participants in the Summer School at Korčula, there were only 9 women: 5 of them from the SFOY (Blaženka Despot, Mirjana Gros (historian), Nadežda Čačinović-Puhovski, Zagorka Pešić-Golubović, Olga Kozomara (sociologist)) and four coming outside the SFRY (Annie Kriegel (France), Ágnes Heller (Hungary), Rose Sommerville (USA), and Sheila Allen (UK)).[13]

However, when looking at the publication numbers, we got the following results: in the period between 1945 and 1989 more than 15% of the texts were authored by women which makes the proportion of women's authorship slightly less than 0,2. If we take these numbers as comparanda

[13] However, we should mention that there are some testimonials which shed a more favourable light on the *Praxis* philosophers and their relationship with women philosophers. Lóránd writes: "The relationship with the *Praxis* professors was very encouraging for the Zagreb women. Slavenka Drakulić remembers Kuvačić as a 'wonderful professor', who gave them books off the official reading lists. Later, they started to get hold of readings on their own: Rada Iveković went to study in Italy, and 'Vesna Pusić I think went to the US and she brought us books'. Nadežda Čačinovič was also part of the *Čovjek i sistem* group, and she was attending the Korčula summer schools of Praxis and was publishing in the journal too: 'We were discussing possibilities of change, the economic and legal frameworks of socialism. Rudi Supek and Eugen Pusić were there, and the group held its meetings on the island of Vis'. Praxis therefore had quite some influence on the beginnings of the new feminism in Yugoslavia, even though the relationship was not always as smooth as these accounts suggest. Biljana Kašić, while emphasising the support from Supek and Kuvačić, also added: "the Praxis philosophers did not take feminism seriously, and at the meetings women did not comment much". Vesna Kesić remembers "a very bad encounter with Mihajlo Marković, who said it is OK that we come and talk about feminism but asked us: "could you please look more feminine"." (Lóránd 2018, 32)

and look at more recent research on women's publications we get the following results.

Women represent 12% of total single-authored papers in JSTOR prior to 1990 (West et al. 2013). When we move to even more recent time, to the period 2004–2015, in the United States, we get the following data. In all years and for all journals, the percentage of female authors is extremely low, in the range of 14–16%. Moreover, the percentage of women authors is less than the percentage of women faculty in different ranks and at different institutions, which comprise around 22% (Wilhelm, Conklin, and Hassoun 2018).

In a recently published study "The Past 110 Years: Historical Data on the Underrepresentation of Women in Philosophy Journals", Hassoun et al., on page 716, give the chart in which they show the results of their research. Hassoun et al. took into consideration eighteen philosophy journals and isolated 23204 articles, with 2265 total women authorships (Hassoun et al. 2022, 687). Their research shows that the proportion of women authors in philosophy from 1900 till the early 1960s stays very low—around 0,05. In comparison, in all scientific fields the proportion is twice as much: around 0,1. From the 1960s till the early 1990s women's authorship was on significant rise in all scientific fields including philosophy: in philosophy it rose from 0,05 to approximately 0,18 in comparison to all fields in which it rose from 0,1 to 0,25. However, in the period between 1990 till late 2000 women's authorships in philosophy remained relatively flat, unlike other disciplines during that period which continued rising, reaching almost 0.3 (Hassoun et al. 2022, 716).

Philosophy is doubtlessly one of the academic disciplines in which the gender gap has always been particularly wide. According to the most recent report of the British Philosophical Association about 30% Senior Lecturers, 21% Readers and 25% Professors in the 41 UK philosophy departments are occupied by women in 2021 (Beebee and Saul 2021, 6–7). In Germany only about 15% of higher academic jobs in philosophy in the period of 2005–2016 are taken by women (Herfeld, Müller, and von Allmen forthcoming). In Spain around 12% of philosophy professors and about 25% of faculty are women (Torres González 2020). In Greece women occupy 29% of faculty at various philosophy departments and

faculties (Iliadi, Stelios, and Theologou 2018). In present day Croatia, around 26% of women have tenured positions at philosophy departments in 2022 (Boršić forthcoming). For many countries data are either lacking or hard to find. However, it seems safe to assume that underrepresentation of women in philosophy is typical for most of the world, not only in contemporary Western philosophy.[14] In comparison to these numbers, 26% of women philosophers employed and active in Croatian universities and other scientific institutions from 1945 till 1989 is formidable.

6. Conclusion

During the communist socialist period of the SRC, i.e., in the period 1945–1989, women philosophers were proportionally approximately on the level of today's women philosophers in western countries, including present-day Republic of Croatia—if we are to judge by the number of doctors of philosophy and the number of publications. Communist socialism was beneficial for women philosophers in two ways. First, administratively, it removed obstacles from women's employment at universities and scientific institutes. To paraphrase Ghodsee's above quoted words, half a century ago the communist bureaucrats raised women's participation in institutional employment to the level of today's employment in capitalism. Second, communism and socialism, being themselves philosophical and socio-philosophical doctrines, offered a set of new topics, investigations, and elaborations for further development. This was especially interesting to women since both doctrines insisted on the equality of labour division across societal strata and sexes—moreover, such studies in communist and socialist themes were heavily supported by the communist government. These factors made it possible that in Croatia, which at the time was economically and educationally much less developed than most of today's western countries, proportionally the same number of women philosophers had an academic post as today in the western world (including today's Croatia). As for the number of publications, it is impressive that at that time the proportion of women authorships was higher than in today's JSTOR, bearing in mind the differences in publication procedures then and now.

[14] As for India, Professor Bindu Puri from Jawaharlal Nehru University, in a Youtube interview, declared that women are very underrepresented in Indian universities in general (Puri 2021). A similar conclusion may be drawn from the recent book written by Jana Rošker on Taiwanese and Chinese women philosophers (Rošker 2021).

If we return to the initial question—whether socialist communism was more beneficiary to women than capitalism—our investigation suggests that, in the case of women philosophers, the situation with academic publications and employment in the Socialist Republic of Croatia was significantly better than in the contemporary capitalist countries.

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WHERE ARE THE WOMEN: THE ETHNIC REPRESENTATION OF WOMEN AUTHORS IN PHILOSOPHY JOURNALS BY REGIONAL AFFILIATION AND SPECIALIZATION

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ABSTRACT

Using bibliographic metadata from 177 Philosophy Journals between 1950 and 2020, this article presents new data on the under-representation of women authors in philosophy journals across decades and across four different compounding factors. First, we examine how philosophy fits in comparison to other academic disciplines. Second, we consider how the regional academic context in which Philosophy Journals operate impacts on author gender proportions. Third, we consider how the regional specialization of a journal impacts on author gender proportions. Fourth, and perhaps most interestingly, we consider the impact of author ethnicity on gender representation, and we examine the breakdown of author ethnicity across Philosophy Journals between 1950 and 2020. To our knowledge, this is the first work to offer an estimate for author ethnicity and gender in philosophy publications using a large-scale data set. We find that women authors are underrepresented in Philosophy Journals across time, across disciplines, across the globe, and regardless of ethnicity.

Keywords: *under-representation; publishing; gender; ethnicity; philosophy journals.*

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1. Introduction

In broad terms, this paper deals with the question: Where are women in philosophy publishing? Somewhat literally, we examine authorships by women in philosophy journals with regard to associated geographic regions. More metaphorically, we compare women authorships in philosophy journals to those in other disciplines over time (1950-2020). We aim to understand the under-representation of women in philosophy as one that extends across time, across disciplines, across the globe, and across compounding factors, such as the recognition of women philosophers as legitimate members of the discipline via the publication of their scholarly work. This is the first, large-scale philosophy-specific analysis to address questions of this sort.

Before delving into a statistical analysis of the present state of the discipline, we begin by looking at the geographic, historical, and disciplinary contexts motivating our research. After all, the history of women in philosophy is the history of women across all academic disciplines (at least in the Western tradition), and these histories locate in time and extend across the globe.

1.1. Historical Context

Although the equivalent of the doctoral degree may have originated in the Muslim world during the 10th Century, the first degree granting universities emerged in Europe shortly thereafter.[1] The first woman in Europe to earn a doctoral degree, Elena Cornaro Piscopia, studied the philosophical sciences at the University of Padua in 1678—nearly a half-millenium after her male counterparts began earning their degrees (Pugh 2018).

Earning her degree from the University of Bologna, Laura Bassi followed in her predecessor's footsteps around a half-century later and eventually became the first woman professor in Europe. Only a handful of other women in Europe earned their degrees before the 19th century, and women

[1] In the 9th Century, Fatima bint Muhammad Al-Fihriyya, a woman credited as an Islamic scholar, established the al-Qarawiyyin mosque, which later developed into an academic institution and is now a university in Morocco.

remained largely precluded from the academy for the next two-hundred years (Etzkowitz et al. 2000; Parker 2015).

Taking the United States as an example, women comprised approximately 16% of PhDs across all disciplines by the 1970s and approached gender parity in the 2000s (NCSES 2015). Given the deep roots, shared by women in philosophy and women in the academy more generally, we would expect to see significant gains in gender equity for women philosophers in the decades between 1950 and 2020. However, women in philosophy have seen some of the fewest gains overall. During this time period in the US, women received fewer than 30% of PhDs in philosophy, and it seems as though the proportion of women philosophy PhDs has plateaued as of the 1990s (NCSES 2015; Schwitzgebel and Jennings 2017; American Academy of Arts and Sciences 2019a; Conklin et al. 2019). On average, women in other areas of the Humanities receive approximately 50% more PhDs than those in philosophy (NCSES 2015; American Academy of Arts and Sciences 019a). The story is similar in other parts of the world (Goddard et al. 008c; Klonschinski 2020).[2]

For the most part, women philosophers seem to continue into academic positions in approximately the same or greater proportions as they earn PhDs (Jennings 2015; Jennings et al. 2016). While data on the representation of women philosophy faculty in different regions of the globe is somewhat difficult to obtain, the existing research suggests that women are consistently under-represented as philosophy faculty, falling somewhere below 30% in Northern America (e.g., the US and Canada) and Europe (e.g., the UK, Greece, and Germany), as well as some Anglophone countries of Oceania (e.g., Australia and New Zealand) (Goddard et al. 008a,b,d; Dodds and Goddard 2013; Rini 2013; Bowell 2015; Iliadi et al. 2018; Klonschinski 2020; Klonschinski et al. 2021).[3]

There is some evidence that the proportions of women philosophy faculty decrease as they seek tenure and promotion, with women comprising around 20% of all Full Professors in US philosophy departments (Conklin

[2] For research on the under-representation of women as undergraduate philosophers, across national contexts, see (Dougherty et al. 2015; Paxton et al. 2012; Thompson et al. 2016; Latham 2018; Beebee and Saul 2011; Iliadi et al. 2018; Klonschinski 2020; Aymelek 2015).

[3] The finding for Greece is particularly striking, since Iliadi et al. (2018) also note that more than half of philosophy students in Greece are women. Paxton et al. (2012) presents similar findings in the US.

et al. 2019). Yet, in some disciplines, women have achieved gender parity at the faculty level (NSOPF 2004).[4] This seems like a disappointing outcome, given that Mary Whiton Calkins was appointed as the first woman president of both the American Psychological Association and the American Philosophical Association prior to the 1920s, and many other firsts were achieved by women philosophers during this same period (Pugh 2018).[5]

Despite any gains we see, it seems like something has gone wrong in academic philosophy. In some sense, philosophy pioneered the acceptance of women in the academy and, with time, made it possible for women to earn globally respected degrees, get published, and pursue academic careers across the disciplines.[6] Yet, the field of philosophy, as of the 2020s, demonstrates a notable lack of gender parity.[7] So, we must wonder, where are the women?

Without a doubt, publication is a factor that mediates an academic's ability to get hired and gain tenure, which makes academic journals the gatekeepers to one of the most important measures of academic success (O'Neill and Sachis 1994; Allen-Hermanson 2017; Chattopadhyay et al. 2013). We already know that women academics experience substantial challenges in this area regardless of discipline, but the situation is somehow worse in philosophy (Ginther and Hayes 2003, 1999; Park and Gordon 1996; Heckman and Moktan 2020; Heilman and Haynes 2005; Krawczyk and Smyk 2016; Shen et al. 2018). In philosophy journals, as within the discipline generally, the proportions of women authors increased

[4] One might wonder whether gender parity or gender equality should be the goal. If, in general, it turns out that women (via no illegitimate cause) are simply less interested in certain questions or certain areas of study, such as philosophy, than their male counterparts, then it might be problematic to suggest that the lack of gender parity in that area indicates that an injustice has occurred. One might propose that a truly egalitarian system could manifest some such gender disparity. However, we know that the institutions upon which the discipline of philosophy is based, at the present time, are not egalitarian and that the gender disparities we are observing are most likely due to injustices embedded in the structure of the discipline. Until we have reason to believe that a lack of gender parity within the discipline is not due to a history of injustice, then it seems safe to assume that gender parity, or something approximating it is the goal. We ask our readers to conditionally consider our project through this normative lens.

[5] Beatrice Edgell was appointed as the first woman president of the Aristotelian Society a short time after (Pugh 2018).

[6] Of course, we recognize that these accomplishments are, to a great extent, an artefact of philosophy's status as one of the first academic disciplines in Europe, but this observation also punctuates our point. Despite being a discipline of firsts, philosophy has fallen behind.

[7] The problem extends well beyond Northern America. See Rosker (2021).

substantially between 1950 and 2020 (Hassoun et al. 2022; Schwitzgebel 2015; West et al. 2013). Yet, according to West et al. (2013), women comprise approximately 26% of authors across all disciplines as of the early 2000s, while women account for half as many authors in philosophy journals. More recent research on this topic suggests that, as of the 2000s, the median proportion of authorships by women philosophers is around 19% (Hassoun et al. 2022). Among those who do successfully publish their work, women seem to author, on average, around two philosophy articles each (Hassoun et al. 2022). This number seems striking when again juxtaposed with the success of Mary Whiton Calkins, an intellectual powerhouse who published over 100 academic articles and 4 books, and she was widely regarded as one of the most influential scholars of her era.[8]

1.2. Prior Work

There have been few other studies comparing the proportions of women authors in philosophy journals to the proportions of women authors in other disciplines. For example, Pearse et al. (2019) conduct an analysis of author gender and the circulation of feminist philosophies across six humanities disciplines using citation networks from the Web of Science database. West et al. (2013) conduct a large-scale citation network analysis to compare authorship gender across all disciplines in the JSTOR database. Both studies found that philosophy journals tend to publish among the lowest proportions of women authors, and West et al. (2013) find that only mathematics journals publish a lower proportion of women.

However, these works rely on citation network analyses, which typically only include work that has been cited by at least one other author. In a large-scale multidisciplinary citation study, Larivière et al. (2013) show that women are cited less frequently than men. In philosophy, the most influential scholars in the canon are most widely read and cited, a habit that reinforces historical biases toward European men and further marginalizes women and those of non-European ethnicities (Healy 2013).[9]

[8] Around that same time, the first woman philosopher published in *Mind*, and one of the most highly regarded analytic philosophy journals, *Analysis*, was founded by a pair of women. See Pugh (2018). Notably, both journals struggle with regard to gender equity today (Wilhelm et al. 2018; Hassoun et al. 2022).

[9] Larivière et al. (2013) also note that women in philosophy are cited much less than their male

As an example of how disproportionate citation practices can be in philosophy, Healy (2015) demonstrated that David Lewis alone received twice as many citations as all women authors in the 500 most heavily cited philosophy articles.

Another potential limitation of prior work is the focus on US data (Schwitzgebel et al. 2021; Conklin et al. 2019; Paxton et al. 2012; Thompson et al. 2016; Benétreau-Dupin and Beaulac 2015). Author gender in philosophy journals is frequently inferred by algorithms relying heavily on the US Social Security Database and have difficulty inferring gender for names uncommon in the US (West et al. 2013; Schwitzgebel and Jennings 2017; Wilhelm et al. 2018; Hassoun et al. 2022). As a result, we seem to have a good deal of information on the situation for authorship by gender in the US, but one might wonder whether the existing findings on author gender in philosophy journals is a problem belonging to the US and the Anglophone world. Some have speculated that the situation may be different elsewhere, especially in parts of the world more likely to engage with philosophies beyond the Analytic Tradition, such as Continental philosophy or Chinese philosophy (Klonschinski 2020; Klonschinski et al. 2021; Iliadi et al. 2018; Schwitzgebel et al. 2018; Noichl 2021; Chiesa and Galeotti 2018).

1.3. Our Contribution

In our work, we expand our analyses to consider the global scope of academic philosophy journals and authorship by gender. We use direct publication records, in lieu of a citation network and use methodology that is inclusive of non-Anglophone names. We compare author gender across three different compounding factors. First, we examine how philosophy fits in comparison to other academic disciplines. Second, we follow with an exploration of how the regional academic context in which Philosophy Journals operate impacts on author gender proportions. For this, we compare author gender in Philosophy Journals that self-report affiliations with institutions or organizations in specific geographic regions. Third, and perhaps most interestingly, we consider the impact of author ethnicity on gender representation, and we examine the breakdown of author ethnicity

counterparts, but the related statistics are not available.

across Philosophy Journals between 1950 and 2020. To our knowledge, this is the first work to offer an estimate for author ethnicity and gender in philosophy publications using a large-scale data set.

In our work, we consider the following questions:

1. **Is there something about the content of Philosophy Journals that differentiates them with regard to the publication of women authors?** In light of existing discussions in the field, we hypothesize that Philosophy Journals behave more like those in STEM fields and less like those in Humanistic disciplines.
2. **Does the geographic regional affiliation of a journal affect the proportions of authorships by women?** We test the hypotheses that author gender proportions are predominantly a Northern American problem.
3. **Does the author's ethnicity impact on the proportion of women authorships?** We test the hypotheses that a broadly "Western" hereditary decent may correspond to a higher proportion of women authorships.

Despite the more global context of our work, we observe trends that mirror prior US-focused analyses. Unsurprisingly, most authors are of American or Western European origin. We do observe a 64% growth in the representation of philosophers with non-Western ethnicities between 1950 and 2020, but this number is disappointing compared to the 241% growth seen by women authors in the discipline. Regarding journal regional affiliation, we observe a common trend. Contrary to our hypothesis, the relatively low proportions of women publishing in philosophy journals is not a problem belonging to Northern America alone. In fact, the situation for women seems to be worse for journals related to Western Europe but better for journals related to Eastern Europe. Even so, women authors are under-represented compared to their male counterparts across each compounding factor. Because most of the journals in our data set are affiliated with Northern America or Europe, we are most confident in our findings relating to these geographic regions. However, we believe, given the size of our data set, that this has important implications for philosophers, regardless of gender, who are attempting to publish in a global context.

2. Methods

We conduct an analysis of philosophy publication data in the JSTOR and Portico databases between 1950 and 2020.[10] We focus on how the proportion of authorships by women philosophers changes across decades and across a number of compounding factors, including author ethnicity, publication regional affiliation, as well as publication data from the same time period in journals from other disciplines.

In this section, we describe the methods used in selecting the data sets examined in this article. We define each of our comparison variables, and we provide the details of the statistical methods employed. We report the details and results for each of the specific analyses in Section 3.

2.1. Data Set

We sourced our data set through Constellate (2021), which provides a free service for accessing publication metadata. We queried only publications available through the JSTOR and Portico databases and limited our search to publications of the "research-article" and "article" document subtype (excluding book reviews, editorials, announcements, letters, etc.).[11] For each research article, we accessed metadata on publication name, publication venue, author list, and publication year.

Using slightly different methodologies, we accessed two sets of article metadata for our analysis: philosophy article metadata and comparison field article metadata.

2.1.1. Philosophy Article Metadata

Our first data set comprises metadata for 262,513 total philosophy articles. This data set comprises all articles available at the time of access from 177 journals that focus primarily on philosophy or interdisciplinary journals

[10] Although data from earlier decades are available through JSTOR and Portico, we focus on articles published between 1950 and 2020 because data from these earlier decades are sparse.
[11] Other data archives are accessible through Constellate, but research articles are not available through these archives.

with philosophical content. We refer to these as Philosophy Journals and Interdisciplinary Journals respectively. A full list of journals is available in Appendix A.

Employing a method similar to Hassoun et al. (2022), we identified an initial list of Philosophy Journals by aggregating the content of several existing lists, including those made available through Thom Brooks' Blog, the Leiter Journal Ranking Survey, the APA/BPA Journal Surveys, Andrew Cullison's Journal Surveys, Brian Weatherson's Journal Surveys, as well as Wikipedia. We identified 124 philosophy journals in the JSTOR and Portico databases using this method.

For our analyses of Interdisciplinary Journals with self-reported philosophical content, we were unable to access bibliographic data for the full list of journals originally included in the study conducted by (Hassoun et al. 2022). As our Interdisciplinary Journal data were too sparse to conduct an identical comparison, we expanded our data set, as we did with the Philosophy Journals. To accomplish this task, we manually identified 53 additional journals that self-reported engagement with philosophical content on the journal website or on the JSTOR website. These journals were selected, in part, for their, more globally inclusive multi-disciplinary specializations and Regional Affiliations.

2.1.2. Comparison Field Article Metadata

We accessed a second set of article metadata for conducting a multi-discipline comparison to the field of philosophy. For this set, we used articles identified by Constellate (2021) as belonging to one of 16 fields grouped into 4 broad disciplines, including the Lab Sciences (i.e, physics, chemistry, ecology, and biology), Technology and Mathematics (i.e., mathematics (all), mathematical logic, computer science, and engineering), the Social Sciences (i.e., psychology, sociology, political science, and economics), and the Humanities (i.e., history, law, religion, and literature).[12] The Humanistic fields were selected based on their content overlap with

[12] The inclusion of mathematical logic, in addition to mathematics (all), is an artefact of our initial analysis, which we chose to include because it serves to demonstrate an important point about the way in which sub-fields within a discipline impact on observations about the overall representation of women within the discipline.

philosophy areas of specialization, and the rest (i.e., the STEM fields) were selected to test our hypothesis that philosophy is more similar to STEM than adjacent Humanistic fields.[13]

We list the disciplines and article count for each decade, in Appendix B. Unlike the philosophy data set, due to fiscal and time constraints, we limited the search to a random sample of a maximum of 25,000 articles for comparison per discipline. This consisted of 253,738 total articles.

2.2. Determining Author Gender & Origin

Data on the gender or ethnic origins of authors is largely unavailable because most philosophy journals do not provide or collect such information. We, therefore, implement an algorithm, made available through Namsor (2021), to infer gender and ethnicity using an author's name. Namsor (2021) is an online service that uses a validated machine learning approach to classify the gender and country of origin associated with a first and last name. See appendix B for the percentage of tagged data tagged with author gender and ethnicity.

2.2.1. Gender

Because there are no historical databases on self-reported author gender in philosophy, we infer author gender, as a man or women, using first names. We acknowledge that our gender assignments may not align with a given author's self-identified gender and that we may occasionally assign the incorrect gender to authors with rare names or names that fall outside common gender conventions. We similarly cannot capture cases of non-

[13] Note that while Constellate has a comprehensive list of top journals in the field of Philosophy, not all top publications across other disciplines are represented in the Constellate data set. For example, the CS data sample lacks ACM and IEEE publications, which tend to be among the most prestigious publication venues in the field. An informal review of the available journals suggests that our analysis tends to include a greater proportion of less prestigious journals. If these less prestigious journals follow trends similar to what we see in philosophy, they most likely publish higher proportions of women than the more prestigious journals. However, given the size of the data sets included in the samples for each field, we would not expect the numbers to change much if we had indeed sampled from the most prestigious journals, since, in all disciplines, the most prestigious journals account for only a small portion of all available publication venues. So, their contributions to the overall publication trends in a field, which is what we are considering in our analyses, would be correspondingly small.

binary or gender fluid individuals. These deficiencies are known limitations of this type of analysis, particularly analyses utilizing historical data where backwards identification of preferred gender may be impossible. We do however believe that gender-based name tagging provides a coarse estimate of author gender and is a valuable metric for understanding some aspects of marginalization in the state of the discipline.

For this paper, we infer gender for only the principle author on each article, which, by convention, is usually the first author of a work.[14] We parse our data to capture all recorded first and last names for the principle author on each paper. We exclude non-human names relating to publications by institutions and committees, manually filtering out words such as: society, institute, project, agency, among others. Papers with first names consisting of only the first initial are similarly excluded from the analysis, as a single initial is insufficient for inferring a gender. We standardize all names to lowercase and replace tildas with hyphens, and we replace backticks with apostrophes but keep them in the original character set (including accents) from Constellate (2021).

There are two common approaches for extrapolating gender from a name: Historic Baby Names from the US Social Security Database and online services. Hassoun et al. (2022) and West et al. (2013), for example, use the US Social Security Database (2021) to infer gender. While Schwitzgebel and Jennings (2017) use Genderize.io (2021), which is an online service. One potential criticism of the former approach is that names in the US Social Security Database are heavily Americanized. In contrast, Genderize.io (2021) captures a wider assortment of names but limit searches to first names using the Latin alphabet. Either strategy may fail to capture the full diversity of the global academic community.

For this work, we instead employ Namsor (2021). This service uses both first and last name, in the original character set (e.g., Cyrillic), to assign gender and is more sensitive to the likely ethnicity of the author. Past work

[14] Although some articles may have more than one author, inferring gender for only the principle author does not significantly impact our work. Philosophy is primarily a single author discipline, and women are considerably less likely than men to co-author. Moreover, while approximately 8% of philosophy journals are likely to have more than one author, only 2% of philosophy articles tend to have mixed gender authors. See Hassoun et al. (2022). Given the size of our data set and the low proportions of mixed gender co-authorships, inferring gender for only the principle author does not significantly impact our work.

by Santamaría and Mihaljević (2018) has shown that this tool has a higher accuracy than the other two approaches. We ran Namsor (2021) on our entire data set, including Interdisciplinary Journals and journals from other fields, and tagged first authors with the corresponding gender only when there was at least a 90% probability of the full name belonging to only one gender.

2.2.2. Ethnic Origin

Similarly, few journals provide self-identified ethnicity for authors. Using Namsor (2021), we attempt to infer author ethnicity using the geographic origin associated with the author's full name.[15]

We recognize this is a coarse method of analysis. For example, marriage may complicate identification when spouses take each other's names. Past work, such as Scheuble and Johnson (2005), has shown that women tend to use pre-marital last names for professional publications.[16] Using a combination of first and last names, along with original alphabets provide sensible guesses at potential ethnicity.

For this analysis, we focus primarily on geographic sub-regions. Namsor (2021) infers the countries most likely associated with a name, along with the probability of the match. Using the top two country matches, we assign each to the corresponding sub-region. If the top two matches correspond to the same sub-region, we sum their probabilities. Then, if the resulting probability is greater than 15%, we assign the author to that sub-region. Note that the low probability provided by Namsor (2021) is in regards to the author belonging to an exact country and not a region. In practice, the alternate country matches typically fall into the same geographic regions.

[15] See Namsor (2021) for more information on the methodology employed.

[16] However, one might worry that this is a more recent development and that women publishing earlier in our timeline (e.g., closer to the 1950s) might have taken their husband's last names, which would make it harder to be certain of author ethnicity in earlier decades, especially the ethnicity of women authors. To address this concern, we should highlight one tragic fact. Across the globe and until more recent decades, conservatives about inter-racial and inter-ethnic marriages strictly and often violently enforced stratified social systems and anti-miscegenation laws and statutes. As a result, we would therefore expect last names to accurately reflect author ethnicity in historic data, and we would expect deviations from this tradition by women to be few in number, especially given the already low proportion of women authors over the decades.

While this method is experimental and should not be taken as a definitive analysis of author ethnicities, we believe it provides a novel and interesting look at publication data in Philosophy.

2.3. Determining Journal Regional Affiliation

In addition to examining ethnicity, we pair this analysis with journal specific factors, such as the geographic location of publication. Once we identified the initial list of Philosophy Journals for which we could access article metadata through Constellate (2021), we manually assigned each journal to a world region based on the institutional or organizational affiliations. We assigned journal affiliations based on self-reporting from the journal website or the JSTOR website. Sometimes, a journal was affiliated with an institution or organization that self-identified as genuinely international in scope, and these journals were assigned to the "International" category for comparing to journals with specific regional affiliations. In some cases (22 philosophy journals), we were unable to identify journal affiliation because none was conspicuously reported, and these journals were excluded from the regional comparison.

We identified 41 journals affiliated with institutions or organizations in Northern America (US & Canada), 43 journals affiliated with Western Europe, 6 affiliated with Eastern Europe, and 10 journals with broadly International affiliations. Asia and the Middle East had a single journal affiliation each, so we omit these categories from our statistical analysis. Though, we do make several notes about these journals.

Our final list of philosophy journals and corresponding article entries was limited to those for which article metadata was available through the JSTOR and Portico databases, and our regional analysis was, unfortunately, limited primarily to journals with articles published in English (89% of all papers in our data set are in English). Due to these limitations we combined areas with low journal counts into fused categories. We recognize that there are potential regional databases that could be leveraged and hope to explore a wider data set in future work. We provide a full list of journals and our assignments for regions in Appendix A. As the Middle East had only two journals in our data set we omit it from our comparative analysis.

2.4. Modeling

We define "authorships" as author-paper pairs. We calculate the proportion of women authorships as the number of women authorships over the total number of women and men, excluding authors whose gender was not identified. We examine authorships, rather than unique authors, throughout the analysis because we are unable to fully disambiguate the set of unique authors.

When possible, in our analysis, we model the data using a generalized linear model (GLM). General linear models are a broad class of models that generalize beyond simple linear regression. Our data does not fit a normal distribution and best conforms to a negative binomial distribution. In all cases, we used this distribution family for generating the model. Due to the long review process and bundled nature of journal publishing, we use year and decade as categorical variables. Unless otherwise stated, we use journal-year pair as the grouping for the data.

3. Results

3.1. Trends Over Time

First, we conduct an initial inspection of the data set described in Section 2.1. As noted, we collected data on journals focusing primarily on philosophy as well as interdisciplinary journals with philosophical content. We refer to these journals as "Philosophy Journals" and "Interdisciplinary Journals" respectively. In this section, we conduct a comparison of the proportion of women authorships in Philosophy Journals to that of Interdisciplinary Journals for each decade between 1950 and 2020.

For this analysis, we constructed a GLM model as described in the methods section 2. We used the number of women authorships as the response variable, the log of the total number of authorships as an offset, and the decade of publication as predictors. We found that the interaction between journal category and decade is significant. We reran our model, stratified by journal type, and interpreted the results for each journal type independently. We show the resulting model estimates for each journal type and decade in Figure 1.

The overall trends show that since the 1970s at least, the representation of women authors has been steadily increasing but is far from equal. Women make up only 22% of authorships. We present the 95% confidence interval as the shaded region around the model estimate. The tight CI's, especially around the estimated model for Philosophy Journals, suggests a high level of accuracy.



Figure 1. Trend for General Philosophy and Interdisciplinary Papers. Total number of authorships, men and women (top). GLM By Decade (bottom)authorships.

Although the two journal types performed similarly in the 1950s, Interdisciplinary Journals consistently publish a greater proportion of women authors than Philosophy Journals. As of 2020, women make up 30% of all publications in Interdisciplinary Journals. The lack of overlap between the CI's (depicted by the white space between the two shaded regions), signifies that the difference between the two journal types is statistically significant as of the 1960s.

Our results are consistent with those reported for "Non-Top Philosophy Journals" in Hassoun et al. (2022). To some extent, we are not surprised by these results, since existing literature on gender determination algorithms suggests that Namsor (2021) (used in our study) performs comparably to the approach used in Hassoun et al. (2022) (i.e., names from the US SSDB). However, we should highlight that Namsor (2021) is better at inferring gender from non-anglicized names, meaning that the algorithm gives us access to gender information about a diverse population of authors, which were not included in the large-scale authorship study by Hassoun et al. (2022). Our preliminary findings offer initial evidence for what seems to be a global trend—that, when we investigate philosophy authorship and gender in a more broadly international (i.e., by considering author names under-represented in the US SSDB), we find relatively few differences.

3.2. Comparison to Other Fields

Second, we compare the proportions of women authorship in Philosophy Journals to the proportions of women authorships in other disciplines.

For our comparison, we reuse the estimated proportions of women authorships in Philosophy Journals from the GLM in Section 3.1. However, we employed slightly different approaches for accessing authorship data for philosophy and non-philosophy disciplines (as noted in Section 2.1). For other fields, we provide raw proportion instead of modeling the estimated proportion. To calculate these proportions, we sum total number of women authorships and divide by the total number of all authorships. We show the resulting proportions for each discipline and each decade in Figure 2. We limit our analysis to a trend-level comparison.[17]



Figure 2. Field Comparison - By Field

Although journals across all fields publish somewhat low proportions of women authors in the 1950s and 1960s, the proportions of women authorships increase across all disciplines in the decades between 1950 and 2020. In the 1950s, Philosophy Journals (solid purple) published the lowest proportion of women (6%) compared to the journals in Humanistic fields (i.e., the Humanities and Social Sciences), but journals in the Humanistic fields showed a good deal of variation with those in political science (green

[17] We use journal-year pairs in our GLM estimates. Because we accessed a random sampling of journals for each non-philosophy discipline and each year, the GLM's calculations for each journal-year pair would be incorrect. For example, our data contain many non-philosophy journals for which we have only a single entry in a particular year. This prevents us from building a comparable model, since we have complete data about Philosophy Journals. Similarly, we do not provide CIs for the non-philosophy data, as we are more uncertain about the statistical error, and any comparison to the CIs on the well modeled philosophy data would be misleading. This complication should not impact on our ability to examine overall trends in a discipline because of the size of our sample, but it does impede our ability to conduct accurate statistical comparisons between the different disciplines.

stars) publishing in proportions close to Philosophy Journals at 7% women authors and those in psychology journals (green lines) publishing 20% women authors. Law (blue stars), psychology, and sociology consistently publish the highest proportions of women authors in each decade and are approaching 50% women authors as of the 2000s.

Compared to journals in STEM fields, Philosophy Journals (6% ± 1) started higher than engineering at 2% (red circles), physics at 3% (solid yellow), ecology at 4% (yellow lines), and mathematical logic at 5% (red stars). However, by the 2010s engineering and ecology journals demonstrated rapid growth (1336% and 706% respectively) that ranked them 8-10% above Philosophy Journals. We can see that a slow start for journals in STEM fields did not indicate lower authorship in the future. Also, as of the 2010s, only journals in physics, chemistry (yellow stars), and mathematical logic publish a lower proportion of women authors than Philosophy Journals. While physics and chemistry are comparable to philosophy over the decades (frequently falling on the cusp of philosophy's CI), the only discipline consistently publishing a lower proportion of women authors than philosophy is mathematical logic, which never falls within philosophy's CI. Whereas mathematics overall (solid red) consistently publishes a greater proportion of women authors than Philosophy Journals and follows a trajectory more similar to Interdisciplinary Philosophy journals (purple stars). We highlight this difference for later discussion about the impact of sub-disciplines on the present research.

Comparing Philosophy Journals to Interdisciplinary Journals might be the closest comparison, as the content is more similar to that of philosophy, and we have a larger sample size for this category. While starting out similar Philosophy Journals with ≈ 6% women in the 1950s, the mean rate of growth for Interdisciplinary Journals was 8% faster. By the 2010s, Interdisciplinary Journals published a statistically significantly greater proportion of women authors at 30% (8% higher than Philosophy Journals).

As the per-field grouping is crowded, we group the individual fields into their broader respective disciplines as specified in Appendix B. Note we omit mathematical logic from the groupings to avoid double counting.[18]

[18] To clarify on this point, we drop mathematical logic from the comparison between broader disciplinary groupings in order to prevent over-sampling mathematics, and specifically a single sub-

For this analysis, we examine Philosophy Journals and not Interdisciplinary Journals. For each field and category, we compute the decade over decade percent change in women authorships. We also compute the mean decade over decade percent change in the proportion of women authors, as well as the total field-wise percent change between the proportions of women authorships in the 1950s and 2010s.

We show the resulting proportions for each discipline and decade, as well as the rate of change per discipline, in Figure 3 and present a detailed table in Appendix C.



Figure 3. Field Comparison by discipline grouping. Proportion of women authorships by field and decade (left). Rate of growth by field and decade (right)

When grouping journals from individual fields into disciplines, we observe that Philosophy Journals had a slower start than other disciplines. While women in philosophy accounted for just 6% ± 1 of authorships in the 1950s, women in other fields accounted for 9-11% of authorships. Notably, the mean rate of growth is comparable to other disciplines (23% in philosophy compared to 22-25% in other disciplines). Similarly, the total change from the 1950s to 2010s is 241% additional women for philosophy, which is comparable to the mean rate of growth overall. The slow start does however put Philosophy Journals last in a discipline level comparison. The proportion of women authors in the 2010s is 9% ± 1 lower than in the next lowest discipline, Math and Technology, and 14% lower than the Humanities.

field of mathematics, in the comparative analysis.

3.3. Journal Regional Affiliation

Third, we examine the proportions of women authorships in Philosophy Journals (excluding Interdisciplinary) by geographic regional affiliation. As previously noted in 2.3, geographic regional affiliation was assigned based on self-identified connections with regionally affiliated institutions or organizations. Journals self-identifying as genuinely internationally affiliated were also analysed for comparison.

For our analysis, we built a GLM, using the number of women authorships as the response variable, the log of the total number of authorships as an offset, and journal regional affiliations as the predictors. We show the resulting model estimates for each region in Figure 4. We provide all estimated values and confidence intervals in appendix D.



a) Map of GLM estimates
b) GLM Estimates with CI

Figure 4. Journal Region Comparison aggregated for all decades. Proportion of women based on GLM

We find that journals affiliated with Eastern Europe publish the largest proportions of women authors, followed by journals affiliated with Northern America, which somewhat contradicts our hypothesis. However, we find no statistically significant difference between the two journal types. An analysis of additional data from Eastern European journals could help clarify whether we are observing a meaningful difference in these regional journal categories. Interestingly, we find that journals affiliated with Western Europe (14% ± 1) publish statistically significantly lower proportions of women authors compared to those affiliated with Northern America(17% ± 1) and Eastern Europe (19% ± 3), as do journals with an International affiliation (12% ± 1). We observe no statistical difference between the proportions of women authorships in journals with International affiliations and those affiliated with Western Europe.

In our data set, we did have one journal regionally affiliated with Asia and one journal affiliated with the Middle East. We can draw no firm conclusions about journals with either geographic regional affiliation because the data set is too small. We did, however, observe that the journal affiliated with the Middle East published the lowest proportions of women (4% ± 2), compared to all other regionally affiliated journals, and that the difference in the proportions of women authorships is statistically significant. We believe this result merits further inquiry in future research.



a) Map of GLM estimates
b) GLM Estimates with CI

Figure 5. Region Topic Comparison. Aggregated for all decades. Proportion of women based on GLM

3.4. Author Ethnicity

Fourth, we compare author gender distribution and the likely region correlating to author ethnicity (based on author first and last name) between 1950 and 2020. For this analysis, we consider only Philosophy Journals (excluding Interdisciplinary Journals).

We built a GLM, using journal-year pairs as input grouping, the number of female authorships as the response variable, the log of the total number of authorships as an offset, and the sub-region associated with author ethnicity as predictors. We show the resulting model estimates for each topic and decade in Figure 6b. We provide all estimated values and confidence intervals in appendix D.



a) Map of GLM estimates
b) GLM of gender breakdown by author ethnicity.

Figure 6. Author Ethnicity Comparison. Aggregated for all decades.

Surprisingly, women with ethnicities associated with the Indo-Pacific region, which includes the Indian sub-continent, Pacific Islands, and South East Asia, publish in statistically significantly higher proportions (25% ± 3) compared to all other regions, except Latin America. Women with ethnicities in Latin America (22% ± 3), Northern America (19% ± 1), and Eastern Europe (17% ± 2) publish in the next largest proportions respectively. While these results are suggestive, we do not identify statistically significant differences in the proportions of women authors for these regions.

Interestingly, women authors with an ethnicity corresponding to Western Europe (12% ± 1) publish the statistically significantly lowest proportions overall—a 5% difference from Africa, the next lowest group. This observation may be somewhat impacted by the split of authors between the Northern America and Western Europe Group, as we will address more in the discussion in Section 4.[19]

Meanwhile, the proportions of women authors with an ethnicity corresponding to Africa, the Middle East, and Eastern Asia (encompassing China, Korea, and Japan) fall in the middle of the pack with no statistical difference.

[19] As a prelude to this discussion, we note that Western European surnames, especially those traced from Anglophone countries, heavily overlap with historically Northern American surnames (e.g., names such as Smith, Jones, Roberts, and Miller), so we might be losing important information about diversity in author ethnicity when it comes to analysing Northern America.



Figure 7. Proportion of authorships by region and ethnicity for all genders, by year. Full trend (top left). Zoomed in on non Western Origins (bottom left). Total Change from 1950s to 2010s by origin (right).

Next, we analyzed the breakdown of author ethnicity over time. Note, here we are looking at all genders. We present a graph of these trends in Figure 7. Unsurprisingly, for our data set, authors of Western European decent make up half of all authorships. In the 1950s, 69% of all authors were tagged as having a Western European origin, and, as authors associated with other ethnicities, became more represented, the number declined to 56% of all authorships. Authors with an ethnicity corresponding to Northern America comprise the next largest group with 19% of all authorships in the 1950s and 24% of all authorships as of the 2010s.

Authors with the remaining ethnicities comprise less than 25% of all authorships in our data set, with each region comprising between 1-7% of authorships. When we examined growth between the 1950s and 2010s, we found that the proportion of authors descending from the Indo-Pacific region had the highest growth at 207%. Eastern Asia had the second highest growth at 185%. Eastern European authorships grew by 125%, while authors with ethnicities associated with the remaining regions had less than 20% growth.

In general, these findings suggest that gender parity among authors in Philosophy Journals is least likely when considering authors of Western European decent, but women with Western European decent publish in considerably greater numbers than women with any other ethnicity. Women philosophers of African decent, however, are published both in some of the lowest proportions and the lowest number.

4. Discussion

This paper presents new data on the under-representation of women authors in Philosophy Journals across decades and across compounding factors, including regions associated with an author's ethnicity, journal geographic regional affiliation, as well as a comparative analysis to publication data from the same time period in journals from other disciplines. In what follows, we highlight interesting findings, address some limitations of this study, and provide ideas for future work.

We join the body of academic philosophers who are concerned that women are, in numerous ways, under-represented in the discipline of philosophy. As of 2020, we observe that the proportion of authorships by women in Philosophy Journals remains significantly lower than the proportions of authorships by men. Naturally, we would like to see equality in every aspect of the profession and ask our readers to consider our findings through this normative lens. However, we are also troubled by the under-representation of women authorships in Philosophy Journals in more limited ways.

For example, one standing concern is about the difference in the proportions of women faculty and the proportions of women authorships in philosophy journals. As of 2020, women comprise approximately 25% of faculty (across all professional ranks) but publish approximately 19% of articles, aggregated across ranked and unranked Philosophy Journals (Hassoun et al. 2022; Wilhelm et al. 2018; Schwitzgebel and Jennings 2017; Conklin et al. 2019). This disparity is troubling, since publishing is a key metric of academic success and is essential for progressing one's career in academia. This issue has been discussed at length, but the general worry involves the possibility of problematic biases against women arising at key points in the review process. Such biases, which would impede women from publishing, might manifest in many ways (Dotson 2013; Brogaard 2012; Blair 2002; Lee and Schunn 2010; Bourget and Chalmers 2014; Hagengruber 2015; Waithe 2020; Hengel 2017).

One might wonder whether gender representation among philosophy faculty is a fair comparison class for gender representation in philosophy journals. Different kinds of academic positions have differing requirements on the quantity and quality of academic publications. If, for example, women are

hired into teaching positions more easily than into research positions, then we might reasonably expect to observe a disparity between the proportions of women faculty and the proportions of women authorships in philosophy journals—one that is not obviously due to any biases in the peer review process. Because publications are more important to research positions, women would be under less pressure to publish and might correspondingly produce and submit fewer publications. This could help explain the gender productivity gap in philosophy (Bright 2017).

To get a better sense of the best comparison class, we would need to know more about the distribution of faculty, by gender, between teaching and research positions in philosophy as well as the distribution, by gender, of submission and acceptance rates at philosophy journals. Further research in this area seems warranted, but we note that this question is complicated by several compounding factors. For example, because publication success is typically required for hiring into research positions, low publication rates could restrict women philosophers to teaching positions, which afford less time and fewer material resources for producing and submitting articles.

Setting this question aside, an alternative hypothesis for explaining the smaller proportion of women authors in philosophy journals, as compared to the proportion of women philosophy faculty, is that women philosophers instead publish in Interdisciplinary Journals with philosophical content, which are perhaps the next best option for women philosophers hoping to overcome this impediment to their academic careers and publish their research (Hassoun et al. 2022).

This hypothesis might be supported by our analysis. When we compared the proportion of women authorships in Philosophy Journals to that of Interdisciplinary Journals, we found that Interdisciplinary Journals publish a greater proportion of women authors as of the 1960s.[20] This finding is consistent with that of Hassoun et al. (2022), whose results show that Interdisciplinary Journals publish greater proportions of women authors

[20] This finding is also consistent with the hypothesis that Interdisciplinary Journals with philosophical content, which are most frequently categorised as Social Science or Humanities journals, also publish from disciplines with greater proportions of women. As these hypotheses are not inconsistent with one another (i.e., it is possible for Interdisciplinary Journals to publish greater numbers of women philosophers and to publish high numbers of women from disciplines where women are more well represented), these are not counterpoints.

as compared to Leiter-ranked Top and unranked Non-Top Philosophy Journals. However, these authors only find statistically significant differences between the proportions of women authors published in Interdisciplinary and Top-Philosophy Journals.

The fact that this result holds, even though our analysis involves a broader corpus, highlights the confidence of the finding. Compared to Hassoun et al. (2022), we aggregate data from Top- and Non-Top philosophy journals to create a single Philosophy Journal category, since the focus of the present analysis is not concerned with so-called prestige effects (De Cruz 2018; Conklin et al. 2019; Wilhelm et al. 2018). We also include a greater number of journals for inclusion in our study—expanding the number of journals that would potentially categorize as Non-Top or Interdisciplinary Journals. Our work also expands on that of Hassoun et al. (2022), by broadening the inquiry beyond the US context. In our work, we specifically make an effort to include non-US based journals. We also implement a gender determination algorithm that allowed us to infer gender for authors with non-anglicized names, which were excluded in the analysis conducted by Hassoun et al. (2022). Despite the differences, both seem to clearly indicate that there is a real and meaningful difference between the representation of women in Philosophy Journals and Interdisciplinary Journals—one that is not US centric, as we test in the other analysis.

Perhaps the best way to explore this question would be to compare the names of individuals graduating with philosophy PhDs, over several decades, to the names of authors in both journal types. To our knowledge this type of study has not yet been performed in prior work, and we plan to explore it in future work.[21] More indirectly, this question supposes that there is something unique about philosophy, which encourages women to publish in adjacent disciplines. For this, we may consider adjacent fields, such as the Humanities and Social Sciences, and some of the traditionally male dominated STEM fields, including Math and Technology and the Lab Sciences.

[21] Though Allen-Hermanson (2017) does compare the proportions of recent PhDs to their chances at publishing, which bears on the sort of analysis we have in mind. See also Jennings (2015) and Jennings et al. (2016).

4.1. Comparing Philosophy Journals to Other Disciplines and Fields

To test this, we compared the proportions of women authorships in Philosophy Journals to the proportions of women authorships in other disciplines. We found that the Humanities and the Social Sciences groupings consistently publish greater mean proportions of women authors, on aggregate, than philosophy or the STEM groupings, which taken in isolation supports the supposition that philosophy is more like STEM than its Humanistic counterparts. However, when comparing the mean proportions of the two STEM groupings (i.e., Math & Technology and Lab Sciences), philosophy publishes lower proportions of women. This comparison gives us some initial evidence to think that the seemingly low proportions of women authorships in Philosophy Journals are not best explained by philosophy's similarity to STEM and are instead better explained by unique difficulties for gender equity in Philosophy Journals.

However, our analysis of the changes in the proportions of women authors across discipline groupings over time suggests that the proportions of women authorships increase at comparable rate per decade (22-25%). Philosophy Journals are in the middle of the pack at a 23% mean increase. So, although Philosophy Journals tend to publish a lower proportion of women authors, on aggregate, than journals in other disciplines, this is better explained by philosophy's comparatively low starting point in the 1950s. This finding is surprising and should leave us wondering whether the relative starting points of journals in individual fields are better indicators of how journals in those fields compare to those in other fields over time. If so, the fact that Philosophy Journals publish comparatively low proportions of women authors might stem from historical demographics and not speak especially poorly of philosophy's progress on gender equity.

To make advancements on this question, we divide disciplines into individual fields. Psychology, Sociology, and Linguistics journals begin with the greatest proportions of women authors in the 1950s and end with the greatest proportions of women authors in the 2010s. Journals in these fields unsurprisingly demonstrate the least total percent gain between 1950 and 2020, and their gains have slowed as the proportions of women authorships in these fields approach gender parity (i.e, 50%). So, the initial starting points of journals in top performing fields do seem to impact on

a field's overall performance, but this might be attributed to their having relatively little runway to start with. We can compare journals in top performing fields to those in bottom performing fields. Journals in Physics, Chemistry, and Mathematical Logic start low and end low, demonstrating similarly small gains. But such small gains are not likely due to a limited runway. One might think these findings suggest that the relative starting points of journals in individual fields do predict how they compare to others over time.

However, many of the journals in other individual fields started out with proportions of women authorships comparable to that of philosophy and have subsequently demonstrated significant gains. Interdisciplinary Journals, for example, are similar to Philosophy Journals in the 1950s and engineering journals start out with a lower proportion of women authors than Philosophy Journals (and had the lowest proportions overall). Even so, Interdisciplinary Journals are much greater than ($p < .001$) Philosophy Journals as of the 2010s, and engineering journals demonstrated the greatest overall gains (1336%) in the decades between 1950 and 2020. So, the low starting points for journals in these fields did not seem to predict their gains, but, much like Philosophy Journals, these journals did end up in the middle of the pack, which suggests that starting points may be a compounding factor. In summary, the historical context prevents Philosophy Journals from reaching gender parity as of 2020, but, in our opinion, Philosophy Journals or the field of Philosophy more generally, probably could have seen greater gains. A number of researchers have made suggestions about how to improve equity in philosophy journals.

Before moving on to a discussion of the regional analyses, which more literally addresses the question of "Where are the Women?", we should talk a bit about the implications and limitations of examining fields and disciplines at different levels. Consider our findings around Mathematics. On our initial round of data collection, we accessed data for Mathematical Logic on the intuition the Mathematical Logic would be representative of Mathematics overall and have some similarities to Philosophical Logic, making it good field for comparison to Philosophy. As it turned out, journals in Mathematical Logic publish the lowest proportions of women authors across all fields and is not representative of Mathematics (all), which is more similar to Interdisciplinary Journals. For all other fields in

our analysis, we took random samples from the field, rather than collecting data from specific sub-fields. The comparison between Philosophy Journals and Interdisciplinary Journals and between Philosophy Journals and other fields provides a clear picture of what is happening in these journals at the level of an entire field. But the comparison between Mathematical Logic and Mathematics (all) reminds us that a more fine-grained analysis of specific sub-fields can paint a very different picture. We wonder, for example, if the patterns observed in Mathematical Logic are similar to those of Philosophical Logic, since there is most likely some overlap in authors between these two sub-fields. If so, we might see that Philosophical Logic, as a journal AOS, publishes much lower proportions of women authors that Philosophy Journals in general.

A good deal of work has been done on AOS in Philosophy Journals (Hassoun et al. 2022; Schwitzgebel and Jennings 2017; Wilhelm et al. 2018). Our findings suggest that additional research on Philosophy Journals AOS, especially in comparison to sub-fields in other disciplines, is a promising area of future work.

4.2. Exploring Journal Regional Affiliation

To continue our exploration of the factors affecting women authorships in Philosophy Journals, we return to the observation that, despite the more global context of our work, we see trends that mirror prior US-focused analyses. To pull on this thread, we conducted a more fine-grained analysis of a topic that is little studied in the discipline—the relationship between authorship gender and geographic region in Philosophy Journals. This inquiry explores how the regional academic context, in which Philosophy Journals operate, may impact on gender proportions.

In our Introduction, we speculated that a journal's regional affiliation may impact on the proportion of women authorships. Perhaps the under-representation of women authors is more of a problem in the United States than the rest of the world. Contrary to our hypothesis, we did not find that journals affiliated with Northern America publish the lowest proportions of women authors. Journals affiliated with Western Europe published the lowest, while journals affiliated with Eastern Europe published the greatest. While these results contradict the intuition that the low proportions of

women authorships in Philosophy Journals is primarily a problem for the US, these results are consistent with the intuition that the problem belongs to the Western Philosophical Tradition more generally.[22]

With consideration to previous research, we note that our observations cannot be explained by the presence of Leiter (2015) ranked journals in our analysis. Although such journals tend to publish historically low proportions of women authors, they account for a small number of our data points. Journal AOS may, however, play a role in our results. All standard AOS categories were represented in our data set and were well distributed between journals affiliated with Northern America and Western Europe (the regions we had the most data for). Journals affiliated with Eastern Europe were a little more likely to be general philosophical journals lacking a particular specialization, which is notable because existing literature suggests that general philosophy journals tend to publish among the greatest proportions of women authors compared to other AOS categories (Hassoun et al. 2022; Wilhelm et al. 2018). Additional research on the role of AOS on author gender for journals with specified regional affiliations merits additional inquiry.

We suspect that the high proportions of women authors in journals affiliated with Eastern Europe could also stem from greater gender equality during the Soviet Era (Larivière et al. 2013; see also Skuhala Karasman and Boršić this issue of EuJAP).[23] If so, we would expect to see greater proportions of women authors in these journals prior to the fall of the Soviet Union in the 1990s, and we would expect to see lower proportions in subsequent decades.[24] We were unable to conduct a longitudinal analysis for journals in our regional affiliation comparison because we lacked sufficient data for that kind of statistical modeling. However, a cursory look at trends for journals affiliated with Eastern Europe were suggestive. We anticipate identifying additional data sources for further analyses of this kind in future work.

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[22] Though, there is plenty of research suggesting that women are under-represent as authors in many fields, across the globe, including Brazil (Lievore and Lievore 2022), Russia (Paul-Hus et al. 2015), China (Rosker 2021), and Poland (Kosmulski 2015).

[23] Larivière et al. (2013) also note that gender parity is more common in countries with lower scientific output, such as the Ukraine.

[24] Some literature suggests that the patterns is the same for Russia as elsewhere, with a steady increase in the proportions of women authors over time, but data does not seem to be available for philosophy (Krasnyak 2017).

We note, with interest, that journals identifying as genuinely International in regional affiliation performed about as well as journals affiliated with Western Europe. Several of such journals reported openness to a wide variety of philosophical traditions and border on interdisciplinarity, which, according to our findings, tend to publish larger proportions of women. Journal prestige could be a contributing factor to our findings, since around half of the journals self-identifying as genuinely International are highly sought after publication venues. It may also be that the "true" regional affiliations of these journals are regions where journals tend to publish women in lower proportions, since such self-reports may be more aspirational than actual. We recognize that many philosophical journals are in a period of transition as they take action to improve equity in authorship.

4.3. Exploring Author Ethnicity

To develop the more international aspect of our analyses, we conclude with an examination of the impact of author ethnicity on gender representation, and we examine the breakdown of author ethnicity across Philosophy Journals. While an ideal data set would contain either the author's self-reported ethnic identity or country of origin, we must infer ethnicity from the author's name. We encourage the reader to interpret these results with the understanding that there is some inherent error. That said, we are excited to provide a novel look into the ethnic diversity of philosophy authorship.

Unsurprisingly for our data set, we find that authors of Western European ethnicity and Northern American ethnicity comprise well over 75% of all authors, and this general pattern is observed over time. These findings are consistent with the hypothesis that authors of broadly "Western Decent" dominate academic publishing in philosophy regardless of gender. The explanation seems rather straightforward. Most of the journals in our data set are regionally affiliated with Northern America and Western Europe. While several journals in our data set publish in multiple languages, most are published in English, and a large number of these journals are based in primarily Anglophone countries.

Between the 1950s and 2010s, we do see a 64% growth in the representation of non-Western ethnicities. Based on the data available,

this growth is far slower than the 241% growth seen by women authors in the discipline. Perhaps unsurprisingly, origins in the Indo-Pacific (207%) and Eastern Asia (185%) see the greatest gains between 1950 and 2020. This finding makes sense, since the human population is largest in these geographic regions. Yet, philosophy is by no means approaching proportional representation compared to the general population. There is not enough data available for us to examine how the proportions of authors of non-Western Decent (broadly construed) compare to those in the field of philosophy more generally, but we are pursuing this avenue of research for future work. From what we do know, the ethnic breakdown within the discipline is somewhat comparable (Schwitzgebel et al. 2021; American Academy of Arts and Sciences 2019b; American Philosophical Association (APA) 1999; Schwitzgebel et al. 2021).

When looking at the impact of ethnicity on gender representation, we find that authors with a Western European origin show a much smaller number of women authors compared to other regions. We are a bit skeptical of this result, since Western European surnames, especially those traceable to Anglophone countries, heavily overlap with historically Northern American surnames (e.g., names such as Smith, Jones, Roberts, and Miller). This is an interesting result to investigate in future work, particularly in the context of decade over decade trends. As a result, it may actually be that we are losing important information about diversity in author ethnicity when it comes to analysing Northern America and that we are losing statistical power in the analyses comparing ethnicities associated with Western Europe and other regions.

While we recognize the broadly Western bias in our study, we also recognize that our data set includes information from the most well-regarded journals in the discipline of philosophy, in addition to over one hundred other journals that self-identify as primarily philosophy in content. Regardless of an author's ethnicity, the discipline's most prestigious journals have been established, throughout the world, as the venues to publish in when a philosopher aims to get hired and gain tenure (Schwitzgebel et al. 2018; Bandini 2020).

There are certainly highly regarded regional journals. For example, *Manuscrito*, *Kriterion*, *Transformação*, and *Philosophos* are well-regarded Continental Philosophy journals in Brazil. Meanwhile, China publishes

the largest number of academic articles world wide but not many more than the US. India publishes the next greatest number—at only one quarter of the other two. The question for the average author seems to be: Do I publish in Mandarin or English? With this in mind, we believe our sample is representative of the discipline outside of Asia and the Indo-Pacific.

5. Conclusion

In our opinion, the low proportions of women authorships in the Philosophy Journals discussed in this paper suggest that publication is a likely bottleneck in philosophy's academic pipeline at the professional level, contributing to the decrease in the proportions of women in the transitions between hiring, tenure, and promotion. While we recognize that women across all disciplines face similar difficulties, some hypothesize that the situation is perhaps among the worst in philosophy. Our findings seem consistent with this view. Moreover, women authors appear to be under-represented in philosophy journals across the globe, though more research on this topic seems necessary. The problem does not belong to the Anglophone world alone, as women are under-represented in multilingual philosophy journals throughout Europe, and we suspect the findings would be similar among philosophy journals with other regions known to have histories of systemic gender discrimination. The situation is more dire for women of non European or Northern American decent, who account for only a small proportion of authors in philosophy journals and who also experience the greatest precarity in the pursuit of academic careers. We now have a clearer picture of how well women and people of different ethnicities are represented in philosophy journals on a more global scale. We hope that this article contributes to the body of knowledge that can help improve things for the most vulnerable members of the philosophical community.

Acknowledgements

We thank Namsor for providing complementary compute credits for this work. Without their support, the analysis of author ethnicity would not have been possible. We also offer special thanks to Nicole Hassoun, who

declined co-authorship on this article. We cannot overstate the way in which her intellectual contributions, as a co-author on previously published (and unpublished), related research, have shaped the way that we approach, frame, and discuss the issues examined in this paper. Here, we would like to credit her for any undeclared contributions as she has been essential to the development of this line of research. We thank Irina Artamonova, Eric Schwitzgebel, our anonymous reviewers, and the Demographics in Philosophy Project for contributions to the development of this research. We also give special thanks to Elly Vintiadis for her patience as we prepared this manuscript for publication.

Appendix A

All Philosophy Journals

Number of papers per decade with a gendered first author included in our data set.

Philosophy	1950	1960	1970	1980	1990	2000	2010	Region
Aesthetics and Art Criticism	356	406	389	322	373	692	828	Northern America
American Catholic Philosophical Q...				45	434	444	475	Northern America
American Journal of Bioethics						415		Northern America
American Philosophical Quarterly		157	302	314	276	246	234	Northern America
Analysis	141	298	342	469	542	607	414	Western Europe
Annals of Philosophy	91	302	419	405	310	394	355	Eastern Europe
Apeiron		19	82	111	153	115		
Applied Philosophy				137	155	198	208	Northern America
Archives de Philosophie	66	164	253	274	221	253	230	Western Europe
Archives for Philosophy of Law an...		136	274	276	297	265	216	Western Europe
Archivio di Filosofia						113	233	Western Europe
Bioethics				59	227	297	694	
British Journal for the Philosoph...	111	153	183	216	285	307	190	Western Europe

Canadian Journal of Philosophy			314	306	209	300	301	Northern America
Charles S. Peirce Society		39	148	182	260	563	900	Northern America
Chinese Philosophy			110	234	255	396	408	
Croatian Journal of Philosophy						299	301	
Dialectica	303	234	359	362	307	565	513	Western Europe
Economics and Philosophy				72	254	109	312	
Educational Philosophy and Theory		5	52	78	130	493	257	Western Europe
Environmental Ethics			21	211	333	429	416	Northern America
Episteme						197	225	Western Europe
Epistemology & Philosophy of Scie...						36	406	Eastern Europe
Erkenntnis			116	296	351	379	619	Western Europe
Ethical Theory and Moral Practice					43	265	452	Western Europe
Ethics	200	243	298	334	261	216	188	Northern America
European Journal of Philosophy					112	225	639	Western Europe
Faith and Philosophy				194	335	332	281	Northern America
Frontiers of Philosophy in China						170	309	Asia
General Philosophy of Science					157	161	186	Western Europe
Hegel-Studien		56	81	115	94	55	40	Western Europe
Heidegger Studies				40	82	88	57	Western Europe
History of Philosophy						2567	614	Western Europe
Hume Studies				3	18	18	518	
Hypatia				237	896	1416	855	Northern America
Indian Philosophy			70	141	150	226	232	
Indian Philosophy and Religion					22	68	78	
Inquiry		121	346	338	350	288	209	Western Europe
International Philosophical Quart...		287	345	337	659	670	415	Western Europe
International Studies in Philosop...			213	344	1182	717		
Isis	190	258	251	196	181	260	208	Northern America
Iyyun	95	104	98	160	242	200	174	Middle East

Journal of Applied Philosophy				256	458	500	593	Western Europe
Journal of Ethics					46	182	172	
Journal of Philosophy	1398	1151	988	810	617	551	503	Northern America
Kantian Review					37	88	294	
Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journ...					114	308	212	Northern America
Law and Philosophy				108	171	190	196	
Les Etudes philosophiques	386	295	260	268	246	267	214	Western Europe
Linguistics and Philosophy			47	171	184	181	133	
Logique et Analyse	16	186	268	236	193	209	161	Western Europe
Logos & Episteme							310	
Metaphilosophy			444	513	506	588	650	
Methexis					100	91	69	
Midwest Studies in Philosophy			163	508	353	323	288	Northern America
Mind	210	367	410	340	311	278	177	Western Europe
Monist		392	528	612	607	602	395	
Moral Philosophy						155		
Nietzsche Studies					81	222	468	
Nomos			69	138	151	109	110	Northern America
Nous		77	248	294	360	592	558	Northern America
Owl of Minerva		5	61	168	170	133	89	
Pacific Philosophical Quarterly				240	197	252	361	Northern America
Phanomenologische Forschungen			36	97	98	123	96	Western Europe
Philo					26	153	54	
Philosophia Africana						124	45	
Philosophia Christi					31	428	366	
Philosophia Reformata	17	19	24	21	49	89	81	Western Europe
Philosophical Investigations			40	158	160	205	277	
Philosophical Issues					195	208	294	Northern America
Philosophical Logic			181	180	227	240	276	
Philosophical Perspectives				57	219	184	238	Northern America
Philosophical Quarterly	117	178	163	242	354	799	592	Western Europe

Philosophical Research				172	244	348	324	Northern America
Philosophical Review	246	218	176	138	122	128	78	Northern America
Philosophical Studies	333	634	913	963	662	833	1320	International
Philosophical Topics				333	438	404	608	Northern America
Philosophischer Literaturanzeiger							313	Western Europe
Philosophy	368	456	630	788	641	264	430	Western Europe
Philosophy & Public Affairs			124	150	191	268	180	
Philosophy & Social Criticism			110	187	295	422	721	
Philosophy Compass							605	
Philosophy East and West	150	142	279	228	211	548	1028	
Philosophy Today	89	234	293	275	365	550	606	
Philosophy and History		49	247	206	113			Western Europe
Philosophy and Literature			1	17	253	276	1089	Northern America
Philosophy and Phenomenological R...	347	431	379	350	433	1257	1089	
Philosophy in the Contemporary Wo...					119	237	134	Northern America
Philosophy of Education		5	79	228	265	421	422	Western Europe
Philosophy of Religion			165	207	187	165	167	
Philosophy of Science	273	273	369	359	477	733	419	
Philosophy of the Social Sciences			225	474	369	313	341	
Philotheos						232	224	Eastern Europe
Phronesis	22	71	134	136	130	121	107	
Polish Journal of Philosophy						86	125	
Political Philosophy					91	209	238	
Political Studies	176	298	531	723	910	841	977	Western Europe
Proceedings of the American Catho...	220	251	233	227	206	224	141	Northern America
Proceedings of the Aristotelian S...	61	109	138	186	233	424	255	Western Europe
Proceedings of the Aristotelian S...	61	109	138	186	233	424	255	Western Europe

Public Affairs Quarterly				73	235	186	147	
Ratio				23	162	286	295	Western Europe
Religious Ethics			88	158	194	220	206	
Religious Studies		156	754	911	643	366	603	
Research in Phenomenology			90	118	106	149	150	
Review of Metaphysics	381	301	230	208	195	195	159	Northern America
Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia	270	177	150	290	319	533	522	Western Europe
Revue Internationale de Philosoph...	171	203	239	240	254	257	145	Western Europe
Revue Philosophique de la France ...	216	218	163	195	211	203	183	Western Europe
Revue de Metaphysique et de Moral...	184	225	221	280	229	265	205	Western Europe
Revue de Philosophie Ancienne				67	86	98	55	Western Europe
Rivista di Filosofia Neo-Scolasti...	215	284	317	259	225	232	384	Western Europe
Rivista di Storia della Filosofia	254	215	215	293	382	594	298	Western Europe
Social Philosophy			123	143	355	401	262	Northern America
Social Philosophy Today				53	317	206	153	Northern America
Southern Journal of Philosophy		174	436	489	395	290	344	Northern America
Speculative Philosophy				48	175	475	614	International
Studi Kantiani				7	77	87	51	Western Europe
Studia Phaenomenologica						386	264	Eastern Europe
Studies in East European Thought		75	134	236	140	153	150	Western Europe
Synthese	88	171	392	695	650	982	1442	International
Teaching Philosophy			115	402	619	521	496	Northern America
Teorema		188	113	97	274	282	Western Europe	
Thought						282	Western Europe	
Vivarium	19	37	42	83	125	119	Western Europe	

Philosophy (Interdisciplinary)	1950	1960	1970	1980	1990	2000	2010
Asian Studies	61	284	278	172	209	267	327
African Law	14	91	139	167	265	142	232
African Studies Bulletin	10	213					
African Studies Review			249	189	169	510	1115
American Slavic and East European...	247	43					
Behavioral and Brain Sciences				2	2339	894	2589
Bulletin of Symbolic Logic					176	654	481
Business & Professional Ethics Jo...				166	219	152	119
Business Ethics Quarterly					633	687	474
Cahiers du Monde russe	9	188	205	225	296	309	220
Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare...					405	111	675
Canadian Journal of Latin America...			47	116	106	121	69
Classical Quarterly	106	196	342	571	887	708	1038
Confluencia				188	506	428	594
Critical Inquiry			254	411	362	406	251
Dialogos		329	669	585			
Eastern Buddhist		54	165	168	139	110	107
Educational Theory	287	347	355	327	320	321	430
Ethiopian Studies, International ...						61	62
Ethiopian Studies, Journal of		89	100	57	67	100	50
Europe-Asia Studies					395	577	319
Far Eastern Quarterly	120						
Feminist Studies			165	308	332	412	312
Harvard Law Review	288	233	166	198	190	193	170
Hastings Center Report			1042	1706	1695	1679	1944
History of Ideas	333	403	412	364	457	605	575

History of Political Thought				236	246	268	169
Idealistic Studies			153	181	227	188	177
India International Centre Quarte...			86	286	453	525	356
Inti			142	340	553	508	338
Islamic Studies		138	145	174	243	237	124
Janus Head					15	108	113
Japanese Journal of Religious Stu...			68	155	156	154	142
Journal of Islamic Studies					97	87	54
Latin American Perspectives			365	510	728	1022	1324
Medical Ethics			168	382	674	415	1645
Mind and Behavior				259	239	178	96
Monumenta Serica	48	107	113	54	114	158	57
Oriental Studies						49	79
Philosophical Forum							201
Pluralist						158	604
Political Theory			462	712	758	859	836
Polity		30	234	336	295	238	156
Rationality and Society				16	300	176	181
Review of Politics	677	771	851	856	990	766	852
Rivista degli studi orientali	163	179	120	123	170	208	150
Sign Systems Studies						634	498
Slavic Review		328	315	299	361	306	1021
South East Asia Research					151	277	525
Soviet Studies	96	200	275	335	139		
Studia Logica	62	177	276	314	370	570	461
Symbolic Logic	198	228	507	811	883	944	1064
Vienna Journal of South Asian Stu...					136	71	25

Appendix B

Comparison Subjects and Sample Sizes

	1950	1960	1970	1980	1990	2000	2010	Total	Tag Gender	Tag Ethnicity
Philosophy Philosophy	7761	11041	17914	23915	29521	41216	42214	173582	86%	90%
Philosophy (Int.)	2719	4628	8868	12299	18465	18551	23401	88931	85%	91%
Humanities Linguistics	903	1416	2008	2386	2388	2592	2345	14038	84%	
Religion	941	1159	1528	1861	2240	2639	2177	12545	84%	
Law	1052	1336	1713	2044	2380	3175	3208	14908	86%	
History	1051	1161	1377	1547	1815	2005	1596	10552	86%	
Social Sciences Economics	730	1074	2062	2880	3439	3953	3474	17612	83%	
Political Science	766	1052	1485	1792	2256	3778	3455	14584	83%	
Psychology	1029	1586	2939	3128	3612	4483	3990	20767	84%	
Sociology	590	1073	1928	2452	3014	4623	5647	19327	81%	
Math and Technology Mathematics (all)	519	1124	2223	2703	3569	4080	3462	17680	80%	
Mathematical Logic †	530	1155	2295	2575	3345	3614	2989	16503	79%	
Computer Science	225	615	1077	2252	3005	3475	2657	13306	84%	
Engineering	68	114	280	624	1690	4671	10681	18128	66%	
Lab Sciences Physics	541	979	1314	1855	3038	3675	3254	14656	79%	
Biology	504	887	1350	2163	2896	4224	3747	15771	82%	
Ecology	176	314	670	1113	2199	4828	9125	18425	78%	
Chemistry	916	1349	1855	2193	2733	3155	2735	14936	80%	
Total	21021	32063	52886	69782	91605	118737	130157	516251	83%	90%

† These data are pulled as a separate sample from Mathematics (all). Some (but not all) results may overlap Mathematics (all).

Appendix C

Trends by Field

	% Women							% Change from last Decade						% Change	
	50s	60s	70s	80s	90s	00s	10s	60s	70s	80s	90s	00s	10s	Mean	Total
Philosophy†	6	7	9	12	15	18	22	4	29	36	29	19	21	23	241
Philosophy (Int.)*	6	9	14	19	23	27	30	40	69	30	21	19	10	31	385
Humanities	11	11	16	23	28	33	36	0	48	39	24	19	8	23	225
History	9	8	13	20	25	31	32	-5	58	49	28	22	6	26	270
Law	9	9	15	19	24	29	34	4	64	30	25	20	17	27	289
Linguistics	19	16	21	28	35	41	43	-16	33	33	24	16	5	16	127
Religion	10	14	17	24	29	35	35	33	23	42	20	19	1	23	232
Social Science	11	10	14	20	27	32	39	-12	45	48	29	21	21	25	256
Economics	9	7	10	15	21	27	32	-25	50	49	38	29	16	26	247
Political Science	7	11	13	16	22	30	35	47	22	23	37	36	16	30	377
Psychology	20	13	21	34	37	40	49	-35	66	60	9	8	23	22	148
Sociology	15	15	21	33	40	41	49	2	41	56	20	3	19	23	229
Math and Tech.	11	8	12	18	24	28	31	-28	52	51	29	19	11	22	181
Computer Science	12	7	12	19	24	30	33	-40	56	62	29	26	9	24	168
Engineering	2	12	11	17	20	25	30	488	-7	50	17	26	19	99	1336
Mathematics (all)	10	9	15	16	27	23	30	-11	68	3	75	-16	29	25	192
Mathematical Logic	5	2	5	6	9	13	15	-50	102	19	55	44	9	30	193
Lab Sciences	9	10	12	16	18	25	32	13	22	33	13	41	25	24	265
Biology	11	12	15	19	20	27	34	9	23	26	8	33	26	21	206
Chemistry	7	7	8	11	13	20	24	-6	20	33	18	56	22	24	240
Ecology	4	7	9	15	19	27	32	82	24	62	30	39	22	43	706
Physics	3	6	12	13	12	17	20	95	89	12	-5	40	17	41	544

† ±1% in a 95% CI. * ±3% in a 95% CI. Others are exact proportion based on random sample.

Appendix D

Authorship by Geographic Region
Percent of women authorships estimated by GLM for three region based analyses. Data aggregated for all decades (1950s-2010s).

		Author Ethnicity	Journal Region
Europe	Western Europe Eastern Europe	12.1 [11.7,12.5]] 19.9 [18.5,21.4]	13.6 [12.9,14.3] 18.7 [15.6,22.4]
Americas	Northern America Latin America	19.4 [18.6,20.2] 22.3 [19.7,25.3]	16.7 [15.8,17.6]
Asia	Eastern Asia Indo-Pacific	17.3 [14.9,20.1] 24.5 [21.6,27.9]	
Africa		15.7 [13.9,17.6]	
Middle East		16.8 [15.4,18.4]	
International			11.8 [10.6,13.1]

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MULTIDIMENSIONALISM, RESISTANCE, AND THE DEMOGRAPHIC PROBLEM

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ABSTRACT

Linda Martín Alcoff and others have emphasised that the discipline of philosophy suffers from a 'demographic problem'. The persistence of this problem is partly the consequence of various forms of resistance to efforts to address the demographic problem. Such resistance is complex and takes many forms and could be responded to in different ways. In this paper, I argue that our attempts to explain and understand the phenomenon of resistance should use a kind of explanatory pluralism that, following Quassim Cassam, I call multidimensionalism. I describe four general kinds of resistance and consider varying explanations, focusing on those focused on vices and social structures. I argue that vice-explanations and structural-explanations are both mutually consistent and mutually entailing. If so, there is no need to choose between vice explanations and structural explanations or any other kinds of explanation. We can and should be multidimensionalists: using many together is better.

KEYWORDS: *explanation; pluralism; structures; vices; women in philosophy.*

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1. Introduction

In her 2012 Presidential Address to the American Philosophical Association, Linda Martín Alcoff commented on the enduring reality that the discipline of academic philosophy is 'demographically challenged' (Alcoff 2013). A complex and entrenched system of factors— social and interpersonal, historical and structural—conspires to artificially exclude certain social groups from entering and advancing through the profession, while, at the same time, disproportionately encouraging and facilitating the entry and ascent of those in other social groups: call this the *demographic problem*. Over the last few decades, our understanding of the causes, extent, and effects of our demographically challenged discipline has improved, thanks to careful empirical and theoretical work (see, e.g., Paxton, Figdor, and Tiberius 2012; Thompson et al. 2016). To take just one example, a recent report by the British Philosophical Association and Society for Women in Philosophy-UK, found that, of permanent academic philosophy staff in the UK, men were 68% of lecturers, 70% of senior lecturers, 79% of readers and 75% of professors (Beebee and Saul 2021, 6). Such systematic studies are also accompanied by testimonies, informal discussions, and other opportunities for reportage, reflection, and debate (Alcoff 2003; Hutchinson and Jenkins 2013). The ultimate goal of all this is *amelioration*: taking practical measures to address the demographic problem in genuine and substantive ways.

A significant obstacle to realisation that ideal is the fact that attempts to understand and respond to the demographic problem often encounter *resistance*. Sometimes, resistance reflects sincere and reasonable concerns; in other cases, resistance reflects the procedural concern that proposed explanations of the problems and practical solutions to them ought to be carefully assessed before being endorsed. Of course, sometimes such putative good-faith concerns are disguises. I think some resistance is principled, well-motivated, and reasonable in the sense of being responsive to evidence and persuasion. In those cases, the resistance is constructive and valuable. Often, though, the resistance either tends or intends to obstruct or delay or weaken efforts to understand and respond to the demographically challenged state of the discipline. It is these cases of *bad resistance* that are my concern in this paper. It is true that even bad resistance can sometimes have good effects; however, bad resistance will not bring about good

effects systematically—which, to anticipate a later theme, is why lots of bad resistance involves various vices (cf. Cassam 2019, 11-12).

The main aim of this paper is to defend a form of *explanatory pluralism* that I will call *multidimensionalism*. It is an epistemological claim: resistance to the demographic problem can, and often should, be explained using different kinds of explanation. This includes explanations in terms of vices and structures. I will distinguish four general reasons for resistance—which can also serve to *sustain* and *rationalise* resistance—and argue they often reflect a variety of epistemic vices, and then show that such vice-explanations for resistance are compatible with structural explanations. At the end of the paper, I add a stronger claim: vice explanations and structural explanations are mutually supporting in the sense that each is at its most effective when allied to the other, and indeed to other kinds of explanation. There is no need to choose between vice explanations and structural explanations when we can and should combine them: using both together is better.

2. Explanatory Pluralism

Resistance to the demographic problem can take different forms. It can mean denying the reality and extent of the problem. It can mean questioning its scale of severity. It can mean bad-faith questioning of proposed causes and sustaining factors. It can mean trying to delay or dispute or otherwise undermine attempts to do something practical about the demographic problem. It can also mean trying to make it harder for people to do the epistemic, social, and practical work of understanding, planning, and acting (more on this in section 3). How could we make sense of the phenomenon of resistance?

One option is to focus on the resistant individuals and to scrutinise their motivations, goals, outlooks, ideologies, and strategies. We could investigate their character or ‘mindsets’, assess how they use their power and resources to enact their resistance, and perhaps criticise or condemn them. Call these *individual explanations*. Critics standardly resist or reject them on several counts—as, for instance, too moralistic, as distractions from structural realities, as too tied up with unhelpful concepts and

practices such as blaming and shaming, and so on (cf. Dillon 2012: 89-90). If one dislikes individual-level explanations, another explanatory option is to focus on *structures*, where the focus is on institutional and social structures and not on individual agents (see, for an influential example, Haslanger 2015). Of course, one can also employ one or the other style of explanation, while maintaining that one of the still enjoys priority over the other. Of course, there are other kinds of explanation, too.

I want to endorse a thoroughgoing *multidimensional explanatory pluralism* when it comes to resistance to the demographic problem. Given the complexity of human life, we should keep open our explanatory options: otherwise, we risk inadvertently drifting into explanatory myopia. Our explanations are myopic when they lack relevant kinds of *depth* or *breadth*. Explanations are too shallow when they fail to attend to relevant levels of explanation. Explanations are too narrow when they exclude a wider range of explanatory factors. Alternatively, one could be myopic in recognising a properly deep and broad range of explanatory factors, but also exaggerate or understate their significance. Think of the criticism that evolutionary psychology overstates the significance of earlier stages of human evolution in its accounts of contemporary human life and practice (see Dupré 2001; Rose and Rose 2000). While no-one doubts the importance of our evolutionary history, one can doubt whether reference to it can furnish a full explanation of contemporary human conduct.

Explanatory myopia might seem convenient and attractive, but it also usually entails epistemic and practical risks. It is also important to distinguish *explanatory myopia* from *explanatory monism*: the myopic fail to see, or see the relevance of, important explanatory possibilities whereas the explanatory monist has made a reasoned judgment to use a single kind of explanation in a given situation. Explanatory myopia is an epistemic failing, whereas explanatory monism is at least in principle defensible. In some cases, monism could also be sensible: our explanatory aims can sometimes be satisfied by using one kind of explanation. Even in those cases, however, one should *end up* as a monist in that particular case, meaning that one should start off with a plurality of explanatory options.

Consider, as an exemplary instance of multidimensionalism, the account of human epistemic failings offered by the vice epistemologist Quassim

Cassam in his book *Vices of the Mind* (Cassam 2019). The book aims to identify and explore the nature and significance of epistemic vices, defined by Cassam as attitudes, dispositions, and ways of thinking that tend systematically to obstruct the gaining, keeping, and sharing of knowledge: this is the core of what he calls *obstructivism* (cf. Cassam 2019, ch. 1). Despite the title and general aims of the book, though, Cassam's own discussion is explicitly pluralistic. Across its case studies, there is a constant emphasis on the variety of ways of explaining cases of bad epistemic conduct and also a careful emphasis on the variable relevance of epistemic vices across those cases. One vice of vice epistemology is to see everything in terms of epistemic vices, which would be an ironic kind of vice-centric explanatory myopia. Cassam is clear that vice epistemology is not at all committed to explaining any and all instances of bad epistemic conduct in terms of epistemic vices. Instead, the vice epistemologist is alert to at least the following other kinds of explanation *(cf. Cassam 2019, 23-27):*

- *Cognitive-explanations:* explaining instances of bad epistemic conduct by reference to sub-personal cognitive biases, such as implicit biases and confirmation biases (see Holroyd 2020).
- *Vice-explanations:* explaining instances of bad epistemic conduct by reference to personal-level epistemic vices, understood as failings of epistemic character (see Battaly 2014; Cassam 2019).
- *Situational explanations:* explaining instances of bad epistemic conduct by reference to specific contingent situational factors, of the sort seen in situationist challenges to claims about virtues and vices (Alfano 2013).
- *Structural explanations:* explaining instances of bad epistemic conduct by reference to the constraints and incentives and practical possibilities built into social structures (see Haslanger 2015).

Four kinds of explanation is already very pluralistic. We could also add other kinds, too, like *interpersonal explanations* that explain bad epistemic conduct in terms of the problematic relationships between individuals. We can also distinguish sub-variants of these kinds of explanations and combine them in all sorts of complicated ways. What we end up with is an explanatory methodology which is appropriately multidimensional.

If this is right, then talk of having to choose between individual or structural kinds of explanation involve a false contrast. Given the diversity of cases, there are lots of options for us to assess. In some cases, vices do all the explanatory work. In other cases, vices and a set of situational factors are needed. In yet other cases, vices and situations and structures offer a satisfying explanatory account—and so on. Cassam emphasises the particularist character of his brand of multidimensionalism:

> [T]he intermingling of structural and personal factors points to the possibility of a limited rapprochement between vice explanations and structural or systemic explanations. The idea would be to recognize a sliding scale of outcomes. At one end are outcomes that can only adequately be understood in structural terms. Social inequality is an excellent example. At the other extreme are outcomes that can only be adequately understood in vice terms. In the middle are many outcomes that have to be understood partly in structural terms and partly by reference to the epistemic vices and other personal qualities of designated actors. (Cassam 2019, 51-52)

We can more formally articulate Cassam's explanatory multidimensionalism in terms of six closely related convictions:

a. there is a plurality of explanatory styles for human behaviour
b. explanatory sufficiency in any given case may require one or more kinds of explanation
c. the degree of priority given to kinds of explanation can vary across cases
d. we should not prejudge which kinds of explanatory style are relevant in advance of a specific case
e. we should not prejudge the priority of any style in advance of any specific case
f. the use of different explanatory styles in one case does not commit one to any similar explanatory pluralism in other cases. Being a pluralist in case 1 does not commit us to pluralism in case 2.

In practice, which kinds of explanation we need to use in a given case will likely depend on the details of the case, our explanatory aims, and the time and resources available to us. This means we should also be alert to any methodological prejudices that may interfere with our assessment of certain kinds of explanation. Explanatory myopia is often motivated myopia. Cassam sensibly argues that the best way to test the adequacy of our explanations is to look at how well they fit the evidence and then debate with advocates of rival explanations. One of his case studies is former US Secretary of State for Defence, Donald Rumsfeld, who took a central role in directing the invasion and occupation of Iraq following 9/11. Cassam argues that the available evidence suggests that explaining Rumsfeld's repeated bad decisions needs reference to both his own character failings—his vices—and wider structural features of the American military and political institutions (cf. Cassam 2019, 24-26ff).

With this account of multidimensionalism in place, I now turn to the phenomenon of resistance to the demographic problem. Before I do, though, note that my discussion is only on the explanation of resistant attitudes and behaviours, rather than engaging issues of blame and responsibility; those are live issues in vice epistemology and are obviously important to our understanding of resisters and our decisions about how to respond to them (cf. Battaly 2019; Cassam 2019, ch. 6). However, they are a task for another time. Suffice to say, I think resistance is a bad thing and some of the reasons why will become clear once we look closer at kinds of resistance.

3. Resistance

By 'resistance', I refer to attitudes, assumptions, actions, and patterns of behaviour that tend or intend to resist attempts to understand and respond to the demographic problem. We can roughly distinguish two aspects. *Epistemic resistance* involves denying, doubting, distorting or otherwise resisting knowledge and understanding of its reality, extent, scale, causes, and negative effects. This could be indirect, such as refusing opportunities to learn, or direct, like spuriously disputing empirical data or bluntly rejecting salient evidence. *Practical resistance* involves trying to prevent, delay, dilute, or otherwise undermine the implementation, scope, efficacy,

and sustainability of any practical responses. In some cases, practical resistance involves aggressive treatment of those calling for or engaging in the epistemic and practical work of understanding and action (for a fuller account of resistance, see Kidd 2018). In most cases, epistemic and practical kinds of resistance form a tight set.

Here are some specific examples of resistant attitudes and behaviours:

- A colleague teaches a module called Moral Philosophy. It gives two weeks to ten moral philosophers, all of them white, male, and Western. Colleagues suggest the module could and should be diversified and suggestions are made. The colleague responds by renaming the module Western Moral Philosophy and adds several women philosophers to the Suggested Further Reading. The module remains all white, all male, and all Western. When this is pointed out, the colleague angrily lambasts what they see as 'unprofessional interference' in their module.
- A group of colleagues starts an informal Equality, Diversity, and Inclusion (EDI) group within their Department. The group starts to write reports and issue recommendations, but these are all ignored because they are not a formalised committee. The Head of Department refuses to grant committee status or to provide workload allowances for the work the group does. Several other senior colleagues argue that the Department does not need an EDI group because such problems only occur in *other* departments, not this one, and refuse to grant time in a department meeting to read and discuss the group's reports, which document in rich detail the problems in the department. A request to discuss these reports at a future meeting is repeatedly refused. Under pressure, the Head finally adds the report to the agenda of the next meeting; however, it is the last item on an already over-long agenda and no time is assigned for debate.

The phenomenon of resistance to the demographic problem is complex. The range of resistant attitudes and behaviours is diverse, at the individual and interpersonal levels. There are complicated situational and structural dimensions to resistant behaviours. There are roles for systems of power and hierarchies of prestige and metaphilosophical preconceptions. This means that resistance is also a historically and socially dynamic phenomenon. It takes quite different forms across time. Institutions can *enable* or *obstruct*

different kinds of resistance. Moreover, resistant behaviours in the profession of academic philosophy relate in various ways to wider social and cultural trends and developments. Still, emphasis on complexity is consistent with identifying certain general *reasons for resistance*, ones that seem recurrent across a range of cases in different institutional contexts. Such reasons do different sorts of work: they can *motivate* or *explain* or *rationalise* resistance to oneself or others. What we can work towards is an account of general reasons for resistance that avoids the opposing risks of *over-generalisation and hyper-particularism.*

In the remainder of this section, I describe four—*ignorance, conservatism, pride*, and *hostility*—then in the following section argue that they often express certain epistemic vices.

Ignorance

Individual resistance is often sustained by kinds of ignorance. Of course, ignorance is a very complex phenomena—one should, for instance, ask whether it is active, genuine, motivated, and whether and to what extent its causes as individual, interpersonal, or structural. There is also a variety of kinds of ignorance that can be relevant to resistance. A resister might be and want to remain ignorant about the existence of the demographic problem, of its causes, or its scope, or its negative effects, or some combination of these. Ignorance can lead one to deny the demographic problem, or underappreciate its scale or severity, or to misidentify or to misunderstand the factors causing and sustaining it, and so on. Ignorance can manifest in all sorts of ways, too, ranging from utter obliviousness to the problem, to scepticism about the claims made about it, to untenable optimism about its solubility, to a preference for cosier or more comforting explanations of the issues in question, among others. In effect, ignorance of the demographic problem can lead one to refuse it the effort, attention, or urgency it needs.

We can taxonomize the kinds of ignorance displayed by a resister in different ways. Annette Martîn, for instance, distinguishes (a) wilful ignorance as motivated by implicit or explicit desires to protect one's psychological interests and/or protect the benefits of their ignorance and (b) cognitivist views which explains ignorance in terms of faulty

reasoning or cognitive errors and (c) structuralist views that see ignorance as systematically arising from one's active participation in unjust social structural processes (Martîn 2021). These describe kinds of ignorance in terms of their nature or source; another option is to distinguish kinds of ignorance in terms of their object, in terms of what it is one is ignorant of, which can be connected to the sorts of views described by Martîn.

In the case of resistance to the demographic problem, we can distinguish three road objects of ignorance. Empirical ignorance involves ignorance of the demographic problem— the fact of it, its causes, its epistemic costs to philosophy, its moral costs to philosophers, the historical and social structures that patterns of social exclusion and marginalisation, and so on. An empirically ignorant resister, in a sense, really does not know what is going on out there, and so lacks the empirical warrant for the practical reforms that to them seem both needless and costly. Some ignorance, of course, will be feigned or faked, and here again we see a way for ignorance to encourage the development and exercise of epistemic vices (Mason and Wilson 2017). Such empirical ignorance can, but need not, be wilful: a wilfully ignorance resister might avoid relevant evidence or refuse to acquire interpretive resources or refuse to consider relevant issues or might inhabit an environment that fails to supply those epistemic resources (Martîn 2021, §3).

Psychological ignorance involves ignorance of aspects of human psychology that are relevant to understanding and responding to the demographic problem. Some of the obvious examples include implicit biases, stereotype threat, confirmation bias, and other features of our minds which are related explanatorily to the demographic problem in philosophy (see Brownstein and Saul 2016; Saul 2016). Of course, there are philosophical and empirical criticisms of some of this work and some activists may have made exaggerated claims on its behalf. Moreover, universities often treat psychologically-based interventions phenomena as 'magic bullets', as if a little implicit bias training is all one needs to deal with these problems. Still, one ought to appreciate that ignorance of various aspects of our psychology can sustain aspects of the demographic problem. The confident faith that 'I don't discriminate against women!' is both psychologically naïve and practically obstructive: a resister needs to know something about the psychology of bias if they are to grasp certain aspects of the demographic problem.

We should also think in terms of conceptual ignorance, the lack of the concepts and ideas needed to identify and articulate the origins, realities, and effects of the demographic problem. Such concepts include 'leaky pipeline', 'microaggression', 'structural racism', and 'active ignorance', to name but a few, which if used properly can help us make sense of the data and testimonies and psychological research about the demographic problem. Without an adequate conceptual repertoire, one will find it harder to properly understand and respond to the demographic problem. As any philosopher knows, without the right concepts, certain phenomena cannot be easily identified, certain distinctions cannot be compellingly drawn, certain problems cannot be persuasively articulated, and so on (which explains why certain resisters actively impugn certain concepts and attack those who promote them).

In worst-case scenarios, instances of resistance involve all three kinds of ignorance, where there is an abject lack of data and testimonies, psychological understanding, and the concepts needed to make sense of the demographic problem. Ignorance drives epistemically resistant kinds of behaviour which in turn blocks the motivations needed to do anything practically (Kidd 2017, 120ff). In some cases, ignorance is a transitory feature of an individual resister. In other cases, it starts to become an entrenched feature of their outlook. All these diverse possibilities are consistent with psychological, cognitivist, and structural explanations and with the distinctions between active/passive and sincere/sincere kinds of ignorance.

Conservatism

A second general reason for resistance might be called 'conservatism', in the 'small-c' sense of a desire to maintain established arrangements which one judges favourable to one's own interests and preferences. This is not a political or ideological characterisation of resistance: anyone can feel an impulse to conserve existing social or material arrangements which make our lives better. It is natural to want to make one's life easier, to stick with what one knows, and to protect the ways of doing things to which one is already practically and epistemically well-adapted. The conservative impulse is also often very sensible. Much of what we do is good and,

therefore, worth protecting and cherishing—that is, conserving (see McPherson 2019). If conservatism reflects a desire to protect and cherish things of value, that is not what I am criticising. In the case of resistance, at least two sorts of conservatism *are* problematic. One expresses laziness, the other reflects selfishness.

The lazy conservative wants to prioritise current (bad) practice over new (and better) practices out of a reluctance to do the required work of change. Lazy resisters want to stick to the ways things have always been done, not necessarily because they think they are good, but because they are what they are used to. The work of change involves investments of time and energy and exercises of self-discipline and usually entails sacrifice and disruptions. The lazy resister might recognise a need for change, and even privately admit the work should be done; however, they lack the motivation to actually do it, even as they concede that the costs of their lazy conservatism is the persistence of conditions that are unjust and harmful. Hence the lazy resister tries to avoid doing the work. Sometimes, they also try to persuade others to resist the work and, if they have power, might order others not to act. In other cases, the lazy resister is compelled to start the work, but then becomes a slacker, quitter, or procrastinator (on these varieties of laziness, see Battaly 2020).

A complication is that many academics are overworked and under-resourced and in their daily working lives subject to multiple proliferating demands. In those cases, what will look like laziness might be a rational response by a time-poor academic (Kidd 2023). A second complication is that not all refusals to do work are lazy in a pejorative sense. There are often good reasons to refuse to do certain kinds of work. I might, for instance, want more clarification about the necessity or purpose of what I am being asked to do. Mindless activity is not the opposite of vicious laziness. It can be difficult to determine how we should try and prioritise our energies. José Medina argues that laziness becomes vicious when it tends to be a means to "develop and maintain forms of irresponsible ignorance" which in turn sustain oppressive social conditions (Medina 2012, 145-147). In those cases, conservative laziness becomes integral to ongoing systems of oppression.

The selfish conservative gives a disproportionate weighting to their own needs and preferences over those of other people, especially concerning preferences and needs that are qualitatively lesser in moral urgency. If I would like the last seat on the tram, but an elderly passenger really needs it, then it is selfish of me to prioritise my comfort over their physical need. Selfishness involves failures to properly acknowledge and respond to the interests and needs of other people, especially those who are vulnerable relative to us in certain ways. The varieties of conservative resistance to the demographic problem often reflect kinds of selfish self-prioritising. The conservative resister sees that current arrangements favour them, but in ways that are unwarranted and also come at the cost of others' interests and needs; they will therefore decide to try and conserve those arrangements. Selfish conservatism is often most visible when it comes to competition for finite goods, such as attention, publicity, invitations to contribute to edited volumes or speak at conferences, prizes, and offers of fellowships or jobs. Many selfish conservative resisters may also have morally nobler motivations, but they consistently allow them to be overmastered by their self-prioritising tendencies. 'I want to keep what is good for me, even if it is bad for you' is the motto of the selfish conservative. In this sense, the conservative resister is importantly different from the ignorant resister: the conservative resister generally has at least some knowledge and understanding of the reality and sources of the demographic problem. Sometimes this understanding might be tacit, but they would not be a good conservative if they were very ignorant.

Pride

A third general kind of resistance involves a sense that acknowledging and responding to the demographic problem would be an affront to one's own pride—to one's moral character or intellectual integrity or professional competence. Pride is not in itself a bad thing, of course; we should distinguish virtuous and vicious forms of pride and confine our criticisms to the latter (cf. Tanesini 2018, 2021, ch. 4). In the case of the demographic problem, one way that members of underrepresented groups are harmed is by having their pride impugned. A key dimension of the demographic problem is the fact that certain kinds of people have their own pride encouraged and scaffolded by features of the profession, while others

find theirs eroded or denied. In the case of proud resistance, however, an individual engages in resistant behaviours because they feel that their own pride is at risk of being compromised; they take talk of structural inequalities as an insult to their achievements, for instance, or hear talk of implicit bias as an affront to their intellectual self-image.

We can distinguish two aspects of proud resister—personal and global. By personal pride, I mean that invested in one's self-conception of one's abilities, capacities, intellectual and moral character, or professional identity. Imagine a proud resister who takes great pride in the image of themselves as a noble member of an intellectual elite—as a superior rational agency, objective and impartial, who has transcended the prejudices of subjectivity and is possessed of an ineffable natural brilliance that eludes the hoi polloi. Such a self-consciously proud philosopher will naturally find that self-conception challenged by many of the themes germane to the demographic problem. Perhaps their confidence in their natural brilliance is dented by work on the gendered character of attributions of brilliance. Perhaps their sense of their immunity to bias gets disturbed by work on the ubiquity of implicit biases across the human population. Since such experiences are disquieting, this philosopher can start to resist acknowledging and acting on the demographic problem. For them, defending their personal pride means going on the offensive.

We can also think in terms of global pride, where the object of the pride is not our own achievements, abilities, or status, but rather the wider traditions or projects of enquiry, our participation in which is felt to confer a sense of pride. In the case of philosophy, a main object of global pride will be certain conceptions of the nature and value of philosophy. Our convictions about the essence of our subject will inflect our sense of the meaningfulness and worthiness of our own activities as a philosopher. "Our identity and dignity depend on what you are breaking down", as one proud resister once shouted at me, after I made some rather general remarks about challenging entrenched misogynistic conceptions of philosophy, of a sort familiar in feminist historiography of philosophy (see, for instance, Lloyd 1984). For that proud resister, his sense of vocational pride and purpose was rooted in a conception of philosophy as a rational enterprise that was intrinsically insulated from contingent social or cultural biases. In such cases, resistant attitudes and behaviours are directed at anticipated or actual attacks on

their conceptions of the nature and value of philosophy, which in turn will often inflect their own self-conceptions as philosophers.

Hostility

The final general reason for resistance I will mention is diplomatically labelled '*hostility*'. It involves forms of resistance motivated by kinds of hostility towards specific persons, social groups, or intellectual communities or traditions. 'Hostility' can include anger, contempt, or other negative evaluative attitudes and can manifest in behaviours such as derogation, scorn, mockery, ridicule, exclusion, violence and other kinds of awful epistemically and practically hostile behaviour. Specific kinds of hostile resistance include sexism and racism, cultural chauvinism, and other kinds of socially or intellectually targeted hostilities. These kinds of hostile resisters are resistant because they are opposed to the interests and flourishing of the persons, social groups, and traditions in question. Hostiles are resistant because they want to cause harm to their targets by prolonging and expanding their exclusion and marginalisation and to prevent good being done to them. For these reasons, they are actively and intensely opposed to efforts to understand and respond to the demographic problem. Indeed, for these hostile resisters, the demographic situation is not a problem in the sense of something bad to correct. It is the desired outcome they want to retain.

Hostile resisters display the same variety as the other general reasons for resistance. Depending on their particular prejudices, hostiles might be philosophers who think women 'cannot do philosophy', that only white people are capable of philosophising well, that there is 'no such thing as Asian philosophy', that religious philosophies are 'stupid', that analytic philosophy is 'dumb and should be ended', that Continental philosophy is 'crap jumped-up literary theory', that the inclusion of LGBTQ+ people has 'ruined the discipline', and so on. Obviously forms of hostile resistance are not all morally equal: all are bad, but some are far worse than others. Sexist hostile resistance, for one, involves enduring patterns of violence. It should be clear, too, that hostile resistance reflects a range of causes—psychological and social, historical and political, metaphilosophical and ideological.

When we consider these general reasons for resistance, we can ask how best to explain what causes and sustains the attitudes and behaviours in question. Recalling Cassam's remarks, an explanation could use individual explanations (cognitive-based or vice-based), situational or interpersonal explanations or structural explanations or some pluralist combination of these. Explanatory preferences vary. Jay Garfield, a distinguished scholar of Buddhist philosophy, prioritises structural explanations of the racism of contemporary US academic philosophy as shown in its resistance to the teaching and research of 'non-Western' philosophies:

> A social structure can be racist without any individual who participates in it being racist when it serves to establish or to perpetuate a set of practices that systematically denigrate—implicitly or explicitly—people of particular races. Philosophy as it is practiced professionally in much of the world, and in the United States in particular, is racist in precisely this sense. (quoted in van Norden 2017, xix)

I agree with this account of structural racism; however, it is consistent with an emphasis on individual-level explanations, too, including those focused on the vices of individual people. As several vice epistemologists have argued, racist practices and structures can be sustained and inflected by individual-level vices such as arrogance and dogmatism (cf. Medina 2012; Tanesini 2020). More generally, racist structures cannot operate and persist within consistent patterns of vicious conduct at the individual and interpersonal levels: this is a theme of Lisa Tessman's account of the 'ordinary vices of domination' which maintain oppressive systems (Tessman 2002, 54-55). If so, vice-explanations and structural explanation are not mutually exclusive.

The challenge is to explain how they can be integrated in the ways suggested by multidimensionalism. How can we think about resistance to the demographic problem in terms of individual vices while also retaining a focus on social structures? Is appealing to vices and structures merely consistent or are there deeper connections between them? These are the questions for the next section.

4. Resistant Vices

Resistance is often localised in specific resistant individuals. *They* are the ones who block reforms, raise spurious objections, dilute findings, deny unjust realities, delay taking action, and in other ways engage in epistemic and practical resistance. A striking feature of typical discourse about individual resisters is our use of a vocabulary of vices: resisters are selfish, lazy, dogmatic, condescending, narrowminded, closedminded, contemptuous, indifferent, and cold-hearted. Sometimes we use terms that indirectly evoke vices, such as describing someone who 'won't ever budge' or 'won't ever change their mind' or is an 'asshole' or a 'jerk'. In vice epistemology, these are called *vice-attributions*: we attribute a vice or set of vices to a person in order to describe and explain their conduct (Cassam 2019, 72-73). Some of these vice-attributions are merely rhetorical—a way to vent frustration, for instance—but some have the further purpose of encouraging criticism: these are *vice-charges* (Kidd 2016). As a critical practice, vice-charging faces several problems, so in what follows I will focus on vice-attributions as explanatory ventures: we attribute epistemic vices to help explain the conduct of individual resisters.

What are epistemic vices? I endorse an expansive account which is both normatively and ontologically pluralistic: epistemic vices can be different *kinds of things* that can be *bad in different ways*. On the normative side, epistemic vices can be bad in at least four senses: an epistemic vice can (a) systematically cause bad epistemic effects, (b) systematically fail to cause good epistemic effects, (c) manifest the presence of bad epistemic motivations or desires, or (d) manifest the absence of good epistemic motivations and desires. Cassam's *obstructivism* focuses on (a). Options (a) and (b) are endorsed by Heather Battaly in her account of *effects-vices* (Battaly 2014). Ian James Kidd refers to (a) as *productive epistemic vices* and to (b) as *passive epistemic vices* (Kidd 2021, §3). Options (c) and (d) are described by Charlie Crerar, who also notes the possibility of hybrid variants, where an individual both lacks good epistemic motivations *and* also has bad epistemic motivations (Crerar 2018). Tanesini offers the most complex account of motives-vices and she also notes that epistemic vices can have *proximate* and *ultimate* epistemic ends—meaning, in effect, that vicious epistemic motivations can be directed at a range of targets (Tanesini 2021, 115f). We could also endorse further options: we might think that

different epistemic vices are bad for different kinds of reasons, that some are effects-vices and some are motives-vices while others are hybrids.

On the ontological issues, an epistemic vice can be different kinds of things and the search for epistemic vices should therefore be a search for different kinds of things. Cassam has usefully distinguished monist and pluralist accounts of vice-ontology: the *monist* thinks epistemic vices are one kind of thing, such as character traits, whereas a *pluralist* argues that epistemic vice can be different kinds of things (Cassam 2020, §2.2). In practice, the pluralist options are attitudes, character traits, and ways of thinking, meaning we have *attitude-vices*, *character-vices*, and *thinking-vices* (see Tanesini 2021, chs. 2-3; Cassam 2019, chs. 3-4). Attitude-vices are mainly defended by Tanesini using empirical work in attitude psychology. Thinking-vices include wishful thinking and conspiratorial thinking. The historical tendency has been monism given the influence of Aristotle's own focus on character-vices. Other than the arguments made by Cassam and Tanesini, there are three strategic reasons to be a vice-pluralist when it comes to resistance. First, it seems that resistant behaviour involves attitudes, character traits, and ways of thinking and that is better captured by vice-pluralism. Second, if the resistant vices are different kinds of things, then it seems plausible they will be caused and sustained by different factors which need different kinds of corrective responses (see Battaly 2016; Tanesini 2021, ch. 9). Third, narrowing our focus to one kind of epistemic vice creates the risk of missing or misclassifying certain resistant vices.

The claim we end up with is that resistant behaviours are often expressive of a range of epistemically vicious attitudes, character traits, and ways of thinking. Appreciating those epistemic vices is therefore integral to understanding resistance to the demographic problem. Three caveats are needed: (1) the claim is not that individual resistance can be exhaustively explained in terms of epistemic vices, (2) there are moral and perhaps political vices as well as epistemic vices, and (3) vices are not the only kind of individual-level failing, since there are also kinds of culpable ignorance, inadequate cognitive abilities, inadequate interpersonal skills, a narrowness of experience, and other failings. Of course, epistemic vices could play a role in causing and sustaining these other individual failings. Arrogance, for instance, often leads a person to overestimate their abilities and inflate

their self-confidence. Such a person is unlikely to work on their cognitive abilities or admit their ignorance or work hard to seek out opportunities for instruction (cf. Medina 2012, §1.1; Tanesini 2020).

The questions are therefore: what kinds of epistemic vices are plausibly involved in the kind of resistant behaviour described in the last section? What vices of the mind can we see in those patterns of epistemic resistance to the demographic problem? I will describe two vices: (1) *closedmindedness* in the case of ignorant resistance and (2) *epistemic malevolence* in the case of hostile resistance. If the examples are well-taken, then resistance of those sorts must be understood at least in part in terms of epistemic vices.

Ignorance and Closedmindedness

Ignorant resisters lack certain kinds of knowledge and understanding of different aspects of the demographic problem—its causes, effects, consequences, and so on. In many cases, they also desire to remain ignorant by engaging in kinds of active ignorance: the resister decides that they do not need to know certain things about the demographic problem, or they decide that they need not to know, in order to maintain comfortable ignorances (cf. Mill 2007). This means that certain ignorant resisters start to conduct themselves in ways that reflect the vice of closedmindedness.

According to a recent proposal by Heather Battaly, closed-mindedness is an inability or unwillingness to engage with relevant epistemic options, such as the options to reconsider a belief, adopt a currently neglected investigative method, or consult certain sources (Battaly 2017b, 2018a). Our epistemic lives consistently expose us to epistemic options which call on us to respond to them in various ways—whether to reassess our beliefs about *x*, whether to revise our understanding of *y*, or whether to adopt a different way of thinking about *z*. The closed-minded person fails to respond to these epistemic options in different ways; they may fail to recognise them, fail to acknowledge them, spuriously question their relevance, dismiss them cursorily, derogate those who offer them, and so on (see Battaly 2018a, 262-278 for further elaboration). In most cases, closed-mindedness is patterned: the epistemic options one is closed to are

not isolated, but parts of whole integrated ways of knowing and making sense of the world of which the options are components. In the case of the demographic problem, a resister might want to maintain certain naïve conceptions of the realities of the discipline. For this reason, closed-mindedness is often attractive. An epistemically closed world might be stable, definite, and marked by a sense of certainty and the absence of disquieting doubts. We should not pretend that virtuous open-mindedness is wholly attractive: openness to epistemic possibilities is often a source of additional work, anxiety, and doubt which can all complicate our practical endeavours (Baehr 2011, ch. 8; Riggs 2010).

How might ignorant resisters display the patterns of inability and unwillingness that are characteristic of the vice of closedmindedness? Without being comprehensive, they can be closed off to the knowledge offered in testimonies, empirical studies, and other sources of new beliefs about the state of the discipline (such as the stories in Alcoff 2003). They could also be resistant to relevant psychological studies, refusing to engage with them, or adopting a rigid stance of unbudgeable doubt. Their epistemic closure can also involve refusing to use or take seriously necessary concepts and perhaps fortifying their closure by derogating those who offer them—as 'woke', ideologically-motivated, or whatever. Closedminded conduct is very diverse and can range from passive forms (such as flat non-responsiveness to evidence) through to more active forms (such as refusing to recognise the relevance of certain kinds of data). Crucially, these closedminded forms of behaviour are made possible by structural conditions—by, for instance, structural failures to circulate kinds of information, or cultures that tolerate certain kinds of ignorance about the demographic realities of the discipline. The motivations of closed-mindedness are also diverse: the ignorant resister may want to sustain a sanguine image of the discipline, or avoid morally salient kinds of knowledge, or work to block the uptake of liberatory concepts, to name but a few. Moreover, there are complex dynamics to interactive closed-mindedness. An ignorant resister is often energetic in their refusals to engage with relevant epistemic options because they are confronted with challenges and counter-objections. For these reasons, closed-mindedness often relies on the cooperative activity of other interpersonal vices, such as aggressiveness and 'bad faith'.

Hostility and Epistemic Malevolence

Hostile resisters are resistant because they are hostile to the interests and concerns of certain social groups or intellectual communities. They are not ignorant and might actually be well-informed about the causes of the demographic problem. They may be lazily or selfishly conservative and resent having their pride stung, as well, but those are not their fundamental motivation. The hostile resister is motivated to allow or cause harm to the members of those social and intellectual communities to whom they are opposed. We could attribute a range of epistemic vices to the hostile resister, but a central one will be what Jason Baehr has labelled *epistemic malevolence* (Baehr 2010). In its general sense, *malevolence* refers to opposition to the good as such, which can take personal or impersonal varieties: the malevolent person may be opposed to justice and equality and other goods, or they may be opposed to the good of specific people. Baehr argues that malevolence, in its epistemic and non-epistemic forms, is active and "personally deep": "the opposition characteristic of malevolence is "active" (…) it tends to issue in actual attempts to stop, diminish, undermine, destroy, speak out, or turn others against the good", and, moreover, this opposition "reflects the malevolent person's fundamental cares and concerns" and is therefore "importantly tied to her self-conception: it is, at least to some extent, what she is about" (Baehr 2010, 191).

The vice of epistemic malevolence is an active disposition to oppose the epistemic good and can take personal or impersonal forms. Unlike other epistemic vices, it tends to be esoteric, in the sense that it has been theoretically described but is not currently a feature of our public vocabularies; no-one outside vice epistemology is likely to say of someone, "Oh, he's so epistemically malevolent!", while most people happily say, "He's so arrogant!" (cf. Kidd 2021, §3). One important function of vice epistemology, however, is to expand our descriptive and evaluative resources by creating new vice-concepts or renovating older ones that have gone into abeyance: there is no reason to think that our inherited resources for describing and evaluating epistemic character are sufficiently comprehensive. But are there really epistemically malevolent people in the sense described by Baehr?

Two of the examples of vicious epistemic malevolence offered by Baehr concern cases of oppression. A fictional example is O'Brien in George Orwell's novel *1984* tortures Winston Smith with the goal of destroying his epistemic autonomy. An historical example is Frederick Douglass' autobiography, which records the ways his 'master' and 'mistress' systematically opposed his efforts at epistemic self-development (cf. Baehr 2010, 206-207). These are cases of violent epistemic malevolence which, in Douglass' case, were continuous with racist social institutions. In his later work, Cassam argues that the 'doubt-mongering' of Big Tobacco companies whose profits rely on creating doubt or ignorance about the health, environmental, and social costs of smoking (Cassam 2019, 89ff). We could also add climate denialists who actively intimidate climate scientists in an effort to deter them from doing and communicating research on anthropogenic climate change (Biddle, Kidd, and Leuschner 2017). I think these are plausible cases of personal and impersonal epistemic malevolence: a person or group acts to undermine or destroy the epistemic good by working to destroy and erode the epistemic abilities, self-confidence, and autonomy of their 'enemies' or to prevent the formation and acceptance of certain truths about the world. In each case, there are severe moral and practical harms, too.

Is the hostile resister actively epistemically malevolent in either the personal or the impersonal senses? I think they are by definition *if* what motivates their resistance is a deep desire to oppose the epistemic good of the social groups or intellectual communities against which they feel animus. In this sense, epistemic malevolence is essentially a motives-vices, which should not obscure the importance of their bad epistemic effects; indeed, one could imagine a hostile resister who—out of cunning or cowardice—fails to enact the hostilities which they feel. Consider some examples of epistemically malevolent hostile resistance. In personal cases, the resister wants to oppose the good of specific persons against whom they are prejudiced—women philosophers, gay philosophers, or whomever their pattern of biases and prejudices disclose as an *opponent*. This will often include successful and high-profile philosophers. Epistemically malevolent actions can extend to impugning, insulting, mocking and subjecting philosophical work to weak or fallacious forms of criticism. For this reason, I disagree with Baehr's remark that it is "generally easier (…) to undermine another person's moral well-being than it is to undermine

her epistemic well-being" (Baehr 2010, 211). The motivating desire of malevolent actions is to oppose or undermine or destroy the epistemic good of the target.

Hostile resistance can also be malevolent in more impersonal ways when it comes to the demographic problem. First, by trying to block efforts to understand and respond, one is effectively aiming to perpetuate social and structural conditions that disadvantage members of underrepresented groups. Sustaining a harmful environment is epistemically malevolent, and this is another way that vices interact with structures; the behaviours through which we express certain epistemic vices usually depend on structural conditions. There are ways of 'doing' certain vices that are only possible in certain kinds of social environment. Second, hostile resisters want to make it harder for certain social groups and intellectual communities to function and flourish. They could, for instance, want to try to minimise the infrastructural inclusion of certain groups or kinds of philosophy, or promote derogatory social stereotypes and metaphilosophical prejudices, or create institutional conditions that facilitate patterns of epistemic exclusion and violence, and so on. If institutional and disciplinary structures enable such malevolence, then they are *corrupting* in the sense of facilitating the development and exercise of epistemic vices (see section 5).

This list is hardly exhaustive, of course, but a unifying feature of these examples is a desire and determination to oppose the epistemic good of certain individuals, social groups, or intellectual communities. The hostile resister opposes the acknowledgment, recognition, respect, inclusion, teaching, study, and appreciation of what they regard as 'targets', where the selection of targets is tied up with invidious social and metaphilosophical prejudices. To see epistemic malevolence at work, one can look at the racist prejudices documented by the Chinese philosophy scholar, Bryan van Norden, in his book *Taking Back Philosophy*. Think of claims that 'there is no such thing as Chinese philosophy', that Indian philosophies are all 'dreamy' and 'spiritual', that philosophy proper is exclusively a European phenomenon, or that even if there *are* 'non-Western' philosophies, they must lack the significance or richness of their (obviously superior) Western counterparts (for these and other examples, see van Norden 2017, ch. 1). Insofar as such attitudes and convictions reflect a desire to oppose and undermine interest in, respect for, or appreciation of those philosophical

traditions, they are expressively of kinds of epistemic malevolence sustained by racist and culturally chauvinist outlooks. In these cases, the individual-level vice of epistemic malevolence is encouraged, inflected, and sustained by wider structural realities: the vices and structures are intimately related.

5. Epistemic Corruption and Multidimensional Explanations

I think that ignorant resistance and closedmindedness and hostile resistance and epistemic malevolence show us why vice-explanations and structural-explanations can be mutually consistent (call this *weak pluralism*) and mutually entailing (call this the *strong claim*). If we want to understand these kinds of resistance, then we must investigate the individual-level epistemic failings through which they are enacted: one cannot perform active ignorance without exercising the vice of closedmindedness and to oppose the epistemic good of certain social communities and intellectual traditions simply is to be epistemically malevolent. However, vice-explanations are not explanatorily sufficient. We should also look to the structural factors which facilitate and sustain kinds of ignorance and hostility. Our social and institutional environments encourage or tolerate certain kinds of attitudes, character traits, and ways of thinking, whether accidentally or by design, and in the case of the demographic problem, these are often vicious.

In effect, such investigations show us that many of the social structures of academic philosophy are *epistemically corrupting*, meaning that exposure to them tends "to facilitate the development and exercise of epistemic vices" or the erosion or extirpation of epistemic virtues (Kidd 2022, 96; cf. Kidd 2020). Awareness of the epistemically corrupting tendencies of features of our institutional and social environments necessitates certain kinds of epistemic work, which we can articulate in terms of a kind of *institutional cynicism* (Kidd 2023). Processes of epistemic corruption involve dynamical interactions between individual epistemic character, interpersonal interactions, and social structures. This presupposes a conception of epistemic character as, in Robin Dillon's words, not as static or insulated from social circumstances, but rather as "fluid, dynamic (…) as processive rather than substantive, as capable of stability without being

static" (Dillon 2012, 105). Our moral and epistemic character does not emerge *ex nihilo*, nor does it emerge fully-formed, nor is it incapable of change. On the contrary, individual character and its various components come to be

> inculcated, nurtured, directed, shaped, and given significance and moral valence as vice or virtue in certain ways in certain kinds of people by social interactions and social institutions and traditions that situate people differentially in power hierarchies. (Dillon 2012, 104)

A vice epistemologist can therefore interpret the epistemic vices of resisters as the complex products of those individuals interacting with corrupting conditions, influences, pressures, and temptations. Consider the definition of epistemic vice offered by Medina:

> [A]n *epistemic vice*: a set of corrupted attitudes and dispositions that get in the way of knowledge (…) these epistemic character traits do have a distinctive sociogenesis for subjects who occupy a particular social position. There are epistemic virtues and vices with distinctive lines of social development, and all of us, from our own social positionality, can learn some lessons from an examination of these epistemic character traits and their formation. (Medina 2012, 30)

Individual resisters are characterised by epistemic vices which are caused and sustained by a constant and ongoing series of interactions with epistemically corrupting interpersonal and structural conditions. Since corruption is a dynamic process. The individual is not passive or a hostage to fortune: one can recognise and try to resist corrupting influences, respond to the warnings of others about our own subjection to corruption, and engage in kinds of critical self-monitoring and critical monitoring of the social environment. For Medina and other vice epistemologists, then, epistemic vices should not be seen *either* as individual *or* as structural since their 'sociogenesis' presupposes a distinction between character vices and structures: *p* and *q* can only causally interact if they are ontologically distinct.

In the case of resisters, we should seek to explain them in multidimensionalist terms which emphasise personal temperaments, life-experiences, interpersonal relationships, social norms and practices, professional ideals, self-conceptions, and material and structural factors as well as wider metaphilosophical convictions and prejudices. Studying their vices will not be a separate task from studying their structural conditions: the one should call attention to the other and the concept of epistemic corruption can guide those enquiries (cf. Kidd 2020). Into the future, one could investigate the range of potential corruptors which encourage and sustain the variety of resistant epistemic vices. A very short list would include inequalities of power, gendered and racialised conceptions of rationality, agonistic conceptions of philosophical practice, false beliefs in an ineffable and unteachable 'brilliance', obsessions with philosophical 'purity', and a wider array of discriminatory social and metaphilosophical prejudices and attitudes.[1] We should also note that the viciousness of resisters can also be intensified by the vices of those on the side of the angels, such as zealousness and self-righteousness. If we investigate the epistemically corrupting dimensions of these factors, then we are likely to see the ways that individual-level vices are dynamically related to structural realities in ways that confirm Cassam's strong pluralist conviction that "satisfying explanations of our intellectual conduct are almost certainly going to have to be multidimensional" (Cassam 2019, 27).

6. Conclusions

The phenomenon of resistance to understanding and responding to the demographic problem requires us to understand resistant attitudes and behaviours. I argued that we should do this using an explanatorily pluralistic methodology. I endorsed *multidimensionalism*: the use of multiple explanatory styles is necessary to a perspicuous explanation of resistance. If so, we need not choose between individual, structural, or other kinds of explanation. In some cases, explanatory monism might be appropriate, but if adopted as a default, it condemns us to explanatory myopia.

[1] Quassim Cassam has described "a preoccupation with philosophical purity" as "a type of intellectual extremism" and one that he "deplore[s]" (Cassam 2022, 8).

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WOMEN IN PHILOSOPHY: WHAT IS TO BE DONE? INTERROGATING THE VALUES OF REPRESENTATION AND INTERSECTIONALITY

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ABSTRACT

It is clear that philosophy has a "woman problem". Despite the recent acceptance of this fact, it is less clear what ought to be done about it. In this paper, we argue that philosophy as a discipline is uniquely well-positioned to think through the marginalisation suffered by women and other minorities. We therefore interrogate two values that already undergird conversations about inclusion—representation and intersectionality—in order to think about the path ahead. We argue that, once we have done so, it becomes clear that the slow pace of improvement over the last few decades is unacceptable and more radical steps need to be taken. First, we outline the current state of women in philosophy focusing on three areas: levels of employment, publishing, and sexual harassment. Then we turn to representation and intersectionality respectively. We conclude by arguing that many women and people of colour have been arguing for a more radically diverse philosophy for many years. What we are facing is a lack of ambition on the one hand and problem of attention on the other.

Keywords: *representation; intersectionality; exclusion; employment; publishing; sexual harassment.*

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1. Introduction

Much work over the last decade, including this special issue, has aimed to show that philosophy has a "woman problem". Philosophy, as an institutionalised academic discipline and a site of knowledge, has failed to properly include, recognise, or celebrate women as members and thinkers in their own right. Because of this, philosophers have found themselves reproducing an almost exclusively all-male "canon" which idolizes a small number of European white men, while obscuring other important thinkers and theorists (Waithe 2015; Witt 2006; Zerilli 2009; Haslanger 2008; Tyson 2018). This canon does not reflect the actual distribution and production of philosophy across the world. As Lisa Kerber (1997, 19) notes: "when women are absent from the narrative history of ideas, it is not because they are truly absent, but because the historian did not seek energetically enough to find them". This gap has led to various movements within and outside of traditional philosophy departments that aim to correct this oversight. This has included volumes on women philosophers throughout history (Waithe 1987, 1990, 1994; Atherton 1994; Warnock 1996; Buxton and Whiting 2020). But it has also included pressure from philosophers themselves that aim to change the representation, position, and treatment of women and other marginalised groups within the academy (Tyson 2018; Holroyd and Saul 2018; Beebee and Saul 2021, 2011; Krishnamurthy et al. 2017).

Fortunately, many in philosophy now accept the existence of a "woman problem", representing a positive shift over the last ten years. The data substantiates this: there is slow but meaningful progress. However, we know from experience that some are still uncomfortable with this recent push for inclusion. The reaction to our edited collection *The Philosopher Queens,* a book about women philosophers by women philosophers, was almost entirely positive. However, some still believed the book to be wrong-headed for focusing on the gender of the philosopher as opposed to the "essence" of the philosophy itself, whatever that is. Despite this pushback, there have been many important and productive efforts to relocate women in the history of our discipline. Mary Ellen Waithe's *A History of Women* Philosophers (1987, 1990, 1994) gives an encyclopaedic overview of women thinkers throughout history, beginning in 600BC. Many collections now discuss European women philosophers in the early modern period, including a book by Margaret Atherton (1994). Mary Warnock's (1996) book *Women Philosophers* brought together work by 17 women, offering a

short introduction to each followed by a selection of their most influential work. Nancy Tuana's series "Rereading the Canon" offers feminist interpretations of canonical thinkers, including feminist approaches to Aristotle, Kant, and Hegel. The Oxford "New Histories of Philosophy" series, edited by Christia Mercer and Melvin Rogers, aims to help academics hoping to diversify their philosophy reading lists, with books on Frances Power Cobbe, Margaret Cavendish, Mary Shepherd, Sophie de Grouchy, and more. A new collected history on *African American Political Thought* (2020) edited by Melvin Rogers and Jack Turner includes chapters on Phillis Wheatley, Harriet Jacobs, Anna Julia Cooper, Ida B. Wells, Audre Lorde, and Angela Davis. The "In Parenthesis" group at Durham University aims to highlight the work of "The Wartime Quartet": Mary Midgley, Elizabeth Anscombe, Philippa Foot, and Iris Murdoch. Two new books have recently been released on these four thinkers: *Metaphysical Animals* (Mac Cumhaill and Wiseman 2022) and *The Women Are Up To Something* (Lipscomb 2021). The Paderborn University group "History of Women Philosophers and Scientists" hosts a summer school every year, to encourage new work in this area. There are also now many important mentoring schemes for women in philosophy, helping them to navigate life in the academy. For instance, The Collegium of Black Women Philosophers (CBWP 2020) runs conferences and helps early-career academics to seek important guidance from more senior members of the field. The Society for Women in Philosophy (SWIP) runs a mentoring scheme that, in conjunction with the British Philosophical Association, links early-career researchers with academics in permanent positions across the UK.

There is also important and productive pressure from students to diversify and decolonise our university reading lists. However, when they do so, students are often not taken seriously, and are on occasion attacked by the right-wing press. For instance, SOAS (London School of Oriental and African Studies) students suggested that most of their readings should be written by those from precisely those geographies that the school is meant to focus on, Africa and Asia. This was met by false claims in The S*n (2017) that students wanted to "ban white philosophers" and were "Barmy radicals". Students continue to ask questions about their reading lists, even in the face of these unsympathetic reactions, even when they sometimes stem from within philosophy itself. As Charlotte Witt (2006, 539) points out, "the fact that feminist scholarship has an explicitly political goal (the equality of the sexes and the end of male oppression) puts it on a collision

course with philosophy's traditional self-image as the disinterested search for truth and knowledge".

Several interesting questions arise from this history of exclusion. For instance, *why* exactly have women been excluded for so long? *How* is this exclusion maintained and compounded? Eileen O'Neill's agenda-setting paper "Disappearing Ink" (1997, 19) discusses how women in early modern philosophy, who were well-known in their own time, have since disappeared from view. It is not the case that women in philosophy never existed. Instead, they have been forgotten: "why were women's printed books treated as if written ins disappearing ink—extant yet lost to sight?" O'Neill argues that this forgetfulness is partly because the losing philosophical positions of the day were associated with women (1997, 34–36). This coupled with the practice of anonymous authorship meant that women of the early modern period almost disappeared entirely. We might also speculate that this process of forgetting women in philosophy is at least partly due to the dispositions of those who have been responsible for maintaining and producing knowledge. Women were formally excluded from academic life until very recently and most historical work to resurrect women philosophy is done *by women.* In other words, until recently, there were simply very few women around to do the active work of remembering.

This paper aims to answer a different question about the exclusion of women in philosophy: *what ought to be done about it?* This paper aims to consider what philosophy departments ought to do about this issue and how they have already begun to tackle it.[1] Our knowledge of these problems stem from our own previous experience, but also from discussions with other women philosophers, interactions that we were able to have whilst editing *The Philosopher Queens*. We also draw heavily on the work of women philosophers who have mobilised around this issue, often for many years. Moreover, the claims that we are making here apply to other university departments. Sexism is not only a problem in philosophy. Instead, philosophy reflects and exacerbates exclusion that exists both within and outside of academia more generally. Louise Antony (2012) argues that philosophy is a "perfect storm" where many different

[1] We do not focus on the question of how to engage in the historical project of resurrecting women philosophers. O'Neill discusses three different methodologies for historical revival in "Disappearing Ink" (1997).

exclusionary factors manifest, making philosophy a particularly stark case. We make some reference in what follows to philosophy's specific forms of exclusion. However, many of the lessons can be thought of as general rather than targeted.

Philosophers are arguably uniquely well-positioned to think about exclusion, marginalisation, and oppression within our discipline, given that many philosophers interrogate these concepts already. We are capable of thinking about *why* inclusion is important and therefore understanding how best it can be achieved. The philosopher's toolkit can therefore be used to think about these problems.[2] The aim here is not to be entirely prescriptive. Instead, we intend for this paper to be part of an ongoing conversation within the discipline. This paper therefore focuses on two core concepts in feminist thinking that might help us to better understand what ought to be done about philosophy's "woman problem": *representation* and *intersectionality.* There are many values or concepts that we could have chosen. But these two, we believe, are best positioned to sharpen the conversation on what ought to be done about the absence of diversity in philosophy today. They are also *already* part of the ongoing conversation. The concept of representation, for instance, undergirds nearly all discussions of who is read and taught in philosophy undergraduate programmes. But what does representation mean and why is it valuable? We approach these concepts, not to underline their importance; we largely take their importance for granted. Instead, here we ask, given that we accept the importance of representation and intersectionality respectively, what is required of us now? We conclude that, once we have properly interrogated these underlying values, far more is required of us than merely including some more women on the reading list. A far more radical approach is needed. Indeed, as we will show in the following section, if philosophy continues to respond to these issues at its current (incredibly slow) pace, it will be many decades until we have a discipline that lives up to our aspirations.

[2] This "toolkit" and how it's generally used could of course be part of the problem. See Dembroff (2020).

The Current State of Women in Philosophy

To say why the concepts of representation and intersectionality are useful, we need to understand the current state of play for women in philosophy. This section draws on the latest data about three areas of women's experiences in philosophy: employment, publishing, and sexual harassment.

2. Employment in Philosophy Departments

Things have certainly improved for women philosophers in the last century. Women are, at the very least, no longer formally barred from academic institutions: they are able to earn degrees, teach, and hold senior positions in university departments.[3] However, there remain questions about the number of women employed in philosophy departments and how they are treated once they get there. Only 25% of Professors in UK Philosophy departments are women (Beebee and Saul 2021). These numbers have improved somewhat in the last 10 years. In their 2011 "Society for Women in Philosophy" report, Saul and Beebee found that only 19% of Professors in the UK were women. Progress is therefore slow but clear. An interesting feature of this data is the sudden drop off rate: women choose to take philosophy at undergraduate level at around the same rate as men, and therefore account for around 50% of philosophy undergraduates. Unlike other university subjects such as STEM, women do not seem to be encouraged away from philosophy from an early age (Calhoun 2009). The problem, then, arises further down the pipeline when women must choose whether to pursue graduate degrees. Ma et al. suggest that

> although they may enter the major unaware of these schemas [philosophy as male dominated], women may become acculturated to the masculine nature of philosophy at the upper-division where gender parity diminishes, or perhaps women see that most of their professors are male

3 The first woman allowed to attend university lectures in Europe was the polymath Anna Maria van Schurman at the University of Utrecht, on the condition that she sat behind a curtain so as not to "distract" the students (Oneill, 1997, 18). The University of Cambridge did not allow women to earn degrees until 1948.

> and course texts are predominantly male-authored (…). [T]hese perceptions may discourage women's identification and engagement in the field. (Ma et al. 2018, 77–78; see also Leuschner 2019)[4]

The male-dominated character of philosophy departments may be discouraging marginalised students from continuing in the field. Evidence from the US suggests that women are disproportionately less interested in philosophy at the beginning of their undergraduate degrees. This locates some of the problem, then, in the students' perception or experience of philosophy *before* they even enter the university classroom (Schwitzgebel, Thompson, and Winsberg 2020).

There is little focus on intersectionality in this data (something that we will discuss later on). However, reports from beyond philosophy paint a stark picture. In her 2019 report for the University and College Union (UCU), Nicola Rollock interviewed 20 of the 25 UK's Black women professors. Only 2 of these women had been Professors for more than 10 years. They described experiences such as bullying from co-workers, excessive and unfair workloads, and being overtaken by less qualified candidates in consideration for promotion. In her interview "The Pain and Promise of Black Women in Philosophy" (2018) Professor Anita L. Allen discusses the state of the field in the United States:

> White women are better represented and perhaps more easily accepted in philosophy than men or women of color. Pay equity and status gaps between women and men tend to favor men. Only about 1 percent of full-time philosophy professors are black, whereas about 17 percent are women. A higher percentage of black men than black women Ph.D students go on to tenure-track positions. (Allen 2018)

Botts, Bright, Cherry, Mallarangeng, and Spencer in their 2014 paper "What Is the State of Blacks in Philosophy?" found that "of US philosophy department affiliates, just 1.32 percent of them are Black" (2014, 237). So,

4 Evidence from non-Anglophone universities also finds a drop-off between undergraduate and professional philosophy. In Greece, women make up the majority of philosophy students, but only around 28% of staff (Iliadi, Theologou, and Stelios 2018).

while things are improving for women (albeit slowly), there is still a huge gap when addressing racialized marginalisation. Simply working towards more women in philosophy departments is not enough when many of them are from the most privileged groups in society. There is still more to be done.

2. Women in Philosophy Journals

Publishing plays an incredibly important role in an individual's chances of success in the academic job market. PhD students are encouraged to have at least one publication in a 'top' philosophy journal, in order to stand a good chance of career progression (usually to a poorly paid and precarious postdoctoral contract). It is well-documented that the publication process in philosophy is extremely slow compared to other disciplines. Students and early-career academics therefore must begin submitting papers for publication as quickly as possible. Good mentoring and support can help young philosophers to navigate this process, but it is often intimidating and frustrating, nonetheless.

We have already seen that women are not well represented in philosophy departments. This may be compounded by women's lack of representation in philosophy journals. In the 2000s only 13% of papers in top philosophy journals were written by women (Hassoun 2022). Strikingly, this hasn't changed a great deal over the proceeding century—in 1900 around 10% of publications in top philosophy journals were by women (ibid.). In her well-known 2007 *Hypatia* paper, Sally Haslanger collected data on the number of women authors in several prestigious philosophy journals: *Ethics, Journal of Philosophy, Mind, Nous, Philosophy Review, Philosophy and Public Affairs, and Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.* The table from that paper is replicated below.

Representation of Women in 3 Philosophy Journals, 2002 - 2007

Journal	*Authors*	*Female*	*Percentage*
Ethics	114	22	19.30
Journal of Philosophy	120	16	13.33
Mind	141	9	6.38
Nous	155	18	11.61
Philosophical Review	63	7	11.11
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research	212	26	12.26
Philosophy and Public Affairs	93	13	13.98
Overall	**898**	**111**	**12.36**

These findings have been corroborated by the Data on Women in Philosophy project (2022) who collected data on top philosophy journals up to 2015. Focusing on 2015 as an example year, they found that women accounted for 20% for authors, and that the proportion of women was higher in journals *without* double-blind peer review. In that year, not a single woman author was published by *Mind.* As Haslanger noted, the data speaks for itself. But to get a fuller picture of the last few years, we have replicated Haslanger's approach with three of the journals (*Ethics, PPA, and Mind*), focusing on the years 2015-2020.

Representation of Women in 3 Philosophy Journals, 2015 - 2020

Journal	*Authors*	*Female*	*Percentage*
Ethics	232	51	22%
Mind	233	15	6.9%
PPA	77	15	19.4%
Overall	542	81	14.9%

As the most up to date data shows, there does appear to be a slight improvement in the proportion of women being accepted for publication in these top journals. *Philosophy and Public Affairs* has seen the largest increase of the three, by around 5.4 percentage points (around a 30% increase). Moreover, while we only collected data from 2015-2020, 2021

looks more promising for *Mind,* with 9 women authors in total. The previous highest year was 4. It is also still the case that women tend to be more strongly represented in discursive or review articles. This, Leuschner notes, "exemplified the fact that women tend to do work of lesser prestige more often" (2019, 6).

There are several further questions that can be raised by this data. First, are women *underrepresented* in these journals or does the disparity simply reflect the fact that there are fewer women philosophers? Second, is the case that women are being discriminated against (either indirectly or directly) during the acceptance process or are women simply not submitting to journals as much as their male counterparts? And if women are not submitting as much, why is this the case? A recent paper by Krishnamurthy et al (2017) found that women *are* underrepresented in ethics journals, once we consider the number of women specialising in the given topic. That is, after accounting for the general underrepresentation of women in philosophy, women are still even *further* underrepresented in top ethics journals. Wilhelm et al. (2018) also found that women are underrepresented when compared to the number of women faculty in the US. On the second question, Anna Leuschner (2019, 4) points out that many top philosophy journals provided data to show that their acceptance rates are roughly equal: women are just as likely to be accepted during the peer-review and publication process. The problem is instead that women are less likely to submit papers for review than their male colleagues. This is also reflected in recent data published by *Ethics,* which shows that women have a low submission rate to the journal, but are just as likely to be accepted as their male counterparts. In other words, "on average, women submitting to this journal have as good a chance of having their articles accepted as do men" (Richardson 2018). If women are submitting less than men, why is this the case? Leuschner (2019, 10) argues that both direct and indirect disadvantages will affect how much women submit for publication.

> Direct effects of biases, that is, material disadvantages, such as inadequate working conditions, as well as nonmaterial disadvantages, such as professional marginalization and devaluation, a hostile atmosphere, microaggressions, and stereotype threat, are likely to lead to indirect effects of biases,

> that is, to the identified differences between women and men academics' working behaviour.

These biases may arise from women's material position within academia; they tend to take on more pastoral and additional work voluntarily, while also being more likely to hold a junior or temporary position.[5] Likewise, Leuschner cites a now well-known study by Leslie et al. (2015) which asks people from various disciplines to rate whether an individual needs "innate genius" to succeed. They found that philosophy had the highest proportion of such individuals. More problematically, Leslie et al. also found that women and African Americans were perceived as lacking this innate talent. Women and other marginalised groups in the academy are therefore held back by a bias that assumes that philosophy is a God-given gift, rather than something learned and cultivated.[6] While we have a good picture of the fact that women are underrepresented in philosophy journals, we perhaps are not totally clear as to why. Leuschner (2019) points out the many different biases that affect women's lives, as well as their working conditions. Saul (2017) argues that we lack sufficient evidence to know why women publish at such low rates in value journals, though we have many hypotheses. It seems, though, that more qualitative data is needed to think through women's experiences in attempting to publish papers. This missing piece of the puzzle could help us to understand the lack of women in "top" journals.

3. Sexual Harassment

Sexual harassment is rife in academia.[7] Nearly every woman has a story of how they or someone they know has been harassed, either in their own workplace or at conferences and workshops. We recently asked women in

[5] Research from economics which shows that women on average take longer to write papers than their male counterparts, but also often write more clearly. This could mean that they spend less time on new research (Hengel 2018).

[6] Leuschner (2019) is also discussed in a paper by Liam Kofi Bright, which considers the more general "productivity gap" between men and women. He writes: "women concentrate on producing high quality papers in response to an expectation that their work will receive greater scrutiny. Whether or not this expectation is accurate, producing such work is time consuming, so women then produce fewer papers overall" (Bright 2017, 2).

7 Parts of this discussion appeared in Buxton and Whiting (2021).

philosophy to share their stories of harassment, to better understand how this affects our colleagues and students. Some of the respondents recounted fellow students or tutors making sexual remarks in seminars, another discussed a long-term relationship with her supervisor (for him then to move on to another of his students when they separated). Many shared stories of older men in our discipline saying that women were simply biologically incapable of rational thought and were therefore unable to do philosophy properly at all. Sometimes as an (apparent) joke, sometimes not. Another woman shared a story of a man stroking her leg under the table at a conference dinner. Other forms of harassment are rampant in philosophy as well. One source recounted a white faculty member saying to a Black woman that she "wouldn't mind owning some slaves", then noting that the woman in question might be particularly suited to the job.

Jennifer Saul, a well-known philosopher of language and feminism, has created the website "What is it like to be a woman in philosophy?" Here you'll find a collection of stories from women in our discipline. Some speak of problems in finding women mentors, others recount times when men grabbed them in bars or hit on them in departmental meetings. It makes for a depressing read. A recent report by the National Academies of Science, Engineering, and Medicine (2018) considered the impact of harassment in academia more generally. They concluded that "the cumulative result of sexual harassment in academic sciences, engineering, and medicine is significant damage to research integrity and a costly loss of talent in these fields". The report also finds that higher education has the second highest levels of sexual harassment, surpassed only by the military.

While the general culture around sexual harassment may potentially have improved in the last decade, universities still often fail to take women seriously in their allegations of assault. As Beebee and Saul note, the pressure needs to be kept up on this issue:

> We therefore, as individuals, as departments and as a profession, need to ensure that we create and sustain a culture that both minimises risk (e.g. by adopting and advertising local staff-student relationship and conference behaviour policies) and maximises the chance that victims will report incidents to us, e.g. by making it clear that they will be taken

> seriously and that staff know what to do if an incident is reported to them. (Beebee and Saul 2021, 5)

So, although more is being done across universities in general, we need to continue creating a space where women can come forward if they need to.

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The status of women in philosophy has certainly improved in the last few decades, and women are beginning to stay in the discipline, publish more, and feel safer. But there remain clear challenges for women in philosophy that need to be addressed. To think through these challenges, the remainder of this paper will focus on the concepts of representation and intersectionality. The aim here is to consider how thinking through these concepts (in this specific context) more fully might lead us in a better and more theoretically grounded direction. We already have some recommendations of things that can be done for women and other marginalised people in philosophy. But pressing further down two avenues, on which we already rely upon heavily, might clear a path and show us what is to be done. We do not argue that these concepts answer all our questions. Rather they help to ground our response to the problems outlined so far in a more rigorous and productive way.

I. Representation

Discussions about what to do about philosophy's "women problem" tend to start with the idea of representation. Rarely is it discussed exactly why or how this representation will bring about the required change, however it is often the most visible way to supposedly make progress. Here, we provide a sketch of how best to consider representation within debates about philosophy, and what this means for our understanding of the history of philosophy as well as the discipline today.

There are many different conceptions of representation, particularly in the sphere of political representation. The type of representation we are primarily concerned with is *descriptive representation*: the extent to which a group of people reflect the identities of those they work on behalf of. Our

view is that philosophers, in their pursuit of knowledge and truth, should reflect the diversity of the society they exist within. One argument for this is made well by the political philosopher Anne Phillips (2021) who argues in her recent work that we should be cautious of grounding our arguments for equality on the potential for some tangible benefit, and rather make the case based on the grounds of unqualified justice. Our philosophy departments should be diverse, just as our political representatives should be diverse, not because they necessarily bring about any specific outcomes, but because academia should strive to reflect the diversity of the public it serves. Equal representation is a necessary arrangement and consequence of a just institution. Phillips' argument is therefore that representation is an end in itself, and a necessary one.

We agree with Phillips that representation is an end, and that women's representation should not be contingent on a set of benefits that may or may not arise from increased diversity. This argument alone should be sufficient to make the case for representation. However, where there is evidence for instrumental benefits arising from a representative curriculum and department, we should also make the argument for inclusion on these grounds (Tyson 2018). One example of such benefits comes from the philosopher Katherine Gines who has argued for the importance of the symbolic representation of underrepresented groups within philosophy due to the benefits of role modelling. She writes:

> When Black women see and/or read the scholarship of other Black women in philosophy, it allows the option of becoming a philosopher to enter into their realm of possibilities in very concrete ways. (Gines 2011, 435)

A paper on the impact of same-gender role models of college students also found that women were more positively impacted and inspired by same-gender role models (Lockwood 2006). This is supported by other research that shows having role models that are the same race and gender as a student improves their educational outcomes (Zirkel 2002).

Representation is therefore important, both as an end in itself and as way to achieve a better outcome for the most marginalised in the discipline today. However, it is also in our approach to the history of the discipline

where representation can falter. In many Western philosophy departments, there is a solidified narrative and timeline that constitutes *The* History of Philosophy. Commonly understood as "the canon", these texts set out the history of the discipline through the major philosophers who have been deemed important enough for inclusion. Drawing on the work of Youde and Steele (2008), Owens and Hutchings comment on how these texts

> establish a common set of reference points for disciplinary discussion, form a core part of university curricula, and serve as a crucial pedagogic tool for the socialization of generations of scholars. (Owens and Hutchings 2021, 347)

There have been many rigorous and powerful critiques of the philosophical canon as currently conceived and taught, such as Waithe's (2020, 3) recent evisceration of arguments used to justify the male-dominated canon. She argues that such exclusion is usually rooted in "ineptness or simple bigotry".

Arguments for canon-expansion can be sorted into two broad categories. The first is that a representative canon is necessary as it more accurately reflects history. Second, a more representative canon might bring about certain benefits for students and our society, in adjusting our understanding of philosophy and its history. For the former view, these arguments are rooted in the belief that the canon, as traditionally conceived, is factually inaccurate and that is reason enough for it to change. It frequently omits important contributions from women philosophers and will often ignore all the rich histories of non-Western philosophical traditions. Any set of texts that is meant to illustrate the richness of philosophical history that fails to include significant contributions from these histories is unlikely to be worthy of the classroom.

However, we might also wish to improve representation within the history of philosophy for the benefits it brings to those doing philosophy *today*. In an excellent essay "On Diversifying the Philosophy Curriculum", Táíwò (1993) raises the importance of what we deprive students of, when we deny them a well-rounded education, which should include the rich histories of non-Western philosophical traditions as part of a core curriculum. Critics of these ideas often argue that those from underrepresented groups are

underrepresented simply because they have not made sufficiently important contributions to these histories to warrant their inclusion. The extensive scholarship on women philosophers is sufficient to rebut this argument, but even if it was the case that women's contributions are not as rich as their counterparts (which it plainly isn't), there exists a strong argument that teaching about the existence of these women will also serve the same purpose of providing intellectual role models and dispelling the myth that to be a great philosopher one must be a white man. Philosophers such as Hypatia of Alexandria may not have published their own philosophical works, but her life as a philosopher, teacher and mathematician is fascinating, and can offer valuable lessons about the lives of ancient philosophers, the challenges that arise in documenting their lives, the role of philosophers in society, and reclaiming and contextualising the contested legacies of notable women from history.

We create the history of philosophy in what and how we teach, and who is considered both as a philosopher and as relevant will also shape the future of philosophy. This is articulated well by May (2015) when discussing the role of citation in developing a history of philosophy—"Citational practices (…) offer a way to mark collectivity, delineate historical precedence, and claim legacies of struggle" (2015, 55). Who we include in our teaching is a choice, even for those who claim objectivity and neutrality.

One of the major challenges with discussions of representation is whether representation is, by its nature, essentializing. On the one hand, if we argue that representation is important due to the diversity of experience and perspectives it brings, we risk suggesting that there is a shared experience and imply that one woman can speak for many. In reality, we know that women's experiences and ideas are highly diverse. As Mary Warnock notes at the beginning of her collection on women philosophers, "In the end, I have not found any clear 'voice' shared by women philosophers" (1996: xlvii). However, if we agree that women do not share a distinctive perspective, why does their gender matter at all? The challenge is that we already do not focus on their work, as demonstrated in both our reading lists and data from publications. The common experience of women philosophers is one of being excluded from philosophy precisely because of their gender. To remove this from the narrative altogether in the name of a "gender blind" philosophy only further compounds this problem.

Questions of the value of representation open up difficult puzzles about the purpose and role of philosophy in our society, but if philosophy is meant to reflect and serve a diverse public, then it fails to do so in its current form.

So, what does this richer look at representation tell us about what ought to be done? First, it demonstrates that students and staff asking for more representation both in reading lists and departments have many ways to make their case, and those that have been resistant to this change ought to listen. We should be interrogating the content of our courses, both who is included in our existing courses and department structures. Representation as an ideal requires us not just to include tokens in our reading lists, but a re-evaluation of whose ideas have been prioritised and how this has shaped our contemporary understanding of philosophy. Similarly, while gender-balanced departments may go some way to addressing representational challenges, we need to consider whether the substantive representation of women's concerns are also being prioritised within courses, as well as in our work structures. We have seen in the data on journal publications that representation is poor in many aspects of philosophy, so this commitment needs to be extended to how philosophy is evaluated, how philosophers from underrepresented groups are supported and encouraged to apply to top journals, and how early-career researchers can be helped to maximise their chances to receiving secure academic posts.

Most importantly however, we need to be open to radical solutions to increasing representation, or we risk philosophy becoming further removed in its image and in its content from the realities of a diverse public. We should evaluate how women philosophers are compensated for additional labour, including role-modelling work and any pastoral work that disproportionately falls on them. In the interim, departments may want to reconsider how performance and progression is assessed, recognising women will likely face more implicit and explicit barriers when working in a discipline that is less likely to view them as intellectual equals. Saul and Holroyd (2018) discuss a number of measures that have already been taken to tackle implicit bias, including universal anonymization, affirmative action programmes, training for academic and administrative staff, and much more. These ideas are illustrative, and many will disagree with them, but there is a need to provoke a conversation that considers more radical solutions because the current pace of change is too slow for many

women who have already been burnt out and disillusioned with whether philosophy is a place for them. We do a disservice to future generations of philosophers as well as those currently working in the field if we do not consider how to speed up what is an unjustifiably unequal discipline. All of this, however, is contingent on an approach that recognises the multiple disadvantages that many women face, and gender alone will be insufficient as a domain for radical change.

II. Intersectionality

The concept of intersectionality has become a touchstone for much contemporary feminism, as theorists and activists attempt to make their politics more expansive and inclusive. Some dismiss intersectionality as a form of "identity politics" which causes fractures within the social class of women. However, the concept instead highlights the compounding and layering ways in which oppression and domination can manifest. Kimberlé Crenshaw (1991), who first coined the term, discussed how Black women are treated by the law. Their simultaneous experiences of being Black and women changes the way in which they are marginalised by others. Intersectional marginalisation and oppression are not merely a question of racial oppression *plus* patriarchal oppression. It is a compounded and unique form of the two. The history of intersectionality predates the introduction of the term by Crenshaw. For instance, the Combahee River Collective (1977)—a Black feminist lesbian group created in the 1970s—argued for an "integrated analysis and practice based upon the fact that the major systems of oppression are interlocking".[8]

Intersectionality is also a rallying call against viewing feminism purely from the perspective of middle-class white women. Concerns raised by powerful white women—such as a desire to enter the workforce—have not always translated to the patriarchal and racist oppression of Black women. Black women had been (forcibly) included in the workforce for many years, often serving rich white women and their families. "Mainstream" feminism (white feminism) therefore often fails to serve the most marginalised women, because it is framed and driven by the concerns of

[8] Patricia Hill Collins argues (1995, 492) that "interlocking" and "intersectional" refer to the macro and micro-level phenomena. This is further discussed in Carastathis (2014).

white women. As Amia Srinivasan argues in *The Right to Sex,*

> the central insight of intersectionality is that any liberation movement—feminism, anti-racism, the labour movement—that focuses only on what all members of the relevant group (women, people of colour, the working class) have in common is a movement that will best serve those members of the group who are least oppressed. (Srinivasan 2021, 17)

More perniciously, mainstream feminism often fails to even attempt to find something that all members of an oppressed group have in common. Instead, they simply take the white experience as universal.

Today, intersectionality is best-described as "a method and a disposition, a heuristic and analytic tool" (Carbado et al. 2013, 303). It is therefore not simply a tool for theorising and thinking about oppression. It is also a specific disposition that we ought to adopt both inside and outside our work. As Carbado, Crenshaw, Mays and Tomlinson recently put it "intersectionality is what intersectionality does" (2013, 312). Intersectionality is therefore not only intellectual but *operational.* There have been some recent worries raised that intersectionality has lost its force after coming into the mainstream. Many women and feminist societies now describe themselves as "intersectional" but fail to put this into practice: "labelling something 'intersectional' does not make it so" (Collins et al. 2021, 692–93). Some, for instance, pay lip-service to Crenshaw's paper, but do not engage with the rich history of intersectional thinking by women of colour. Some like Collins highlight the need for focus on intersectionality's *critical* aim writing that "critical analysis does not only criticize, but it also references ideas and practices that are essential, needed, or critical for something to happen" (2021, 691). We therefore ought to avoid a depoliticized version of intersectionality and remember its ability to critically interrogate concepts, practices, and ideas. In other words, "if intersectionality is to have a promising future in feminist theory, its intellectual history must be engaged with rigor, integrity, and attentive-ness to the theoretical and political aims which originally animated it" (Carastathis 2014, 312).

A non-intersectional approach to the question of women in philosophy will therefore best serve those women who need the least support. That is, if

we focus only on the "pure" question of women, without considering other forms of oppression, we fail to serve and support other, more marginalised, women in philosophy. We therefore hope that the value of intersectionality is clear. It helps to shift the focus of concern, such that multiple forms of oppression within the category of women can be heard and addressed. There are several benefits to this view. It allows feminist theorists to critically and practically assess the messy reality of the social world more clearly: it accounts for the ways in which oppression and domination intersect and shape one another. It also allows our approaches and work to become more inclusive, since we are no longer concerned with the totality of shared experience.

There are (at least) two ways in which we can think about intersectionality in the context of women in philosophy: how it affects women and marginalised people in our departments and how it affects our research. Here, we are going to focus on the experience of individuals. It should be clear that focusing on the concerns of white, powerful women in philosophy will obscure concerns raised by other groups. For instance, writing on her experience in an Australian philosophy department as a woman of colour, Tracy Llanera wrote the following:

> On more than one occasion I have mentioned to other academics that being a woman of color makes me anxious about my chances in the job market, since there are so few philosophers in the Australian region with a similar profile. More than once, I've received dismissive retorts from white women to the tune of "well, it's hard for all women". (Llanera 2019, 378)

This kind of response to women of colour in our discipline is not only offensive, it also fails at the level of fact. It is hard for women in philosophy, we know that. But the difficulty that women face in the discipline is not distributed evenly. Far from it. The fact that "it's hard for all women" does not help us to think about how it can be even harder for certain women, and how we might compound that injustice by brushing it aside. That is, focusing on the "woman question" as a singular and universal issue can blinker us from appreciating the inequality *between* women in philosophy as well. When considering the importance of including more women (as

demonstrated in the last section), we also need to ensure that this inclusion is not singular. For instance, class is an often-missed axis of exclusion in philosophy. Very few people from working class backgrounds take philosophy degrees and even fewer progress to senior positions. Focusing on the woman question *alone* may obscure how difficult, and different, philosophy is for those without financial resources and family wealth. This does not mean that the "woman problem" should be ignored. But in attempting to address it, we should be careful not to replicate the same exclusion that we seek to overcome.

We lack reliable data on how intersectional oppression can and does affect women in philosophy. As noted earlier, one of the core contributions of the concept of intersectionality is to give voice to the *different* forms of hardship and oppression faced by members of the same gender. Black women do not only face *more* hardship than white women, but the challenges also that they are face are of a different kind. Most papers on women's status in philosophy journals are not intersectional and therefore do not capture the distinctive ways in which women of colour, queer women, or disabled women can be excluded from academic life. Likewise, most reports of how many women are employed in philosophy departments do not tell us how many of these women are white. We already know that it is the vast majority: we do not need to wait for this data before starting to think through solutions and ways forward. But lacking this intersectionality in our narrative often means that we obscure what the state of play really is.

One area which philosophy is particularly failing to address is the inclusion of queer and trans voices in the discipline. This is in spite of the fact that we know that trans women are often subject to hatred, offensive language, exclusion and marginalisation from their own colleagues and students. Many young trans students have chosen to leave the discipline because of this hostile environment. Robin Dembroff (2020) calls this philosophy's "transgender" trash-fire. Some of this stems from ignorance. But part of this exclusion may arise from philosophy's methodology in treating the question of whether trans women 'count' as women as just another interesting area of discussion, rather than something which deeply affects people's lives. For instance, Dembroff argues that philosophers often use folk intuitions or appeals to 'common sense' when thinking about trans rights, rather than reading or listening to queer and trans voices. But of course, if 'common

sense' is generated against the background of marginalisation, then these resources simply carry that injustice forward. Talia-Mae Bettcher argues in "When Tables Speak" that those considering the metaphysics of gender often forget that trans women are (or ought to be) part of the discussion of what constitutes trans inclusion. As Bettcher writes:

> We're here. In the room. And we've suffered from life-long abuse. I've helped a friend die of AIDS, fending off the nurses who misgendered her, watching in horror as the priest invalidated her entire life at her funeral by reducing her to a man. I've been personally assaulted in public to prove that I was a man. I've had a friend trans-bashed. And as this beating was gang-related, she then lost her home. I've had a friend stripped by police-officers, forced to parade back and forth while they ridiculed and harassed her. So please understand that this is a little bit personal. (Bettcher 2018)

We need to better understand how different forms of oppression are compounded in philosophy departments and academia more generally. Some forms of philosophy are not taken seriously *as philosophy.* At the beginning of *The Racial Contract,* Charles Mills noted that white philosophers set up disciplinary boundaries that count these people and ideas as incompatible with "serious philosophy" (1997, 4). As Kristie Dotson argues in "How Is This Paper Philosophy?", the disciplinary practices in philosophy bar diverse voices from being viewed as valuable. She writes (2012, 6): "the environment of professional philosophy, particularly in the U.S., bears symptoms of a culture of justification, which creates a difficult working environment for many diverse practitioners". We should not, then, simply focus on the number of women doing philosophy, but what kind of philosophy we are all doing, reading, and encouraging (see also Superson 2011). Collins (2021, 692) argues that dialogues among subordinated groups are an important way to establish this new knowledge and practice. But such dialogues can be difficult to develop if you are consistently told that the kind of philosophy you're interested in "is not really philosophy".

All of this speaks to the need for something bigger and bolder in our approach to women in philosophy. A commitment to intersectionality

requires that we do not stop at minimal inclusion but must push to make philosophy better for everyone.

Conclusions

One clear conclusions to be drawn from all this is that there is much work left to be done. Although there has been some progress over the last few decades, it has been slow. This slowness has prevented us from properly tackling the more pernicious forms of exclusion in our discipline. Instead, we have been aiming for the bare minimum standard of inclusion. As we pointed out earlier, philosophers have at their disposal many rich theoretical resources to be better when trying to understand the experiences of women in philosophy. Properly interrogating the concepts that we are already relying upon, we believe, points us in a more radical direction. For instance, once we understand the value of representation, paying lip-service to inclusion rather than taking radical steps towards it shows itself to be unacceptable. What is most frustrating is that much of what we have said here is not new. Women have been arguing for more valuable (and intersectional) inclusion for many years (Haslanger 2008; Wylie 2011; Waithe 2015; Tyson 2018; Witt 2006; Llanera 2019). A central issue, then, is the lack of attention paid to the important voices of these women. A shift in attention to something more aspirational is required.

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BEING-FROM-BIRTH: PREGNANCY AND PHILOSOPHY

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ABSTRACT

Women are underrepresented in philosophy. And pregnancy is under-researched in philosophy. Can a connection be made between the two? I will argue that whilst the counterfactual of 'had women historically been better represented in philosophy then pregnancy would have been too' may be true, it is not necessarily the case that we can now, in the present day, expect (or desire) a correlation. In order to understand the gap between these two areas of underrepresentation, one need only adopt a non-essentialist understanding of women so as to recognise that not all women experience pregnancy or are interested in pregnancy (philosophically or otherwise). Nevertheless, given the historical silence(ing) of women in philosophy on the topic of pregnancy, it is important now to redress that imbalance by tackling both issues of underrepresentation simultaneously. To demonstrate further I refer to the difference between representational diversity and substantive diversity (which is related to the more commonly known distinction between descriptive representation and substantive representation). This will be the topic of the first section of the paper. Then, in the second and third sections of the paper I will explore the underrepresentation and misrepresentation of women in philosophy, regarding not only the lack of women numerically speaking but also how women, as a general 'kind', are (misogynistically) described in philosophy historically. I will then apply the same treatment to pregnancy in the fourth and fifth sections of the paper, exploring both its underrepresentation as a topic of philosophical endeavour

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and misrepresentation within society at large. The analysis contains a review of the literature, and cites statistical quantitative data and qualitative grounded interviews, to provide evidence for my claims. I will end by hypothesising about the relationship between these under- and mis- representations, and will provide musings on the future for women and pregnancy in philosophy.

Keywords: *representation; diversity; women; pregnancy; philosophy.*

1. Introduction

Women are underrepresented in philosophy. And pregnancy is under-researched in philosophy. Can a connection be made between the two? I will argue that whilst the counterfactual of 'had women historically been better represented in philosophy then pregnancy would have been too' may be true, it is not necessarily the case that we can now, in the present day, expect (or desire) a correlation. In order to understand the gap between these two areas of underrepresentation, one need only adopt a non-essentialist understanding of women so as to recognise that not all women experience pregnancy or are interested in pregnancy (philosophically or otherwise). Nevertheless, given the historical silence(ing) of women in philosophy on the topic of pregnancy, it is important now to redress that imbalance by tackling both issues of underrepresentation simultaneously. To demonstrate further I refer to the difference between representational diversity and substantive diversity (which is related to the more commonly known distinction between descriptive representation and substantive representation). This will be the topic of the first section of the paper. Then, in the second and third sections of the paper I will explore the underrepresentation and misrepresentation of women in philosophy, regarding not only the lack of women numerically speaking but also how women, as a general 'kind', are (misogynistically) described in philosophy historically. I will then apply the same treatment to pregnancy in the fourth and fifth sections of the paper, exploring both its underrepresentation as a topic of philosophical endeavour and misrepresentation within society at large. The analysis contains a review of the literature, and cites statistical quantitative data and qualitative grounded interviews, to provide evidence

for my claims. I will end by hypothesising about the relationship between these under- and mis- representations, and will provide musings on the future for women and pregnancy in philosophy.

2. Representation and Diversity

In the area of political theory, a distinction is often made between descriptive and substantive representation, based on two of the four types of representation identified by Hanna Pitkin in *The Concept of Representation* (1967).[1] To explain the difference between these types of representation, take group X to include all the x's who are to be represented, and take group Y to include all the y's who are to be the representatives. Y *descriptively* represents X when the x's and y's share a salient characteristic P. For example, it could be argued that Margaret Thatcher descriptively represents women as Margaret Thatcher is herself a woman. Y *substantively* represents X when the interests Q of the x's with respect to their characteristic P is acted upon by Y. For example, it could be argued that Barack Obama substantively represents women as he acted upon women's interests.

Pitkin argued that the descriptive type of representation is limited because it focuses on the identity of the representative(s) rather than the actions or policies of the representative(s) and how they reflect the interests of the represented group.[2] This is evident when we consider whether descriptive representation leads to substantive representation, and therefore whether the represented x's and their representative y's sharing characteristic P is necessary and/or sufficient for Y representing the interests Q of X which pertain to P. Consider a possible counterexample to sufficiency, where Margaret Thatcher is a woman yet did "nothing" for women (Murray 2013). Here we see descriptive representation despite not acting upon the interests of those represented, and so the sharing of P was not sufficient for the sharing of Q. And consider a possible counterexample to necessity, where Barack Obama is not a woman yet did do something for women.[3] Here

[1] The two other types of representation that I will not be discussing are formalistic and symbolic.
[2] Pitkin (1969, 9) argued that these other forms of representation, all but substantive, fail to consider "what is going on during representation" and as such do not reflect what is important to focus on in representation.
[3] For example, supporting the 2014 'HeForShe' campaign and launching policies to address the gender

we see substantive representation despite not having the characteristic of those represented, and so the sharing of P was not necessary for the sharing of Q. If these counterexamples are not convincing, there are many others that help to show the conceptual gap between descriptive and substantive representation.[4] Another way of making sense of this conceptual gap is to acknowledge that members of groups are not always allies to that group. As perplexing as that may seem, I am sure each reader can bring to mind someone who fits this description, whether it be a misogynistic woman, a racist person of colour, or a gay man with internalised homophobia, for example.

Following on from the work led by Laura Sjoberg and Yoav Galai at Royal Holloway University of London, a related qualification can be made between representational diversity and substantive diversity:

> Representational diversity asks: do the administration, the faculty, the staff, and the students of the University/the department represent the race, ethnicity, gender, sexuality, dis/ability, and national origin diversity of the community that the University serves?
>
> Substantive diversity asks: does the content of our syllabi and our publications accurately and effectively reflect the scope of our fields? If not, what content is being privileged? What content is being marginalised? When we teach philosophy, whose philosophy are we teaching? Whose understandings influence what we define as philosophy?

This distinction in some way mirrors that put forward by Pitkin, where representational diversity is about descriptive representation or shared characteristics with those represented, and substantive diversity is about substantive representation or acting on the interests of the represented. In this paper I will be looking at the relation between the (descriptive) representational diversity of philosophy when it comes to women and

pay gap.

[4] Philips (1995), Williams (1998), and Young (2000), show that the quantity of women as representatives for women is not sufficient for reflecting the quality of the representation of women's interests. And Celis (2008) shows that a representative does not necessarily have to look like who they are representing in order to act in their interests.

the substantive diversity of philosophy when it comes to research about pregnancy. I will argue that we get (descriptive) representational diversity in philosophy by having women philosophers in the canon, women philosophers in our departments, and women philosophers in our reading lists, but that we also should strive for substantive diversity in philosophy by having pregnancy be a canonical topic, where pregnancy is included in the research interests of our members of department, and is taught as part of our syllabi. The (descriptive) representational diversity of the inclusion of women in these spheres does not automatically result in substantive diversity of the inclusion of pregnancy. Pregnancy is not only a women's issue. However, the historic exclusion of women from these spheres is partly explanatory for the exclusion of pregnancy. As such, I will explore the historic underrepresentation (and misrepresentation) of women in philosophy alongside the historic underrepresentation (and misrepresentation) of pregnancy in philosophy, in order to demonstrate a correlation between them and an indication towards a probabilistic influence that one has over the other.[5] Specifically, I want to make the counterfactual claim, that if philosophy were to have included more women, then it is likely that philosophy would have included pregnancy in a more substantive way. And so now one of the various strategies we may take to correct these underrepresentation's is to include more women in philosophy which may help to increase the inclusion of pregnancy in philosophy.

Whilst I am connecting women with pregnancy in this loose sense, I want to make clear that this is not intended as an argument for essentialism, whereby women are defined by their reproductive capacities. And whilst I am using the language of 'woman' as if it were a neat category, I stress the importance of challenging (rather than reinforcing) the binary of man/woman. Of course, in an ideal world, the gender of the philosopher should simply be irrelevant. However, we are not living in a world where gender is or has historically been irrelevant, which is why highlighting women's work is important (for examples, see Finn 2021; Vintiadis 2020; Buxton and Whiting 2020), as well as paying closer attention to highly gendered work, like pregnancy. This does not, however, make pregnancy a topic

[5] This is in line with Dodson (2006) and Philips (1995) who state that the influence of descriptive representation on substantive representation is 'probabilistic, rather than deterministic'. As such, inclusion of women increases the possibility of inclusion of pregnancy, but does not guarantee it, and there may be other ways too of achieving more substantive diversity and representation of pregnancy.

for only women to engage with specifically. I remember at the start of my career considering whether I, as a feminist, ought to specialise in feminist philosophy. Whilst I do indeed now engage with feminist philosophy, I am firmly of the opinion that I, as a feminist, ought to specialise in any area of philosophy that I like (as I do in metaphysics and logic), and also that everyone ought to be a feminist (as feminist philosophy is for everyone). Philosophers who are women are philosophers first, and incidentally women, yet the prejudice comes from taking them to be women first, and incidentally philosophers.[6] It is seemingly harder to bring to mind names of philosophers who are women who are not side-lined as philosophers who write about women, for women. There are two important points which speak to this prejudice: (1) philosophy of gender, pregnancy, and feminist philosophy are not solely by and for women, they are by and for everyone, and impact on everyone; (2) philosophers who are women do not solely work on the philosophy of gender, pregnancy, and feminist philosophy, they work in all areas of philosophy. As such, women philosophers are not philosophers for women. This means that descriptive representation does not always lead to substantive representation when it comes to women in philosophy.

That is not to say though that historically the connection cannot be made. Rather, when we look back, we can see that women philosophers did contribute disproportionately to specifically feminist philosophy, suggesting more of a link between descriptive (representational) diversity and substantive representation/diversity. As Vintiadis puts it:

> Women have contributed in many different ways, and their work spans the range from analytic philosophy of logic (e.g., Susan Stebbing, Susan Haack, Ruth Barcan Marcus) through to new subject areas in applied ethics (e.g., Martha Nussbaum, Judith Jarvis Thomson, Christine Korsgaard). And of course, women should be free to contribute to philosophy as they individually see fit, and not forced into someone else's vision of what they ought to be writing about, qua women. Still, the most obvious way that women have contributed is in addressing questions that arise for women, in the first

[6] As described by Buxton and Whiting (2021) in discussing the reception of their book *The Philosopher Queens*.

> instance, in the area of feminist philosophy. Though feminist philosophical approaches, such as those of Judith Butler, Luce Irigaray and Patricia Hill Collins, are very different from one another, they have generally been an attempt to bring to light that what has been traditionally taken to be an objective point of view, a view from nowhere, was, in fact, associated exclusively with one particular point of view, the male one—that of the knower by default. (Vintiadis 2021)

The claim that, in certain circumstances, descriptive (representational) diversity is linked to the substantive representation/diversity of historically excluded groups (such as women in philosophy) has been subject to empirical testing and is generally supported.[7] In order to demonstrate, and by way of context, I will now provide some of that pertinent data which highlights (and connects) the underrepresentation of women and pregnancy in philosophy.

3. The (Under)representation of Women in Philosophy

A 2018 survey conducted by the Higher Education Statistics Agency showed that only 29.7% of philosophers employed in UK universities are women. This is the lowest representation of women in any discipline outside of science, technology, and engineering. And in the US, the latest data assessed in 2011 from the Digest of Education Statistics (a publication of the National Center for Education Statistics) found only 21% of professional philosophers to be women. This is also reflected in the data on percentage of tenured women in philosophy departments (across 98 Universities in the US) collected by Julie van Camp from 2004 to 2015, Sally Haslanger in 2009, Nicole Hassoun in 2015, and Greg Peterson and Zayna Hustoft in 2019: 19% in 2004, 20% in 2006, 22% in 2008, 22% in 2010, 23% in 2011, 28% in 2015, and 28% in 2019.[8] The numbers are even lower when considering factors such as race, ethnicity, and dis/ability (although philosophy is yet to produce comparably comprehensive reports

[7] See Sobolewska, Mckee, and Campbell (2018) who provide evidence for this in the case of race and ethnic minorities: Miller and Stokes (1963), Swain (1993), Bratton and Haynie (1999), Tate (2003), Preuhs (2006), Burden (2007), Minta (2009), Butler and Broockman (2011), Saalfeld and Bischof (2012), Chaney (2015).

[8] See https://women-in-philosophy.org/data/faculty

on these factors). As such, there is still considerable work to be done, and not solely with respect to gender.

The number of women in philosophy departments is a measure of representational diversity. Another way of measuring representational diversity is with respect to publications—seemingly the type of research output that is most valued within academia. Schwitzgebel and Jennings provide data on the percentage of female authorships in top philosophy journals between 1954 and 2015, where the figures start at 5% from 1954-1955, and rise to 10% from 1974-1975, then 12% from 1994-1995, then 17% in 2004, plateauing at 19% a decade later in 2014, and finally reaching 20% in 2015.[9] Connecting the representational with the substantive, data from the JSTOR network dataset shows that between 1900 and 2009 most of the publications by female authors are in feminist studies and are published in specialist journals such as *Hypatia* and ethical or political journals. This data implies that women in philosophy were generally publishing on women's interests in philosophy, such that the representational diversity did result in increased substantive diversity—or at the least that women philosophers were pigeon-holed into certain areas of philosophy (where those areas were simultaneously pigeon-holed as women's areas). There has also been a simultaneous increase (though whether by correlation or causation is yet to be determined) with respect to women in philosophy departments and research relating to the status of women in philosophy. On this, the BPA/SWIP 2021 report (which followed on from their 2011 report) on women in philosophy was summarised by the authors as such:

> The new survey results paint a picture of slight improvement in representation of women at nearly all levels, with substantial improvement in the percentage of permanent staff who are women (up from 24% to 30%) and in the percentage of professors who are women, (up from 19% to 25%) (…). Perhaps the most significant change since the 2011 Women in Philosophy report has been the explosion of research attention devoted to the issue of the underrepresentation of women in philosophy. While the underrepresentation of women in academia was already well studied, especially in STEM, in 2011 there had been virtually no empirical research relating to

[9] See https://women-in-philosophy.org/data/h_journal/

> women in philosophy. There has now been a huge amount of work in this area.[10]

This growing area of research has helped to identify speculative reasons why there may be low descriptive representational diversity of women in academic positions, and this is due to a substantive issue—namely, with respect to how academic mothers are treated. In a news article in 2017 on the topic, philosopher Anna M. Hennessey provided the following case:

> Mary Ann Mason, professor and co-director of the Center, Economics & Family Security at the University of California, Berkeley, School of Law, conducted a lengthy study over the course of a decade on how childbearing and rearing affect the academic careers of both men and women. Mason and her team published their findings in the 2013 book, *Do Babies Matter? Gender and Family in the Ivory Tower* (Rutgers University Press), as well as in her widely read article for *Slate,* 'In the Ivory Tower Men Only' (Mason 2013). The results demonstrate that academic women who decide to have children pay a great "baby penalty". In fact, childbearing and rearing often result in the end of a woman's career, while for men, having children is a career advantage (…). Ultimately, the reality of these penalties play a decisive role in how significantly less women than men in academia have children. On average, tenured women who do decide to have children are age 40 when they begin a family, often having one child. Mason's study also reveals cases in which academic women are blacklisted once they notify faculty of their pregnancies, as well as other cases in which women report how even simple *discussion* of having children negatively affects their job candidacy during interviews. (Hennessey 2017)

Hennessey goes on to show that this "baby penalty" is not just applicable generally to those women with academic careers, but also there is a specific phenomenon of them then not being able to write about the experience itself, given the all-encompassing nature of it.

[10] See https://dailynous.com/2021/11/16/women-in-philosophy-recent-reports/ and https://bpa.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/2021/11/2021-BPA-SWIP-Report-Women-in-Philosophy-in-the-UK.pdf

As Elisa Albert asks: "so who's gonna write about it if everyone doing it is lost forever within it?" (Albert 2015) And similarly Maggie Nelson: "here's the catch: *I cannot hold my baby at the same time as I write*" (Nelson 2015). If this is the case, then it is no wonder that there are simultaneous under-representations of women and of pregnancy in the literature. This suggests more than mere correlation between the lack of descriptive diversity and the lack of substantive diversity, and points towards a systemic issue regarding the burden of reproductive labour disproportionately effecting women far beyond the gestational period.

This discrimination and issues of underrepresentation are echoed in anecdotes from women philosophers who were part of the edited collection *Women of Ideas* and were asked "What is it like being a woman in philosophy?" (Finn 2021, xiii) Here are a few responses to that question:

> Elisabeth Schellekens: 11 years ago I was the first member of my then department to apply for maternity leave (in response to which several well-meaning colleagues wondered why I would want to sabotage my career thus and if I ever intended to return to work). (Elisabeth Schellekens, in Finn 2021, xxii)

> Jennifer Nagel: As an undergraduate, I never had a woman professor or instructor in philosophy, and I took a number of advanced logic classes in which I was the only woman. I remember feeling self-conscious when raising my hand to speak in class, as though I were speaking on behalf of all of womankind, even in asking a tiny question about a proof. People would turn and look at me. I also felt somewhat alone, and wondered whether being outnumbered like this was a bad sign, an indication that I should shift my interests to the kinds of things that were more popular among women; this feeling was then heightened by some dabbling in feminist literature in the Carol Gilligan vein, literature encouraging the notion that women's thinking is naturally concrete and care-oriented, as opposed to abstract. It was a relief to stumble upon Jean Grimshaw's 1986 book *Philosophy and Feminist Thinking,* which gave voice to some of the worries I had felt about the thesis that women have some naturally different way of

> thinking, while still deeply engaged with the issues of justice that drove me towards feminism in the first place. (Jennifer Nagel, in Finn 2021, xviii–xix)

> Angie Hobbs: There is still much more that could be done to encourage girls to take up philosophy, and—as with all academic subjects—to make it easier to combine an academic career with family life. The latter point applies to fathers too, of course, but it is still women who get pregnant, give birth and breast-feed. However, the situation has improved from the start of my career: I gave a paper on the ethics of flourishing at a UK university in the early 1990s and was told beforehand "Don't worry if we don't pay much attention to your paper: in this Department we regard ethics as a bit pink and fluffy and female". (Angie Hobbs, in Finn 2021, xvi–xvii)

> Alison Gopnik: In general, the fact that human beings have children—a particularly salient fact for women—has largely been invisible to the men, and often at least notionally celibate men, who have dominated philosophy. The 1967 Encyclopedia of Philosophy has 4 references to children. When I was doing my D.Phil at Oxford, I made the argument that paying attention to children could illuminate a wide range of philosophical problems, from epistemology to ethics. The senior philosopher I was talking to looked puzzled: "Of course," he said, "one has seen children about, but you would never actually talk to one". (Alison Gopnik, in Finn 2021, xvi)

These comments also speak to the substantive issue that was mentioned previously: namely, that women philosophers were pigeon-holed into certain areas of philosophy, where those areas were simultaneously pigeon-holed as women's areas. In the cases described above, those areas included the philosophy of children, concrete care-oriented philosophy, and ethics. This qualitative data is supported by the quantitative data provided earlier from the JSTOR network dataset whereby most of the publications by women in the twentieth century were on feminist topics in specialist ethics and politics journals. But even those published philosophers—women working in 'women's areas'—did not warrant an entry in the

aforementioned Encyclopaedia of Philosophy. As Witt and Shapiro have noted, the index of the encyclopaedia did not cite canonical philosophers such as de Beauvoir and Wollstonecraft as being mentioned in any article within it (Witt and Shapiro 2021). So having only four references to children was only part of a much larger issue regarding both the descriptive representational diversity of women philosophers and the substantive diversity of women's interests in that encyclopaedia.

Thankfully, we are currently doing better on gender representation than the 1967 encyclopaedia (though we still have a long way to go on other axes of privilege and oppression, for example with respect to race, ethnicity, and dis/ability). There is now a huge wealth of literature documenting women within the history of philosophy including the following resources: Hutton (2019), O'Neill and Lascano (2019), Buxton and Whiting (2020). In *A History of Women Philosophers* (Waithe 1987-1991), Mary Ellen Waithe documents women philosophers from many eras: more than 16 in the classical world; 17 from 500-1600; more than 30 from 1600-1900 (Witt and Shapiro 2021). And Vintiadis 2021 highlights the following notable philosophers who, despite their extensive work, did not make it into the philosophical canon:

> In the ancient world, Hypatia of Alexandria, Hipparchia of Maroneia and Arete of Cyrene; in the 17th century, Elena Cornaro Piscopia of Venice (the first woman to receive a university degree) and Margaret Cavendish Duchess of Newcastle; and in the 18th century, Laura Bassi and Dorothea Erxleben (…). We must also not forget that non-white thinkers—Sojourner Truth, Anna Julia Cooper, Audre Lorde and W E B Du Bois, who belong to groups more marginalised than most white women—have long been arguing that their status as knowers is not recognised and given sufficient credit. (Vintiadis 2021)

Women philosophers wrote, to use O'Neill's (1997) words, in "disappearing ink", whereby their work disappeared from the history of philosophy. Though intriguingly O'Neill shows that in the seventeenth century there was a "lively interest in the topic of women philosophers" (O'Neill 1997, 32) which was all but gone by the nineteenth century. Why

was this? O'Neill stresses the contribution that the "social and political events surrounding the French Revolution" (O'Neill 1997, 20) made to this erasure of women's work. She also provides the following explanation:

> In the transition from the eighteenth to the nineteenth century, there were a number of developments, internal to philosophy, regarding what constituted the main philosophical problems, the proper method of inquiry, and the appropriate style of exposition (…). [T]he alignment of the feminine gender with the issues, methods, and styles that 'lost out', together with a good deal of slippage between gender and sex, and the scholarly practice of anonymous authorship for women, led to the almost complete disappearance of women from the history of early modern philosophy. (O'Neill 1997, 36)

Following on from those insights, I suggest that the systematic exclusion of women philosophers from the canon is also in part due to the (mis) representation of women in (and outside of) philosophy and the social position within which they were held, as I will show in the following section.

4. The (Mis)representation of 'Woman'

Here I critique not 'just' the historical exclusion of women from philosophy, but also the way that philosophy has characterised women.[11] I propose that the two are connected, and probably mutually reinforcing, in a vicious circle. Women have been (mis)represented in philosophy as not capable of philosophising, despite the existence of women philosophers. This has been well documented, but here are some notable examples from Kant and Hegel who are notorious for having such views:

> A woman who has a head full of Greek, like Madame Dacier, or one who engages in debate about the intricacies of mechanics, like the Marquise du Châtelet, might just as well

[11] Though I will not be going into the more recent philosophical literature on what gender is, and how or whether to define what it means to identify as a woman—this would go beyond the scope of the paper, as my intended focus is to show how women have historically been represented as not well equipped for philosophy.

> have a beard; for that expresses in a more recognizable form the profundity for which she strives. (Kant 1764/1960, 61–62)

> Women can, of course, be educated, but their minds are not adapted to the higher sciences, philosophy, or certain of the arts (…). Women are capable of education, but they are not made for activities which demand a universal faculty such as the more advanced sciences, philosophy and certain forms of artistic production. (Hegel 1820/1967, 263–264)

The idea that women cannot (and ought not) philosophise is embedded within philosophy. As Lloyd demonstrates in her book *The Man of Reason: 'Male' and 'Female' in Western Philosophy*, "the implicit maleness [of ideals of reason] is no superficial linguistic bias (…) [but is something that] lies deep in our philosophical tradition" (Lloyd 1984/1993, xviii). This deep bias is also echoed more generally historically with respect to women not being able to write or think as well as men, since women were intended for other purposes. Women were said to be assigned to the bodily and private domestic sphere of the home which required women as wives and mothers in the family, rather than to the public sphere and pursuits of the mind such as philosophy which were reserved for men (Okin 1979, 1989). So women not only ought not participate in philosophy, but also could not, given their limited capacities:

> Girls only learned spinning, weaving, and sewing, and at most a little reading and writing (…). In Euripides a woman is called an oikourema, a thing (the word is neuter) for looking after the house, and, apart from her business of bearing children, that was all she was for the Athenian—his chief female domestic servant. (Engels 1884/1902, 77–78)

> It may be affirmed without fear of calumny, that the woman who dabbles with philosophy and writing destroys her progeny by the labor of her brain and her kisses which savor of man; the safest and most honorable way for her is to renounce home life and maternity; destiny has branded her on the forehead; made only for love, the title of concubine if not of courtesan suffices her. (Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, in d'Héricourt 1864, 73–74)

> So too with the two ingredients which constitute our life-principle, the rational and the irrational; the rational which belongs to mind and reason is of the masculine gender, the irrational, the province of sense, is of the feminine. (Philo of Alexandria, in Lloyd 1993, 27)

> A woman's preaching is like a dog's walking on his hind legs (…) you are surprised to find it done at all. (Samuel Johnson, in Woolf 1957, 56)

The division of such tasks is connected to the (mis)representation of woman as inferior to man, a view that was prominent as far back as in the works of Aristotle who states "[T]he relation of male to female is by nature a relation of superior to inferior" (Aristotle *Politics* 1254b13–14). Given that the discipline held women in such low regard, I take it as no surprise that women were actively excluded from participating—and after all, why would they want to? To change it from the inside, perhaps, to *be* the counterexample to these sexist tropes. But what value would a woman find in inclusion to this realm, as opposed to rejecting it outright? Flikschuh cites Wiredu in saying it takes 'considerable discipline' to do so:

> The Ghanaian philosopher, Kwasi Wiredu, once said that given their views on Africans, it takes considerable discipline for a Black person to find anything of value in the philosophical writings of Hume or Kant (these are just random examples from the discipline). Wiredu conscientiously exercised that discipline, which is one reason among many why he is himself a true philosopher. I think something similar might hold for women: 'given the history of philosophy, it takes considerable discipline (…)'. (Katrin Flikschuh, in Finn 2021, xv)

We learn from Lorde that "The master's tools will never dismantle the master's house" (Lorde 1979/1984, 110–113) when it comes to Black scholars pursuing racial justice, and this may apply to women with regard to gender equity in philosophy as well. But since philosophy was not always solely the 'master's house' (as discussed earlier, where the pivotal point for explicit exclusion of women was around the turn of the nineteenth century), perhaps there are tools that remain that are not

sharpened for the purpose of exclusion. And working with those tools requires not only 'considerable discipline', but also an overcoming of what is known as 'stereotype threat'. Given that philosophy is stereotyped as male[12] in the ways described above, there is the danger that the stereotype threat causes women to underperform in philosophy (by assuming the position that it is not 'for them').[13] This descriptive underrepresentation of women in philosophy may also be a cause, and effect, of the lack of substantive 'women's issues' represented in the content of philosophical work. As I shall show next, there has been a considerable lack of work on pregnancy specifically, which speculatively may be the result of the lack of people directly engaged in pregnancy being directly engaged in philosophy historically, and adds to the stereotype threat that philosophy is 'for', and 'about', the male population, disinterested in that which affects predominantly women.

5. The (Under)representation of Pregnancy in Philosophy

Pregnancy has been under-researched in philosophy historically: "for philosophy it is as if pregnancy has never happened" (Smith 2016, 15). Even beyond philosophy, Young notes that "through most of the history of medicine its theoreticians and practitioners did not include the reproductive processes of women within its domain" (Young 2005, 56). Early mentions of pregnancy in philosophy functioned as metaphor as we see in Socrates comparing himself to an intellectual midwife to help men give birth to ideas:

> [M]y art of midwifery is just like [the midwives] in most respects. The difference is that I attend to men and not women, and that I watch over the labour of their souls, not of their bodies. (Plato 396BC/1997, 167)

Here we see again the "distinction between what is proper to the world of philosophy (men and ideas), as distinct from the realm of the maternal (women and the body)" (Knowles 2020), where pregnancy is only relevant in philosophy as a metaphor given that it is a matter of the (woman's) body

[12] As argued by, e.g., Haslanger (2009).
[13] As argued by, e.g., Saul (2015)

rather than the (man's) soul. But other bodily experiences are prominent in the history of philosophy, specifically the other end of life, namely, death. Villarmea puts the point well, and inspired the title of this paper:

> There are many thinkers who identify philosophy with learning to die, but relatively few consider birth a subject for philosophy and even fewer give delivery or pregnancy a second thought. In this respect, the Heideggerian expression that characterises human existence—albeit excessively—as 'being-toward-death', captures the imbalance that pervades the history of philosophy as we generally know and teach it. (Villarmea 2021)

Villarmea goes on to say that the over-representation of death and the under-representation of birth in philosophy constitutes "a deafening silence—a silencing even" (Villarmea 2021). Some may appeal by way of explanation that death happens to all of us, and as such is a universal experience of interest to philosophy that deals with universals, whereas pregnancy and birth is something that only some of us do (where those 'some' were typically from the same group of people—women—who were excluded from philosophy). In line with this, Vintiadis describes the lack of work on pregnancy in philosophy historically as "another example of female experience being dismissed as irrelevant" (Vintiadis 2021). We can now therefore see that 'being-toward-death', presented as a universal claim, masks an underlying partiality away from female experience. And as Young famously describes, once we have brought pregnancy into view, the male bias within philosophy becomes apparent (Young 1985, 25).

But this overlooks that pregnancy is something that effects all of us: we are all the result of a pregnancy. In Rich's words, "all human life on the planet is born of woman" (Rich 1977, 1), and in less gendered terms, as Villarmea puts it "every human life begins with gestation and birth" (Villarmea 2021). As such, there is certainly something universal about birth, as we are all *being-from-birth*. Every one of us has therefore had some interaction with pregnancy, not by being pregnant ourselves, but by having been the result of someone else's pregnancy. Thus, we have all experienced being born, whereas death, by contrast, is not something anyone has experienced

before![14] As a result, it is surprising that pregnancy and birth are so marginal (Husserl literally names them "marginal problems"[15]) when they really ought to be considered more central, at least as central as death. So why the difference in coverage between pregnancy and birth on the one hand, and death on the other? As Hennessey states:

> Some investigation reveals that intellectual approaches to birth are suppressed in both active and passive ways. While one could argue that the historical domination of white men in the academy is part of the problem, the lopsided coverage of these two monumental endpoints of life is quite complex and cannot be reduced to it. (Hennessey 2017)

Whilst I agree about the complexity, I nevertheless do not want to underestimate the connection between the descriptive underrepresentation of women in philosophy and the substantive underrepresentation of topics such as pregnancy in philosophy (where each has influence over the other).

The fact that pregnancy has not been a traditional focus in philosophy is, as Kingma puts it, "remarkable": [16] pregnancy is a source of fascinating philosophical issues, and so given both the common nature of pregnancy as an essential part of the human life cycle and its highly unique aspects, it is truly astonishing that not more attention in philosophy has been paid to this topic. This has not gone unnoticed, as Gurton-Wachter states:

> We don't have a familiar canon of nuanced literary or philosophical texts about the experience of having a child, even though having a child, too, is a profound, frightening, exhilarating, transformative experience at the boundary of life, an experience from which one comes back a different person. (Gurton-Wachter 2016)

[14] These claims depend, of course, on what your definition of 'experience' is and what qualifies as 'death'.

[15] In the original German, 'Randprobleme' (though 'marginal' means something different within the context of Husserl's phenomenology). See Husserl (1908-1937/2013).

[16] See Kingma's 'Better Understanding the Metaphysics of Pregnancy' project description at https://bump.group/about.

What we do have a familiarity with, however, is the more recent literature on the topic of abortion. This is a glaring anomaly. But it does have something in common with the rest of philosophy: not much attention is paid to the gestator—the person undergoing the pregnancy itself. In bioethics and philosophy there is a considerable metaphysical and ethical body of literature on foetuses (if not pregnancy, per se). Mostly this focuses on the ethical implication of progressive foetal development—for example its implications for moral status and/or the permissibility of abortion. A second focus—though much more often forgotten—is the moral relevance of the physical location inside the pregnant body (see, e.g., Warren 1989; Kingma and Woollard forthcoming). As such, the literature is hardly woman-centred. If the pregnancy or birth itself were of philosophical value, then we would see the topics treated on their own terms, without relating solely and directly with ethical issues to do with the foetus. After all, as Witt argues, "there are many other philosophical issues related to birth that have nothing to do with abortion or any other ethical issues for that matter", but nevertheless "when birth does surface as a topic of philosophical inquiry, it is usually within the sphere of ethics" (Witt 1996).

Other exceptions from modern times is within continental feminist philosophy in the work on the maternal from Luce Irigaray (e.g. 1985) and Julia Kristeva (e.g. 1980), and within continental political philosophy in the work on natality from Hannah Arendt. But as Knowles points out, "it is only relatively recently that questions of pregnancy, birth and early motherhood have begun to be taken seriously in mainstream analytic philosophy" (Knowles 2020). As evidence of this, consider, for example, that neither the Stanford Encyclopaedia entries on 'analytic feminism' nor 'feminist metaphysics' mention pregnancy or birth (Garry 2021; Haslanger and Ásta 2018). Despite that, there have been trail-blazing projects in those areas such as those led by Fiona Woollard and Elselijn Kingma on the metaphysics of pregnancy and Stella Villarmea's philosophy of birth in the medical humanities paving the way for more central discussions of pregnancy within analytic philosophy. This newly established ontology of pregnancy has been investigated from various other perspectives in the last decade or so, both indirectly in dealing with the individuation of embryos (e.g. Nuño de la Rosa 2010) and life cycles (e.g. DiFrisco and Mossio 2020), and also directly when examining pregnancy from a relational perspective (e.g. Howes 2008) and from the perspective of biological

individuality and organismality (e.g. Grose 2020; Nuño de la Rosa et al 2021). These provide more promising accounts of pregnancy than how pregnancy was represented historically, which I will now provide a brief overview of.

6. The (Mis)representation of 'Pregnancy'

Going back to biblical times, we are told that the pain women suffer during pregnancy and birth is in order to redress the sin of Eve when she supposedly temped Adam to take a bite of the apple. We see this in the book of Genesis: "I will greatly multiply your pain in childbirth, in pain shall you bring forth children yet your desire shall be for your husband" (Genesis 3.7). Not only that, but according to Martin Luther, women were "not created for any other purpose than to serve man and be his assistant in bearing children" (Found in McKeown 2014). Despite that being the woman's purpose, she was not valued as contributing much to the process other than an environment within which the father's 'seed' could grow (see DeRenzi 2004). Feldman names this the 'flowerpot' view: "Without this pot there will be no plant, but what the plant will grow into is all contained in the seed" (Feldman 1992, 98).

The flowerpot view has been prominent in the history of philosophy, dating at least back to Aristotle for whom the foetus "behaves like seeds sown in the ground (…) [its] growth (…) supplied through the umbilicus in the same way that the plant's growth is supplied through its roots".[17] This view had prominence too in the Middle Ages, where Thomas Aquinas particularly devalued the process of gestation and the mothers contribution, treating the father as having the central role in creation (see Sauer 2015, 30).

Into the seventeenth century, this flowerpot view started to take on scientific backing with anatomists discovering sperm in semen under the microscope, contributing to the theory of 'preformation'. Preformation stated that male gametes contained the whole of a future person and the homunculus was originally described as an 'animalcule'. The reproductive role of the female was understood to be entirely that of an incubator, an

[17] Found in Connell (2016, 129). It is worth noting that Connell seems to have recently changed view on this.

environment in which a future child would grow separate from (though inside of) the pregnant person (Rothman 1994, 105). This is reflected upon by Rothman who states

> The perception of the foetus as a person separate from the mother draws its roots from patriarchal ideology, and can be documented at least as far back as the early use of the microscope to see the homunculus. (Rothman 1989, 157)

Fox's (2022) recent work on eighteenth century experiences of pregnancy and childbirth uncovers further 'scientific reasoning' behind patriarchal influences. As described in Finn et al. (forthcoming), theories included the notion that the female should be happy, cheerful, and moderate in order to conceive, and that too much sexual activity would destroy the chances of maintaining a foetus in the womb. We see here the foundations of contemporary assumptions that 'good mothers' are 'model women', authentically living in accordance with their destiny and inherent identity. As Romanis et al. point out, women who did not conform to this ideal were considered to be monsters: "From classical times, theologians and physicians declared barren women to be monstrous" (Romanis et al. 2021, 821). And as Kingma and Woollard argue, we still encounter a "heavily gendered cultural ideal of motherhood", which we can trace back through this long history of control over the female body (Kingma and Woollard forthcoming; see also Hays 1998; Bueskens 2018; Kukla 2005; Mullin 2005).

Finn et al. (forthcoming) show that in the nineteenth century a strong legislative momentum in all areas of law developed. The enactment of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861 was a landmark in the legislative agenda for many reasons. In particular, it made abortion a criminal offence and this law remains on the statute books today. Such legislative enthusiasm continued into the twentieth century. Acts of Parliament became more specifically targeted at pregnant women and new mothers. Notably, the Infant Life (Preservation) Act 1929 and the Infanticide Act 1938 emphasise the protection of the foetus and neonate, and, in 1967, the Abortion Act created defences to the termination of pregnancy. Current legislation covers an ever-broadening range of reproductive issues such as technological and medical advances, which helped pave the way for how

we conceptualise pregnancy today.[18] The historical misrepresentation of pregnancy and the need to control it is both a cause and an effect of the underrepresentation of women among those who put forward such theories and laws. Given where we are now, it is clear that more work needs to be done to better understand issues like pregnancy from those who experience it and those who are impacted by the resultant theories and laws.

7. Conclusion

In this paper I have provided a historical review of the representation of women and pregnancy in philosophy. There has indeed been progress in both descriptive and substantive representation, but nevertheless there is still a long way to go. Whilst it may manifest differently across time and place, unfortunately "patriarchy has not dissolved and neither have the traditional stereotypes of pregnancy and maternity" (Oliver 2010, 761). Misogynistic attitudes persist, and this is reflected in the continual degrading of the gestator and gestation which is reinforced by certain philosophical theorising and systemic marginalisation. As Le Doeuff depressingly noted back in 1977:

> From Hipparchia to the female historians of philosophy, there has been little progress in emancipation (…). Whether forbidden to enter the area of philosophising, or 'benefitting' from a more or less cunning permissiveness, women have not yet won the battle that would give them a right to philosophy. For the moment it is important to know against whom—and with whom—this struggle can be fought. (Le Doeuff 1977)

It is my hypothesis that the origins, as well as the fundamental approaches, of philosophy could partially explain the underrepresentation and misrepresentation of pregnancy within it. Pregnancy is something that historically has mostly affected women. And philosophy is something that historically is dominated by men. Therefore, historically those who were involved in philosophy were not those who were involved in pregnancy (specifically, they either could not be pregnant, and those who could disproportionately had not been). Furthermore, women's ideas

[18] See Finn et al. (forthcoming) for more details on the historical transformation of pregnancy.

in philosophy (and beyond) have historically been underrepresented, and worse, silenced. This is to the detriment not just of the women but of the areas that have excluded them, which are deprived of their worthy contributions. I believe that the lack of diversity has led to the neglect of certain topics in philosophy, like pregnancy. This is echoed in Vintiadis who points to Mary Midgley's 'Rings and Books'—an unpublished script prepared for a talk on BBC Radio in the 1950's—making a similar point:

> This brings to mind Mary Midgley who in discussing how our living situations influence the way we think about the world points out how much of philosophy has been done by privileged men without families who had the luxury of doing philosophy in isolation—like Descartes in his room contemplating the truth about knowledge, isolated from the mundane exigencies of everyday life. The problem with such isolated thinking is that it skews the way we think about the world and ignores viewpoints that might be revealing of another dimension of reality. (Vintiadis 2021)[19]

As I have attempted to demonstrate, the viewpoints of women were specifically ignored historically and this gave rise to skewed understandings of pregnancy. Baron similarly argues:

> The historical record, of course, reflects the views of those who were politically and structurally dominant; we know comparatively little about women's views of pregnancy during Antiquity and the Middle Ages. The prevailing understanding of conception and gestation that has been passed down to us is therefore one according to which women contribute passively to development, providing a space, and nutrition for the foetus; men, on the other hand, provide generative force and life. (Baron 2019, 495)

As we have seen, a feminist, human-centred (rather than man-centred) world of philosophy is still only in its early stages, and philosophy still has a lot further to go in order to come to terms with its history and

[19] See Midgley's script online at https://www.womeninparenthesis.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/rings-and-books.pdf

assumptions. Ideas (and the lack thereof) about pregnancy grew out of the positions of men of privilege, and those men used their analyses to justify those positions—a never-ending, and vicious, echo chamber. But when women, people with different understandings of pregnancy as a state and possibility, enter the discussion, the analysis of pregnancy shifts. The same goes for the inclusion of trans-perspectives in this gendered area. As sociologist Barbara Katz Rothman (1982) describes, philosophy has strong roots in a patriarchal society, a world in which men's bodies are the taken-for-granted ordinary, and women's an interesting variation; a world in which the children of men grow in the bodies of women, where the seed of Abraham covers the world. "Acknowledging gaps in our history of ideas provides fertile ground for exploration" (Hennessey 2017), and so perhaps what is needed is a study of the sociology of philosophy to unearth these gaps in order to offer new things to the discussion.

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IS CONSCIOUSNESS GENDERED?*

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ABSTRACT

We can ask whether there anything it is distinctively like to be female or male (a question about sex). And we can ask whether there anything it is distinctively like to be feminine or masculine (a question about gender). I think the answer to both these questions is "Obviously yes". Why yes? And why obviously? Consciousness is gendered, and obviously gendered, because the political realities of what it is like to be masculine, and what it is like to be feminine, are distinctively different. Moreover, consciousness is sexed too, and obviously sexed, because the physical realities of what it is like to be male, and what it is like to be female, are distinctively different. And that is why the answer to our two questions is not just "Yes", but "Obviously yes".

Keywords: *consciousness; gender; sex; body; transgender.*

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"What is it like," a man might ask, "to be a woman?"

"Well, what is it like," a woman might retort, "to be a man?"

What-is-it-like questions are always intriguing. And, some might add (perhaps the two in this dialogue), impossible to answer. For if a woman could say what it is like to be a man (or vice versa), that would have to mean that she could occupy his very viewpoint on the world. It would mean that his consciousness, his subjective viewpoint, could turn into *her* consciousness.

But how could that happen? My "subjective viewpoint" is not a *literal* viewpoint, like the summit of Arthur's Seat, that I can occupy, or vacate to let you see the view from there. Nor is consciousness like a virtual-reality headset that anyone can wear. I can't just hand over to you the eye-goggles and the ear-phones of my experience, so that you can experience as directly as I do what it is like to be me.

But even if my consciousness *was* like a virtual-reality headset that you could just put on, what would you get by wearing it? You wouldn't get *my experience.* You'd get *your experience of* my experience. But when you asked "what it was like to be me", that evidently wasn't what you were after.

"Come to our *musée folklorique* at Artisanal-en-Provence!" say the tourist brochures, "Come and have an authentic experience of life as a French peasant!" "Hmm", says the philosopher (in her exasperating way). Whatever else a tourist may find to delight her in Artisanal-en-Provence, it seems a good bet that it won't be *that.* If things go well for her there, she will end up thinking "Wow, so this is what it is like to be an authentic French peasant". But by definition, this is a thought that would never even occur to an authentic French peasant. At least, not to an *authentic* authentic French peasant.

Despite this line of objection, we should keep hold of an important truth that philosophy has often obscured. This is that at least sometimes others' consciousnesses, their mental lives, are known to us just by looking and seeing. Since at least Descartes's time, most philosophers have taken for

granted "the privacy of the mental". But sometimes mental states are as public as anything else. When you hit your thumb with the hammer I see, directly, that you are in pain. When the cabinet minister staggers out of Downing Street I see, directly, that he is blind drunk. When the school bully humiliates the shy pupil in front of the whole class, her anguished embarrassment is not *private*, as most of her previous mental states were. Being shy, she is a specialist in hiding. But that is precisely her torment as she faces the bully's jeers: *this* mental state of hers is public, directly visible to everyone.

Connectedly, there is such a thing as vicarious proprioception. As I watch the climber reach for the crucial elusive hold, my finger-muscles clench. When the pianist reaches the last few excruciatingly difficult bars of Chopin's Nocturne 9.2, I hold my breath in anticipation. When I see a toddler's parent step on a lego-brick lurking in a patterned carpet, I feel his pain—quite close to literally. In these and many other cases, the mental isn't private at all; not at least if "private" means "unobservable". Despite Descartes, when we ask what-is-it-like questions, our questions needn't always be unanswerable; or even hard to answer.

One classic modern source for what-it-is-like questions is Thomas Nagel's famous journal article "What is it like to be a bat?" (Nagel 1974). Nagel thinks that it is obviously true that there is *something* it is like to be a bat; there are *facts* about what it is like to be a bat; bats have consciousness, just as we do. But bats and humans have very different kinds of consciousness. So, for example, echolocation plays for bats roughly the function that sight plays for human beings. But even though they are functionally analogous, it seems obvious that there must be differences between the subjective experiences of seeing and echolocating. Or again (I would add; this isn't in Nagel), bats have a natural urge to take wing and fly through the night sky, scanning it for moths and midges to gobble up as they go. Humans have no such urge; or at least, none of the humans I've met have. (Perhaps humans who do feel that urge don't live long enough to be easy to meet.) Conversely bats, as far as I know, display no natural urge to create works of art, or to fight wars.

These truths about perception (and, as I add, desire) make it a fact that bat consciousness is very different from human consciousness, just as it is a

fact that bat bodies are very different from human bodies. How do the facts about consciousness relate to the facts about bodies? Nagel thinks that this is rather a deep philosophical mystery: a mystery that we might also call "the mind-body problem". On the one hand, we can't easily explain how if at all the two kinds of fact are connected. On the other hand, neither can we just deny the existence of either kind of fact. The mind-body problem leaves us scratching our heads. Perhaps it even *should* leave us that way.

Alongside "What is it like to be a bat?", we might equally ask the two questions I began with: "What is it like to be a man?" and "What is it like to be a woman?" Is there anything that it is *distinctively* like to be a man or a woman, as there is something that it is *distinctively* like to be a bat, or a human (or a dog, or a llama, etc.)? At the level of our consciousness, is there "a man's world" and "a woman's world"? Are there two separate realms of consciousness here, each with its own particular flavour?

Sex is distinct from gender; I'll say how in a moment. So this question also can be divided in two. We can ask whether there anything it is distinctively like to be female or male (a question about sex). And we can ask whether there anything it is distinctively like to be feminine or masculine (a question about gender).

I think the answer to both these questions is "Obviously yes". Why yes? And why obviously?

There is something it is distinctively like to be male or female, because a crucial—and overwhelmingly obvious—aspect of what it is like to be human is bodiliness. (On this aspect of what it is like to be human, see my *Epiphanies*, 4.4-4.5 (Chappell 2022); on what it is like to be human in general, see the whole of Chapter 4.) Our consciousness of our own bodies is fundamental to nearly all the rest of our consciousness. (There are "out of body experiences", apparently; but they are exceptional.) The form of our bodies, and our awareness of our bodies from "inside them", is an essential condition of the form of our phenomenology: *what it is like to be human* is, in key part, *what it is like to have a human body*. (Notice how this point can help us with Nagel's initial question "What it is like to be a bat?", and also with Nagel's further question how facts about bodies relate to facts about consciousness. Notice too how it *can't* help us with those two questions.)

But male and female bodies differ, and in distinctive ways. As male and female they are typically differently shaped, e.g. in genitalia, in having or lacking breasts, in distribution of body-fat and body-hair, in size, and in musculature. They are subject to different sensibilities: females feel the cold more, males are less good at coping with sleep-deprivation. They are affected by different hormonal secretions, and on different timescales, and these different hormones have different effects on their moods and their inclinations. Very crudely, females (or most of them within a certain age-range) experience the menstrual cycle, while males (same caveat) experience (…) testosterone. Male and female bodies even smell different (I gather this is related to the hormonal differences).

In the case of the sex distinction, male/female, what matters is the physical; in the case of the gender distinction, masculine/feminine, what matters is the political. *Male and female* consciousnesses differ because male and female bodies differ; *masculine and feminine* consciousnesses differ because male and female political roles have differed. So there is something it is distinctively like to be masculine or feminine, because a crucial—and overwhelmingly obvious—aspect of what it is like to be human is political life.

I mean this in a broad sense of "political". Wherever there are humans, there are power-relations. One foundation of these power-relations is the management of expectation. The task of predicting the behaviour of other humans (whether groups or individuals) is intractably huge. We reduce this task to manageable proportions via conventions and taboos, expectations and reliances, contracts and understandings, traditions and rules. From these, over time, grows ideology.

Central to many of these conventions, etc., is the profiling of other humans. One obvious way to profile them is by their biological sex (actual or perceived). From this, over time, grows the ideology of gender: we build up a story about what kind of social and communal role follows from membership of either biological sex. Our concepts of "masculine" and "feminine" are, precisely, stories of this kind. That such stories can and do encode not only power-relations but also oppression, and that this has been their function throughout history, is obvious from the beginning of our culture.

"But hang on", some people might object at this point, "consciousness is just subjective awareness of the world! What does *politics* have to do with whether *consciousness is gendered*?" This objection attributes a false—and ideologically-driven—unworldly purity to consciousness. The philosophy of mind is not, *pace* so many of its contemporary exponents, an ethically neutral or ideologically innocent study. The philosophy of mind is a part of "human science"; politics has *everything* to do with it. When Karl Marx popularised the phrase "class consciousness" (ger. *Klassenbewusstsein*), his use of "consciousness" was not a mere homophony. We humans are both physical and political beings: our political condition shapes our awareness of the world as surely as our physical condition.

I remember visiting Bulgaria in the Soviet era, and being forcibly struck by the difference in people's body-language from how people held themselves in England:[2] the bowed shoulders, the refusal to meet each other's eyes, the way even a walk across a railway-station concourse was a kind of furtive sidle, the constant sideways and backwards vigilance for the police—whose body-language was completely different from everyone else's: it was the strutting, shameless, crotch-first body-language of the cock of the walk, the school bully again. It sounds clichéd to say that when you live under a tyranny you are constantly watching your back; but it is the literal truth. The reality of ubiquitous surveillance charges your whole experience with a sense of vulnerability, exposure, *nakedness*. During my short time passing through communist Sofia, I not only noticed how everyone else was, literally, watching their backs; I found myself doing it too.

[2] Cf. George Orwell on anarchist Barcelona in 1936, in *Homage to Catalonia*, Ch. 1 (Orwell 1938): "When one came straight from England the aspect of Barcelona was something startling and overwhelming. It was the first time that I had ever been in a town where the working class was in the saddle. Practically every building of any size had been seized by the workers and was draped with red flags or with the red and black flag of the Anarchists (…). Every shop and café had an inscription saying that it had been collectivised; even the bootblacks had been collectivised and their boxes painted red and black. Waiters and shop-walkers looked you in the face and treated you as an equal. Servile and even ceremonial forms of speech had temporarily disappeared. Nobody said 'Señor' or 'Don' or even 'Usted'; everyone called everyone else 'Comrade' and 'Thou', and said 'Salud!' instead of 'Buenos días'. Tipping was forbidden by law since the time of Primo de Rivera; almost my first experience was receiving a lecture from a hotel manager for trying to tip a lift-boy. There were no private motor-cars, they had all been commandeered, and all the trams and taxis and much of the other transport were painted red and black. The revolutionary posters were everywhere, flaming from the walls in clean reds and blues that made the few remaining advertisements look like daubs of mud. Down the Ramblas, the wide central artery of the town where crowds of people streamed constantly to and fro, the loudspeakers were bellowing revolutionary songs all day and far into the night (…)."

Consciousness is not a mere bloodless abstraction: it is, among other things, politically charged. Nor is oppression a mere abstraction: for the oppressed, it shapes every aspect of how they see their environment, the obstacles and the affordances, the threats and the opportunities, in their way. To transpose a remark of Wittgenstein's (*Tractatus* 6.43), the world of the oppressed person *is a different world* from the world of the free person.

All of this applies as much to oppression via the category of gender as it does to class oppression. Consider Homer, *Iliad* 1.431-450 (my translation):

> Odysseus came to Chryse with his sacrifice.
> Once they were in the deep harbour, then his sailors
> took down the sail and stowed it within the black ship (…)
> then disembarked and walked ashore through the surf,
> bringing the oxen to be offered to Apollo;
> and out of the ship there also stepped Chryseis.
> Led to the altar by Odysseus of the wiles,
> back in her father's hands, she heard him speak:
> "Agamemnon lord of men has sent me, Chryses,
> to give you back your child, and to sacrifice
> a hundred oxen to appease Apollo,
> to stop the wide-wept woes he's brought the Greeks."
> He spoke and gave her up, and Chryses had back
> his daughter, his delight. Swift then for sacrifice
> they placed the beasts about the firm-built altar,
> with pure hands took the sacred barley up.
> And Chryses raised his arms in prayer for them (…).

Chryseis was captured in war by the Greek field-marshal Agamemnon, and became his slave-girl. Her father, the priest Chryses, begged Agamemnon to return her to him. Agamemnon rudely dismissed Chryses' request; the god Apollo disapproved and sent a plague on the Greek army. So now, to appease Apollo and end the plague, Agamemnon sends Odysseus as his envoy to return Chryseis to her father.

The transaction that is going on in the present translation is essentially one between the war-lords Agamemnon and Achilles, neither of whom is even present. The transaction is about Chryseis, but she herself is just a piece

of property; she has no more standing to speak in this transaction than do the oxen that are brought along with her. (We can do the ideology of the "human"/"animal" distinction another time.) In Homer's text, she does not even have her own name, any more than do the cattle that she travels with: "Chryseis" is a patronymic not a proper name, meaning no more than "daughter of Chryses" (which in turn apparently just means "man of Chryse (the place)"). It takes a scholiast on Homer (a scholar annotating the margins of the manuscript) to tell us that she even had a name of her own, a name that wasn't just a derivative of her father's name, and that her own name was Astynome.[3]

Before the events described in the quotation, Chryseis (/Astynome) has watched one man, Agamemnon, kill her family and neighbours, burn her city down, rape, enslave, and imprison herself. Now she watches another man, Odysseus, hand her back to a third man, her own father. And through all of this she herself *never says a word*. She does indeed keep what Pat Barker, in the title of a wonderful recent novel about just these Homeric transactions, calls *The Silence Of The Girls.*

This is a world where, on the basis of the masculine/feminine gender distinction, half the human species is treated as subservient to the other half. It is a world where the reality of women as human people, and as conscious experiencers, is close to completely erased. It is a world of war and violence; a world of religiously-sanctioned pillage and rape, and the fetishisation of possession and status. It is a world (as Simone Weil so well sees in her famous essay "The *Iliad* as poem of force") that is built upon the possibilities for violence that are present in the human body. And I agree with Weil, against Nietzsche, that this vision of the world as a terrible place of violence and oppression, a place where force turns its victim into a thing, is a vision which is to be wept over not (as Nietzsche thought) celebrated.

> [U]ne telle accumulation de violences serait froide sans un accent d' inguérissable amertume qui se fait continuellement sentir, bien qu' indiqué souvent par un seul mot, souvent

[3] Latinised as Cressida, Chryseis' name was transferred to a quite different character in the Middle Ages: Shakespeare's Cressida is drawn, via Chaucer and Boccaccio, from Benoît de Sainte-Maure's twelfth-century *Roman de Troie*, and has little or nothing to do with Homer's Chryseis.

> même par une coupe de vers, par un rejet. C' est par là que l' *Iliade* est une chose unique, par cette amertume qui procède de la tendresse, et qui s' étend sur tous les humains, égale comme la clarté du soleil.

The *Iliad*'s world is the world of the patriarchy. (Or *a* world of the patriarchy, one version of that world.) There is simply no possibility, in such a world, that masculine and feminine consciousnesses, men's and women's subjective experiences of that world, could be *anything but* different.

Consciousness is gendered, and obviously gendered, because the political realities of what it is like to be masculine, and what it is like to be feminine, are distinctively different. Moreover, consciousness is sexed too, and obviously sexed, because the physical realities of what it is like to be male, and what it is like to be female, are distinctively different. And that is why the answer to our two questions is not just "Yes", but "Obviously yes".

At this point I predict that I will face two objections: one (so to speak) from the right, and the other from the left. The right-wing objection will be about what I have just said about masculine/feminine and political oppression. It will be: "But that was *Homer*'s time. You can't argue that gender is oppressive *now* by pointing out that it was oppressive *then*!" The left-wing objection, by contrast, will be about what I said earlier about male/female and physical difference, and it will be: "Wow, innate differences between males and females on the basis of their bodies? What a sexist you are".

To the objection from the right, my answer is that gender is an ideology that oppresses people in our society as surely as it did in Homer's—though, to be sure, the oppression is much less extreme now than it was then. The objection is quite right to draw our attention to the fact of historical change: a fact that is always relevant when thinking about politics, but all too apt to go missing when we are doing philosophy. People don't always manage to notice that ethics is a study that is conditioned by history and politics. Even when they do notice that, they are still (as I said before) very prone to make the mistaken assumption that, in contrast to ethics, philosophy of mind is an apolitical study. Our inquiries into a question like "Is consciousness gendered?" can easily be undermined by this mistake.

There isn't a timeless fact of the matter that answers this question: gender is ideological and political, and ideologies and politics change. So even if consciousness is in fact always gendered, there are different *ways* for it to be gendered, corresponding to those different political and ideological possibilities. And since ideology is not always equally bad or harmful—since some ideology, indeed, is not harmful at all—it becomes possible for us to ask the question what a *benign* ideology of gender might look like. Are there ways of keeping the, or a, masculine/feminine distinction in our society that are not harmful, that are perhaps even positively beneficial? Yes, I think so. To ask whether *ideology* is always bad is, in a way, to ask whether *politics* is always bad; whether it is even possible to have a more or less harmless politics. Despite some bitter experience, I am not entirely pessimistic about this possibility. But I just note it; I won't here try to explore it any further.

I turn to the objection from the left. This is the objection that it is sexist to say, as I have said, that consciousness is not only gendered but also sexed, because there are physical differences between males and females. My answer is: Not at all, *provided* we notice that the male/female distinction is not the only axis of physical difference that we might observe among human bodies. As well as distinguishing human bodies as male/female, we can also distinguish them as old/young, well/ill, fat/thin, strong/weak, able-bodied/disabled, and in many other ways as well. If my question had been "Is human consciousness modified by health/illness?", my answer to that too would have been "Yes, obviously". If it had been "Is consciousness modified by age?", the same again. Likewise for fat/thin, strong/weak, and all sorts of other bodily distinctions that we might draw as well.

In all of these respects I am simply following out the logic of my own argument. I started by saying that a crucial determinant of human consciousness or subjectivity is our experience of our own bodiliness: what it is like to be a human being is determined, in key part, by what it is like to have a human body. But there are many different *kinds* of human body. For very many of the particular kinds of human being that we distinguish by reference to their bodies, what it is like to be a human being of that kind has a distinctive nature, determined by reference to the kind of body in question. *One* of the distinctions we make about human bodies is, of course, male/female. But *only* one. What prompts the allegation of sexism here is the perception that I have said that the male/female distinction is

the single key distinction that we make among human bodies. But I haven't said that. I didn't say that at any point; and what I have just said is an explicit denial of it.

Let me say it again: there are lots of ways of distinguishing among human bodies; the male/female distinction is just one of those many distinctions; to take this to be *a* distinction is both natural and reasonable; to take it to be *the only distinction that matters* is neither inevitable nor even correct. It is, in fact, a dangerous piece of ideology, and one that has been absolutely crucial to the process whereby the physical distinction male/female has normally been deployed to rationalise the political distinction masculine/feminine. According to the ideology of gender that still dominates our world today, biology itself vindicates the idea of a world that is and must be *authoritatively and definitively binarily divided* between the masculine and the feminine. But biology itself does no such thing. Biology certainly recognises *a* distinction between the male and the female bodies; but biology also recognises distinctions between rhesus-positive and rhesus-negative bodies, left-handed and right-handed bodies, tall bodies and short bodies, and so on as above. Which of these distinctions between body-types we choose to foreground, and which to pass over as less important or not important at all, is not a *biological* decision; it is a political one.

My question has been: "Is consciousness gendered, differentiated by the masculine/feminine distinction?" My answer is "Yes; and consciousness is sexed too, differentiated by the male/female distinction". But it is also differentiated in lots of other ways by lots of other distinctions. Which of these distinctions we decide to treat as more or less important is not settled by biology. It is settled by us.

As a postscript: there is another distinction that you might expect me to make here, at least if you happen to know a bit about me personally. This is the cis/trans distinction, the distinction between those who are transgender and those who are not. We have been asking whether consciousness is gendered. What about whether it is *trans*gendered? Is there, in other words, anything that it's specifically and distinctively like to be transgender?

Speaking as a trans woman, my answer is "Yes, there most certainly is". To be transgender is to stand in a *very* distinctive relation both to the masculine/feminine divide, and to the male/female divide. As I experience

it, it is to find myself at odds with both those classifications. My own story is about finding myself classified both as masculine and as male when what feels right and natural to me, and what I want for myself, is to be classified on the other side of both distinctions—as feminine, and as female. This is certainly a story about finding, among many other things, that my consciousness has a particular and distinctive quality that clearly isn't there in other people's consciousness—except when they too are transgender.

There are other possible transgender stories. (Even for trans women; trans men and gender-non-affirming people are moving in other directions again.) For instance, someone might care only about moving from male to female, and reject the masculine/feminine distinction altogether (i.e. she might regard it as bad ideology that should just be abolished). Or she might care only about moving from masculine to feminine, and reject the male/female distinction more or less altogether (i.e. she might regard it as unimportant biology that should not be foregrounded in the way we organise society or think about ourselves). But at any rate *some* trans women, including me, think that both the male/female and the masculine/feminine distinctions are capable of being given positive and non-harmful political expressions. And we think that we ourselves would do better on the other side of both distinctions from where we started out.

Now on the whole, people (including transgender people) are demonstrably correct in their judgements about what would be better for them. And we live in a society where everyone is supposed to have a wide latitude of freedom to choose what they think is better for them even when they *aren't* correct. So it is not easy to see why anyone would struggle to allow transgender people the same simple right of self-determination that cisgender people take for granted.

However—welcome to the UK, 2023.

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ABSTRACTS (SAŽECI)

ONTOLOGICAL PLURALISM AND ONTOLOGICAL CATEGORY

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ABSTRACT

Ontological pluralism is the view that there are different ways of being. Historically, ways of being are aligned with the ontological categories. This paper is about to investigate why there is such a connection, and how it should be understood. Ontological pluralism suffers from an objection, according to which ontological pluralism collapses into ontological monism, i.e., there is only one way to be. Admitting to ontological categories can save ontological pluralism from this objection if ways of being ground ontological categories.

Keywords: ontological pluralism; ontological category; ways of being; fundamentality.

ONTOLOŠKI PLURALIZAM I ONTOLOŠKA KATEGORIJA

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SAŽETAK

Ontološki pluralizam je gledište prema kojemu postoje različiti načini postojanja. Povijesno gledano, načini postojanja usklađeni su s ontološkim kategorijama. Ovaj rad istražuje zašto postoji takva veza i kako je treba

shvatiti. Ontološki pluralizam suočava se s prigovorom prema kojem se ontološki pluralizam urušava u ontološki monizam, tj. u gledište da postoji samo jedan način postojanja. Priznavanje ontoloških kategorija može spasiti ontološki pluralizam od ovog prigovora ako načini postojanja utemeljuju ontološke kategorije.

Ključne riječi: ontološki pluralizam; ontološka kategorija; načini postojanja; fundamentalnost.

INTRODUCTION TO THE SPECIAL ISSUE "WOMEN IN PHILOSOPHY: PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE"

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ABSTRACT

This article is an introduction to the special issue on Women in Philosophy: Past, Present and Future. Over the past decade, there has been increased attention given to the underrepresentation of women in academic philosophy, as well as the lack of diversity in philosophy more broadly. While there has been some progress in the demographics of philosophy, as evidenced by recent surveys and empirical studies, women are still significantly outnumbered by men and disparities persist. This special issue aims to address the ongoing problem of inclusion in philosophy by exploring the contribution of women in the field. The contributors have been given freedom to write on topics they consider important, with the hope of stimulating further discussion and generating new ideas for addressing this issue.

Keywords: women philosophers; diversity; inclusivity; representation; philosophy.

UVOD U POSEBNO IZDANJE "WOMEN IN PHILOSOPHY: PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE"

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SAŽETAK

Ovaj članak uvod je u posebno izdanje "Women in Philosophy: Past, Present and Future". Tijekom proteklog desetljeća, sve je više pažnje posvećeno nedovoljnoj zastupljenosti žena u akademskoj filozofiji, kao i nedostatku raznolikosti u filozofiji općenito. Iako je došlo do određenog napretka u demografiji filozofije, što dokazuju nedavna istraživanja i empirijske studije, žene su i dalje značajno manje zastupljene od muškaraca, a nejednakosti i dalje postoje. Cilj ovog posebnog izdanja jest rješavanje problema uključivanja u filozofiju istraživanjem doprinosa žena u ovoj disciplini. Autori članaka bili su slobodni pisati o temama koje smatraju važnima, s nadom da će potaknuti daljnju raspravu i generirati nove ideje za rješavanje ovog problema.

Ključne riječi: žene filozofi; različitost; inkluzivnost; predstavljanje; filozofija.

VOWING MORAL INTEGRITY: ADRIAN PIPER'S PROBABLE TRUST REGISTRY

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ABSTRACT

The artist and analytic Kant scholar Adrian Piper has been aptly described as "one of the most important and influential cultural figures of our time. The award-winning work of installation and participatory performance art, Probable Trust Registry: Rules of the Game #1-3, implicitly poses philosophical questions of interest to contractarian philosophy and its critique, including whether through an art installation one can execute

a genuine, morally binding commitment to be honest, authentic, and respectful of oneself. Especially for audiences who closely identify with her experiences, Piper's artwork, like that of other important artists, has powerfully catalytic ethical potential. Motivated by admiration for the artist and a perceived conflictual relationship between women of color and conventional discourses of moral solidarity, I offer three different ways to understand Piper's Probable Trust Registry. I suggest that Piper's thought-provoking artwork, which implicitly nods at John Rawls and Charles Mills, can be interpreted as asking its audiences to agree to selections from a menu of rules that, in the alternative, embrace universal moral imperatives, predict future moral integrity, or vow moral integrity.

Keywords: art; aesthetics; Adrian Piper; Charles Mills; conceptual art; performance art; contractarianism; critical race philosophy; Black Women Philosophers.

ZAVJETOVANJE NA MORALNI INTEGRITET: *PROBABLE TRUST REGISTRY* ADRIAN PIPER

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SAŽETAK

Umjetnica i analitička stručnjakinja za Kantovu filozofiju, Adrian Piper, s pravom je opisana kao „jedna od najvažnijih i najutjecajnijih kulturnih figura našeg vremena". Nagrađivani rad instalacije i participativne izvedbene umjetnosti, *Probable Trust Registry: Rules of the Game #1-3*, implicitno postavlja filozofska pitanja zanimljiva kontraktualističkoj filozofiji i njezinoj kritici, uključujući mogućnost izvršenja istinske moralno obvezujuće posvećenosti iskrenosti, autentičnosti i poštovanja samoga sebe putem umjetničke instalacije. Posebno za publiku koja se blisko identificira s njezinim iskustvima, Piperina umjetnost, poput drugih važnih umjetničkih djela, ima snažan katalizatorski etički potencijal. Motivirana divljenjem prema umjetnici i percipiranom konfliktnom odnosu obojenih (tj. ne-bijelih) žena i konvencionalnih diskursa moralne solidarnosti, nudim tri različita načina za razumijevanje Piperinog *Probable Trust Registry*ja.

Predlažem da se Piperino misaono izazovno umjetničko djelo, koje se implicitno oslanja na Johna Rawlsa i Charlesa Millsa, može tumačiti kao poziv njenoj publici da se slože s odabirom pravila koja, između ostalog, prihvaćaju univerzalne moralne imperative, predviđaju budući moralni integritet ili se zaklinju u moralni integritet.

Ključne riječi: umjetnost; estetika, Adrian Piper; Charles Mills; konceptualna umjetnost; performans umjetnost; kontraktualizam; kritička filozofija rase; filozofkinje crnkinje.

WOMEN PHILOSOPHERS IN COMMUNIST SOCIALISM: THE CASE OF CROATIAN WOMEN PHILOSOPHERS IN YEARS 1945–1989

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ABSTRACT

The text presents an analysis of the situation with women philosophers in Croatia during the communist socialist period (1945 – 1989). The analysis is concentrated on two aspects: receiving doctorate degrees in philosophy and publications. Our analysis shows that during that period, women philosophers were proportionally approximately on the level of today's women philosophers in western countries, including present-day Republic of Croatia by both criteria, i.e. the number of doctors of philosophy and the number of publications. Communist socialism was beneficial for women philosophers in two ways. First, administratively, it removed obstacles from women's employment at universities and scientific institutes. Second, communism and socialism, being themselves philosophical and socio-philosophical doctrines, offered a set of new topics, investigations, and elaborations for further development. These factors made it possible that in Croatia, which at the time was economically and educationally much less developed than most of today's western countries, proportionally the

same number of women philosophers had an academic post as today in the western world (including today's Croatia). We also analysed seven major philosophical journals published at the time and found that between 1945 and 1989, in percentage, 15,4% of the texts were authored by women. The proportion of women authorship is 0,2. This is an impressive number if we think that at that time the proportion of women authorships was higher than in today's JSTOR, bearing in mind the differences in publication procedures then and now.

Keywords: women philosophers; communism; Croatia; Praxis.

FILOZOFKINJE U KOMUNISTIČKOM SOCIJALIZMU: SLUČAJ HRVATSKIH FILOZOFKINJA U RAZDOBLJU OD 1945. DO 1989. GODINE

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SAŽETAK

Tekst predstavlja analizu situacije filozofkinja u Hrvatskoj tijekom komunističko-socijalističkog razdoblja (1945. – 1989.). Analiza se usredotočuje na dva aspekta: stjecanje doktorata iz filozofije i publikacije. Naša analiza pokazuje da su filozofkinje tijekom tog razdoblja po oba kriterija, odnosno po broju doktora filozofije i broju publikacija, bile proporcionalno na otprilike istoj razini kao i danas u zapadnim zemljama, uključujući današnju Republiku Hrvatsku. Komunistički socijalizam bio je koristan za filozofkinje iz dva razloga. Prvo, administrativno, uklonio je prepreke pri zapošljavanju žena na sveučilištima i znanstvenim institutima. Drugo, komunizam i socijalizam, sami po sebi filozofske i sociofilozofske doktrine, nudili su niz novih tema, istraživanja i elaboracija za daljnji razvoj. Ti čimbenici omogućili su da u Hrvatskoj, koja je u to vrijeme bila ekonomski i obrazovno mnogo manje razvijena od većine današnjih zapadnih zemalja, proporcionalno isti broj filozofkinja ima akademsku

poziciju kao danas u zapadnom svijetu (uključujući današnju Hrvatsku). Također smo analizirali sedam najvažnijih filozofskih časopisa koji su izlazili u to vrijeme i utvrdili da su između 1945. i 1989. godine 15,4% tekstova napisale žene. Omjer ženskog autorstva je 0,2. To je impresivan broj ako uzmemo u obzir da je u to vrijeme omjer ženskog autorstva bio veći nego trenutno na JSTOR-u, uzimajući u obzir razlike u postupcima objavljivanja tada i sada.

Ključne riječi: filozofkinje; komunizam; Hrvatska; Praxis.

MULTIDIMENSIONALISM, RESISTANCE, AND THE DEMOGRAPHIC PROBLEM

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ABSTRACT

Linda Martín Alcoff and others have emphasised that the discipline of philosophy suffers from a 'demographic problem'. The persistence of this problem is partly the consequence of various forms of resistance to efforts to address the demographic problem. Such resistance is complex and takes many forms and could be responded to in different ways. In this paper, I argue that our attempts to explain and understand the phenomenon of resistance should use a kind of explanatory pluralism that, following Quassim Cassam, I call multidimensionalism. I describe four general kinds of resistance and consider varying explanations, focusing on those focused on vices and social structures. I argue that vice-explanations and structural-explanations are both mutually consistent and mutually entailing. If so, there is no need to choose between vice explanations and structural explanations or any other kinds of explanation. We can and should be multidimensionalists: using many together is better.

Keywords: explanation; pluralism; structures; vices; women in philosophy.

VIŠEDIMENZIONALNOST, OTPOR I DEMOGRAFSKI PROBLEM

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SAŽETAK

Linda Martín Alcoff i drugi naglasili su da filozofija kao disciplina pati od „demografskog problema“. Upornost ovog problema djelomično je posljedica različitih oblika otpora kojima se nastoji riješiti demografski problem. Takav otpor je složen i pojavljuje se u mnogim oblicima te se na njega može odgovoriti na različite načine. U ovom radu tvrdim da bi naši pokušaji objašnjenja i razumijevanja fenomena otpora trebali koristiti pluralističko objašnjenje koje, prema Quassimu Cassamu, nazivam višedimenzionalnost. Opisujem četiri opća oblika otpora i razmatram različita objašnjenja, usredotočujući se na one koji su usmjereni na mane i društvene strukture. Tvrdim da su objašnjenja utemeljena na porocima i strukturalna objašnjenja međusobno usklađena i da se međusobno impliciraju. Ako je tome tako, nema potrebe birati između objašnjenja utemeljenih na porocima i strukturalnih objašnjenja ili bilo kojih drugih vrsta objašnjenja. Možemo i trebali bismo biti višedimenzionalisti: upotreba mnogih zajedno je bolja.

Ključne riječi: objašnjenje; pluralizam; strukture; poroci; žene u filozofiji.

WHERE ARE THE WOMEN: THE ETHNIC REPRESENTATION OF WOMEN AUTHORS IN PHILOSOPHY JOURNALS BY REGIONAL AFFILIATION AND SPECIALIZATION

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ABSTRACT

Using bibliographic metadata from 177 Philosophy Journals between 1950 and 2020, this article presents new data on the under- representation of women authors in philosophy journals across decades and across four different compounding factors. First, we examine how philosophy fits in comparison to other academic disciplines. Second, we consider how the regional academic context in which Philosophy Journals operate impacts on author gender proportions. Third, we consider how the regional specialization of a journal impacts on author gender proportions. Fourth, and perhaps most interestingly, we consider the impact of author ethnicity on gender representation, and we examine the breakdown of author ethnicity across Philosophy Journals between 1950 and 2020. To our knowledge, this is the first work to offer an estimate for author ethnicity and gender in philosophy publications using a large- scale data set. We find that women authors are underrepresented in Philosophy Journals across time, across disciplines, across the globe, and regardless of ethnicity.

Keywords: under-representation; publishing; gender; ethnicity; philosophy journals.

ETNIČKA ZASTUPLJENOST AUTORICA U ČASOPISIMA ZA FILOZOFIJU PREMA REGIONALNOJ PRIPADNOSTI I SPECIJALIZACIJI

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SAŽETAK

Koristeći bibliografske metapodatke iz 177 časopisa za filozofiju između 1950. i 2020. godine, ovaj članak predstavlja nove podatke o podzastupljenosti žena kao autorica u filozofskim časopisima kroz desetljeća i četiri različita čimbenika. Prvo, istražujemo kako filozofija stoji u usporedbi s drugim akademskim disciplinama. Drugo, razmatramo kako regionalni akademski kontekst u kojem djeluju časopisi za filozofiju utječe na omjere rodova autora. Treće, razmatramo kako regionalna specijalizacija časopisa utječe na omjere rodova autora. Četvrto, i možda najzanimljivije, razmatramo utjecaj etničke pripadnosti autora na zastupljenost rodova te proučavamo raspodjelu etničke pripadnosti autora u časopisima za filozofiju između 1950. i 2020. godine. Koliko nam je poznato, ovo je prvo istraživanje koje nudi procjenu etničke pripadnosti i roda autora u filozofskim publikacijama koristeći veliki skup podataka. Podaci pokazuju da su autorice podzastupljene u časopisima za filozofiju kroz vrijeme, discipline, širom svijeta i bez obzira na etničku pripadnost.

Ključne riječi: podzastupljenost; izdavaštvo; spol; etnička pripadnost; časopisi za filozofiju.

BEING-FROM-BIRTH: PREGNANCY AND PHILOSOPHY

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ABSTRACT

Women are underrepresented in philosophy. And pregnancy is under-researched in philosophy. Can a connection be made between the two? I will argue that whilst the counterfactual of ‘had women historically been better represented in philosophy then pregnancy would have been too’ may be true, it is not necessarily the case that we can now, in the present day, expect (or desire) a correlation. In order to understand the gap between these two areas of underrepresentation, one need only adopt a non-essentialist understanding of women so as to recognise that not all women experience pregnancy or are interested in pregnancy (philosophically or

otherwise). Nevertheless, given the historical silence(ing) of women in philosophy on the topic of pregnancy, it is important now to redress that imbalance by tackling both issues of underrepresentation simultaneously. To demonstrate further I refer to the difference between representational diversity and substantive diversity (which is related to the more commonly known distinction between descriptive representation and substantive representation). This will be the topic of the first section of the paper. Then, in the second and third sections of the paper I will explore the underrepresentation and misrepresentation of women in philosophy, regarding not only the lack of women numerically speaking but also how women, as a general 'kind', are (misogynistically) described in philosophy historically. I will then apply the same treatment to pregnancy in the fourth and fifth sections of the paper, exploring both its underrepresentation as a topic of philosophical endeavour and misrepresentation within society at large. The analysis contains a review of the literature, and cites statistical quantitative data and qualitative grounded interviews, to provide evidence for my claims. I will end by hypothesising about the relationship between these under- and mis- representations, and will provide musings on the future for women and pregnancy in philosophy.

Keywords: representation; diversity; women; pregnancy; philosophy.

BITAK-OD-ROĐENJA: TRUDNOĆA I FILOZOFIJA

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SAŽETAK

Žene su nedovoljno zastupljene u filozofiji, a trudnoća je nedovoljno istražena u filozofiji. Može li se uspostaviti veza između ta dva fenomena? Tvrdit ću da, iako je kontrafaktična tvrdnja „da su žene bile povijesno bolje zastupljene u filozofiji, trudnoća bi također bila zastupljena" možda istinita, to ne znači nužno da u sadašnjosti možemo očekivati (ili poželjeti) korelaciju. Kako bismo shvatili jaz između ovih dvaju područja nedovoljne zastupljenosti, dovoljno je usvojiti ne-esencijalističko shvaćanje žena kako bismo prepoznali da neke žene ne doživljavaju trudnoću ili za nju

nisu zainteresirane (u filozofskom ili drugom smislu). Ipak, s obzirom na povijesnu šutnju o trudnoći u filozofiji koju su proživljavale žene, sada je važno ispraviti tu neravnotežu istovremeno obrađujući obje teme nedovoljne zastupljenosti. Kako bih to dalje dokazala, upućujem na razliku između reprezentativne raznolikosti i suštinske raznolikosti (što je povezano s poznatijom razlikom između deskriptivne reprezentacije i suštinske reprezentacije). To će biti tema prvog dijela rada. Zatim ću, u drugom i trećem dijelu rada, istražiti nedovoljnu zastupljenost i pogrešno predstavljanje žena u filozofiji, ne samo u smislu nedovoljnog broja žena nego i u smislu načina na koji su žene, kao opći „rod", (mizogino) opisivane u filozofiji kroz povijest. Isti postupak primijenit ću na trudnoću u četvrtom i petom dijelu rada, istražujući kako se tretira kao tema filozofskog istraživanja te kako je pogrešno predstavljena u društvu općenito. Kako bi se pružili dokazi za moje tvrdnje, analiza sadrži pregled literature i navodi statističke kvantitativne podatke i kvalitativno utemeljene intervjue. Završit ću hipotezom o odnosu između ovih nedovoljnih i pogrešnih predstavljanja te ponuditi razmišljanja o budućnosti za žene i trudnoću u filozofiji.

Ključne riječi: reprezentacija; različitost; žene; trudnoća; filozofija.

WOMEN IN PHILOSOPHY: WHAT IS TO BE DONE? INTERROGATING THE VALUES OF REPRESENTATION AND INTERSECTIONALITY

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Lisa Whiting
Independent scholar, London, UK

ABSTRACT

It is clear that philosophy has a "woman problem". Despite the recent acceptance of this fact, it is less clear what ought to be done about it. In this paper, we argue that philosophy as a discipline is uniquely well-positioned to think through the marginalization suffered by women and other minorities. We therefore interrogate two values that already undergird

conversations about inclusion—representation and intersectionality—in order to think about the path ahead. We argue that, once we have done so, it becomes clear that the slow pace of improvement over the last few decades is unacceptable and more radical steps need to be taken. First, we outline the current state of women in philosophy focusing on three areas: levels of employment, publishing, and sexual harassment. Then we turn to representation and intersectionality respectively. We conclude by arguing that many women and people of colour have been arguing for a more radically diverse philosophy for many years. What we are facing is a lack of ambition on the one hand and problem of attention on the other.

Keywords: representation; intersectionality; exclusion; employment; publishing; sexual harassment.

ŽENE U FILOZOFIJI: ŠTO UČINITI? PROPITIVANJE VRIJEDNOSTI REPREZENTACIJE I INTERSEKCIONALNOSTI

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Lisa Whiting
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SAŽETAK

Jasno je da filozofija ima "problem sa ženama". Unatoč nedavnom prihvaćanju ove činjenice, manje je jasno što bi trebalo poduzeti oko toga. U ovom radu tvrdimo da je filozofija kao disciplina u jedinstveno dobroj poziciji da promisli o marginalizaciji koju trpe žene i druge manjine. Stoga, propitujemo dvije vrijednosti koje već podupiru razgovore o uključivanju – reprezentaciju i intersekcionalnost – kako bismo razmišljali o putu koji je pred nama. Tvrdimo da, kada to učinimo, postaje jasno da je spori tempo poboljšanja u posljednjih nekoliko desetljeća neprihvatljiv i da je potrebno poduzeti radikalnije korake. Prvo, ocrtavamo trenutno stanje žena u filozofiji fokusirajući se na tri područja: razine zaposlenosti, izdavaštvo i seksualno uznemiravanje. Zatim se osvrćemo na reprezentaciju odnosno

intersekcionalnost. Zaključujemo tvrdnjom da se mnoge žene i ljudi druge boje kože godinama zalažu za radikalniju i raznolikiju filozofiju. Ono s čim se suočavamo je manjak ambicija s jedne te problem pažnje s druge strane.

Ključne riječi: reprezentacija; intersekcionalnost; isključenje; zapošljavanje; izdavaštvo; spolno uznemiravanje.

IS CONSCIOUSNESS GENDERED?

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The Open University, UK

ABSTRACT

We can ask whether there anything it is distinctively like to be female or male (a question about sex). And we can ask whether there anything it is distinctively like to be feminine or masculine (a question about gender). I think the answer to both these questions is "Obviously yes". Why yes? And why obviously? Consciousness is gendered, and obviously gendered, because the political realities of what it is like to be masculine, and what it is like to be feminine, are distinctively different. Moreover, consciousness is sexed too, and obviously sexed, because the physical realities of what it is like to be male, and what it is like to be female, are distinctively different. And that is why the answer to our two questions is not just "Yes", but "Obviously yes".

Keywords: consciousness; gender; sex; body; transgender.

JE LI SVIJEST RODNO ODREĐENA?

Sophie-Grace Chappell
The Open University, UK

SAŽETAK

Možemo se pitati postoji li nešto specifično u tome kako je biti žensko ili muško (pitanje o spolu). I možemo se pitati postoji li nešto specifično u

tome kako je to biti ženstven ili muževan (pitanje o rodu). Mislim da je odgovor na oba pitanja „očito da“. Zašto da? I zašto očito? Svijest je rodno određena i očito rodno određena jer su političke stvarnosti onoga kako je to biti muževan i kako je to biti ženstven različite. Osim toga, svijest je također spolno određena i očito spolno određena jer su fizičke stvarnosti onoga kako je to biti muško i kako je to biti žensko različite. Iz tih razloga odgovor na naša dva pitanja nije samo „da“, već „očito da“.

Ključne riječi: svijest; rod; spol; tijelo; transrodnost.

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